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ADVOCACY AND CONTEMPT-PART TWO:
CHARTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
CONTEMPT: ENSURING ADEQUATE
BREATHING ROOM FOR ADVOCACY
Louis S. Raveson*
Abstract Professor Raveson previously argued that the Constitution limits the contempt
power to the punishment of actual obstructions of the administration of justice. In this
Article, he maintains that any standard for defining contempt that is less restrictive than
actual obstruction or the imminent threat of obstruction would be unconstitutionally over-
broad. In addition, Professor Raveson discusses the inevitable imprecision that inheres
even in the actual obstruction standard for contempt. He explains that the appropriate
division between permissible advocacy and contempt must reflect a balance between the
frequently conflicting goals of a trial in order to maximize the value of these interests to
the system of justice as a whole. Finally, Professor Raveson suggests a number of vari-
ables that can assist to define and balance these competing interests, as well as provide
greater certainty to the bench and bar in determining whether particular conduct is
contemptuous.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After two days of hotly debated pretrial motions in a serious crimi-
nal trial, the public defender against whom all the motions had been
decided grimaced momentarily in frustration. The court, having
warned the defender the day before to refrain from gestures showing
disagreement with the judge's rulings, ended the trial by summarily
holding the attorney in contempt, handcuffing, frisking, and jailing
him. Although the jail sentence was reversed on appeal, the state's
highest court affirmed the contempt conviction without expressing any
doubt that the attorney's conduct was contemptuous.'
Unfortunately, this case is but an example of the courts' virtually
unrestrained power to punish attorneys for contempt, and the arbitrar-
iness with which that power is too frequently wielded. The fear,
threat, and actual use of contempt sanctions are prominent features of
many trials. Indeed, the courts' contempt power to a large extent
actually defines the boundaries of permissible advocacy. Because the
contempt power at present remains terribly broad and undefined, it is
utilized idiosyncratically by judges to enforce whatever subjective level
of order, decorum, and respect they deem appropriate, all too often at
the expense of the vigor necessary for proper advocacy. Perhaps more
importantly, the omnipresent threat of a standardless contempt power
has a powerful deterrent effect on the ardor with which attorneys rep-
resent their clients.
In a previously published companion Article, I demonstrated why
the Constitution should limit the substantive scope of the judicial con-
tempt power so that it may be employed only to punish actual obstruc-
tions of the administration of justice.2 I suggested that because the
goals of our system of justice are often at odds, the dividing line
between appropriate advocacy and obstruction of the administration
of justice can be drawn only by balancing the various aims of a trial.
The proper balance, in turn, can only be accomplished by including
within the calculus of contempt a recognition of the actual experiences
1. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990).
2. See Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Contempt
Power-Part One: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1990).
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of attorneys and other participants in the -trial process. I argued,
finally, that appropriate consideration of the value of advocacy, not
just to the interests of the litigants, but more fundamentally to the
processes of justice, requires that we permit advocacy to interfere at
times with other competing goals of a trial. Vigorous representation
would necessarily be chilled if inevitable excesses of advocacy and
lapses of decorum were treated as contemptuous. To prevent this, as
well as to realize the full value of advocacy, it is critical to construct a
buffer zone surrounding the kinds of advocacy we wish to encourage
in order to protect it adequately from punishment.
The present Article addresses the fundamental questions posed by
these concerns: First, how can the obstruction of justice standard be
implemented so that a line ensuring sufficient breathing room for
advocacy is drawn between protected advocacy and punishable mis-
conduct? Second, how can obstruction be defined to provide adequate
notice to attorneys who must conform their conduct to the standard,
and to judges who hold the power of contempt in their hands? As we
shall see, these questions cannot be answered categorically. The crea-
tion of a buffer zone around valued advocacy and the provision of
greater precision in the definition of contempt can only be achieved
through the identification and application of criteria that operate to
expose and balance the competing goals of a trial. This would maxi-
mize the combined value of these goals in a particular case and in our
entire system of justice.
II. DEFINING CONTEMPT
A. Overbreadth
The statutory standards for contempt are so broad that they are
virtually meaningless. This is especially true where the conduct in
question is either advocative or not actually disruptive. Definitions
such as obstruction,3 disorderly or insolent behavior,4 "misbehavior,"
5
and "insulting language" 6 do little to distinguish protected from pun-
ishable cohduct. Many states make no effort to define contempt by
statute; instead, they grant the power to the courts.7 Still, others actu-
3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988); WLS. STAT. ANN. § 785.01(l)(b) (West 1981).
4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 11, § 1271 (19.79);
IDAHO CODE § 7-601 (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 476.110 (Vernon 1987).
5. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1 (West 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. -§ 4131
(Purdon 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-9-102 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-1 (1987).
6. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 222(3) (West 1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-456 (1982).
7. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-3 (Smith Hurd 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 20-1201 to 2103 (1980); Lk. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.4611 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN.
745
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ally attempt to define contempt in part by prohibiting contemptuous
behavior.
8
The failure of contempt statutes to define the scope of punishable
conduct with sufficient specificity threatens the adequacy of the
breathing room provided for advocacy by imposing a potentially vague
or overbroad proscription. We need to be concerned about the
problems of overbreadth and vagueness at two different levels. First,
an overbroad or vague law may be susceptible to constitutional chal-
lenge on its face. Second, and more importantly, the potential for
vagueness and overbreadth of the definition of contempt must be con-
sidered in differentiating protected advocacy from punishable interfer-
ence with the administration of justice.
Pursuant to the overbreadth doctrine,9 courts invalidate laws that
prohibit conduct protected by the first amendment. 10 The problem
with an overbroad statute, and a prerequisite to its invalidation for
overbreadth, is that it is drawn so broadly as to make unlawful a sub-
stantial amount of constitutionally protected activity. One commen-
tator argues that existing contempt statutes should be invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.12 Indeed, contempt statutes may pro-
§ 9-1-17 (1972). Statutes may, of course, rely upon common law definitions to define the scope
of prohibited conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957). But this is of
little avail because the common law development of obstruction standards fails to articulate a
clear definition.
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1271 (1979) ("A person is guilty of criminal contempt
when he engages in . . . [d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior .... "); see also, ALA.
CODE § 12-1-8 (1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 7-6-1 (1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN §§ 588.01-.03 (West 1947 & Supp. 1987).
9. Although the overbreadth doctrine is limited to first amendment freedoms, see infra note
32 and accompanying text, the rationale for invalidating overbroad laws-that they sweep so
broadly as to proscribe and deter a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity-
should be applicable to the aspects of advocacy protected by the sixth amendment and the right
to due process. Valuable courtroom expression should be protected from an unacceptable level
of restraint and deterrence, whether the source of that protection is the first amendment or other
constitutional guarantees. Indeed, in many ways the sixth amendment and the right to due
process provide even more compelling bases for the safeguarding of zealous advocacy from
chilling by an overbroad proscription than the right to speech itself.
10. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing
struck as overbroad because it precludes peaceful picketing protected by first amendment). See
generally, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
11. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). The Supreme Court increasingly has demanded
that the amount of protected conduct affected be substantial before a law will be invalidated as
overbroad. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (law regulating conduct
rather than "pure speech" must reach substantial amount of protected behavior to be judged
unconstitutionally overbroad).
12. See Brautigam, Constitution Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J. 1512,
1527-33 (1972). Brautigam also argues that present contempt statutes are unconstitutionally
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scribe a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity or
advocacy. Appellate courts reverse many contempt convictions for
conduct trial judges believe is punishable under the applicable stat-
utes. 13 Appellate courts, however, do not find the behavior at issue
protected by the statutory definition of contempt. Nevertheless, the
appellate courts find that the behavior is protected by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, these courts conclude that the conduct in question does
not come within the statutory (or judicial) definition of contempt. 4
Thus, there is often no disparity between what the contempt statutes
define as punishable and what the appellate courts determine to be
constitutionally unprotected. But this convergence of the line drawn
by legislative enactments and judicial interpretations is no mere coinci-
dence. It necessarily arises from the fact that many statutes, or the
courts' construction of statutes, exclude constitutionally protected
conduct by limiting the definition of contempt to "obstruction" of the
administration of justice. 15  If allegedly contemptuous conduct falls
vague as well. Brautigam's overbreadth analysis, however, suffers from some confusion. He
argues that contempt statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad because:
[c]onduct which cannot meet the requirement enunciated in Bridges v. California of an
extremely high imminence of extremely serious evil falls within the prohibition of contempt
statutes. Insults, the tardiness of an attorney, and an individual's dress have all been
punished as contempt, even though it is inconceivable that such conduct could be punished
outside a courtroom, or that it could pose an appreciable threat to the administration of
justice.
Id at 1531 (citations omitted). Brautigam appears to miss the point that all of the conduct he
refers to has been found by appellate courts to be contemptuous. See eg., United States v.
Schiffier, 351 F.2d 91, 93 (6th Cir. 1965) (attorney referring to trial as "drum head court martial"
and "a star chamber proceeding" held contemptuous), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966); Cham-
pion v. State, 456 P.2d 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (attorney held in contempt for appearing in
court without proper attire); Esper, Tardiness of Attorneys as Contempt of Court, 19 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 541, 548 (1970) ('T]here is no disagreement that tardiness of an attorney is contempt
.... "). Thus, there is no disparity between what is punishable under the contempt statutes and
what the respective appellate courts conclude is unprotected by the Constitution. Brautigam's
complaint about the criminalization of these categories of conduct under contempt statutes is not
really overbreadth. Rather, it is that the appellate courts are drawing the line separating pro-
tected from punishable conduct in the wrong place. In other words, Brautigam would appear to
view insults, tardiness, and inappropriate dress as constitutionally immune from punishment,
and the decisions holding to the contrary as constitutional error. If an appropriate appellate
court were in fact to conclude that such expression is shielded by the Constitution, contempt
statutes which authorized prosecution for these types of behavior would be overbroad.
13. See, eg., Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978).
14. See eg., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); In re
Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 813 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 370 (7th Cir. 1972).
15. With respect to statutes employing the obstruction standard, see laws cited supra note 3.
For cases construing broader statutory definitions of contempt to mean actual obstruction, see
infra note 20.
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within the statutory definition and is found to be obstructive, it is not
protected by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, a significant number of state contempt statutes
authorize punishment for conduct that does not rise to the level of
actual obstruction or even imminent threat of obstruction.1 6  For
example, statutes in Indiana, California, and New Jersey define
contempt respectively as the "creat[ion of] any noise or confu-
sion" in the courtroom, 7  "conduct tending to interrupt," 18 and
"misbehavior." 19 Although some courts limit their state's statu-
tory contempt power to actual or imminent threats of obstruc-
tion,2° others fail to restrict the contempt power to either of these
standards.2' Absent an authoritative judicial construction
excising a precise category of constitutionally protected conduct
from the laws' reach, such statutes appear overbroad22  on
16. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 525-29 (concluding that the constitutional standard for
contempt is satisfied by the actual obstruction standard). The text treats that standard and the
"imminent threat of obstruction" standard as coextensive for purposes of its overbreadth
analysis. However, courts might conclude that the "imminent threat of obstruction" standard
sets a constitutional limit on the substantive definition of contempt less strict than the actual
obstruction limitation. Id. at 528.
17. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-7-1 (Burns 1986).
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209(a)(1) (West 1990).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1(a) (West 1987).
20. See, e.g., Exparte Stephenson, 89 Okla. Crim. 427, 209 P.2d 515, 520 (1949) (construing
contempt statute prohibiting "disorderly or insolent behavior" to apply only to "conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judiciously, obstructive of
the administration of justice"); State v. Harper, 376 S.E.2d 272, 274 (S.C. 1989) (statute defining
contempt as "undue disturbance of [judicial] proceedings" narrowed to actual obstruction
standard).
21. See, e.g., Ex parte Krupps, 712 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1102(1987). In Krupps a plurality of the court held that the refusal of a prose defendant and six
spectators to rise when the trial judge entered the courtroom, after they had been warned of the
consequences of failing to do so, was a proper ground for criminal contempt. The plurality
explicitly stated that "criminal contempt is not restricted only to conduct that obstructs or tends
to obstruct, the proper administration ofjustice," but includes the broader notion of disrespect as
well. Id. at 149-50. However, the argument that the obstruction standard is constitutionally
required was never discussed in the plurality opinion and does not seem to have been presented
to the court. See also, Tarrant v. State, 537 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (contempt is
"any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct courts... or which is calculated to
lessen its authority or dignity"), cert. denied, 544 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1989); In re Daniels, 118 N.J.
51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990) (tendency to obstruct sufficient to comply with constitutional
restrictions on contempt power); Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 366, 111 S.E. 621, 622 (1922)
(contempt defined in accordance with statute as conduct that tends to bring authority of court
into disrespect).
22. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing contempt conviction for
publication of newspaper editorial). In Bridges, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court's
basis for punishing the publication in question was that it had an "inherent tendency" to interfere
with the orderly administration of justice in a pending action, and that in upholding the
contempt, the California Supreme Court found a "reasonable tendency" to cause such
748
Advocacy and Contempt
interference. Id. at 272-73. However, the Supreme Court concluded that, "[i]n accordance with
what we have said on the 'clear and present danger cases, neither 'inherent tendency' nor
'reasonable tendency' is enough to justify a restriction of free expression." Id. at 273. Similarly,
in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court was faced with vagueness and
overbreadth challenges to the validity of an anti-noise ordinance prohibiting persons near a
school from making a noise that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace of the school session.
Although the Court sustained the validity of the Illinois law, it did so expressly because it found
that the courts of Illinois had previously limited the phrase "tending to disturb" in a breach of
the peace ordinance to apply only where there was at least an "imminent threat of violence." Id.
at I11. Thus, the Supreme Court treated the "tending to disturb" standard in the anti-noise
ordinance as corrected by authoritative judicial construction of the state's highest court. Id. (as
to vagueness); id. at 119 (with respect to overbreadth). See also, Baltimore Radio Show v. State,
67 A.2d 497, 505-06 (Md. 1949) (court rule making publication of any matter which may tend in
any manner to interfere with administration ofjustice punishable by contempt, invalid as broader
than clear and present danger standard), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
More recently, in Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), a Houston ordinance that prohibited
"willfully or intentionally interrupt[ing] a city policeman . . . by verbal challenge during an
investigation," id at 454, was held to be facially invalid for overbreadth because it was not
constitutionally acceptable to leave to the police "unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for
words or conduct that annoy or offend them." Id at 465. Contempt statutes authorizing
punishment for "misbehavior" or "conduct tending to disrupt" seem to grant trial judges that
same kind of unfettered discretion that Hill held to be offensive to the Constitution. Indeed,
some courts and commentators have suggested that the determination of what conduct is
contemptuous can only be made by relying on the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g.,
Brautigam, supra note 12, at 1524; Note, 4 Pragmatic Look at Criminal Contempt and the Trial
Attorney, 12 U. BALT. L. Rav. 100, 101 (1982).
See also, Hirschkop v. Snead, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd in part, 594 F.2d 356
(4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d
242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir.
1970) (reversing trial court's order prohibiting defendants and their attorneys from making any
public comments on pending criminal case as constitutionally impermissible). In Bauer, the
Seventh Circuit considered a challenge on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness to-local
rules of a federal district court in Illinois that restricted lawyers' rights to comment publicly on
pending litigation. The Seventh Circuit invalidated as overbroad several of the rules that
prohibited public comment during the period between completion of trial and sentencing in
criminal cases and in all civil matters, and limited a rule proscribing attorneys' statements during
the investigative stages of a criminal trial to prosecuting attorneys. 'More importantly, the court
found that the standard used in the rules, that lawyers' comments about litigation must be
prohibited "if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair
trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice," was overbroad. The court limited
the remaining rules to only those comments that pose a "serious and imminent threat" of
interference with the fair administration of justice; only these can be constitutionally proscribed.
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249.
Similarly, in Hirschkop, the Fourth Circuit invalidated several sections of an almost identical
disciplinary rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. There too the court imposed a
narrowing construction, subjecting each of the expressed prohibitions to a standard of reasonable
likelihood of interference with a fair trial. 594 F.2d at 368-69. Both Hirschkop and Bauer also
invalidated several of the rules on the ground of vagueness. See infra note 40 and accompanying
text. Although Hirschkop undoubtedly was correct in limiting the standardless disciplinary rules
of Virginia, its choice of the "reasonable likelihood" test, rather than the "serious and imminent
Washington Law Review Vol. 65:743, 1990
their face.
2 3
threat" standard imposed in Bauer, was probably erroneous. See the discussion of Bridges v.
California supra.
Different standards of constitutional tolerance between disciplinary rules and contempt
statutes may well be justified. Indeed, Hirschkop explicitly distinguished the rule at issue there
from the court's contempt power, where the court of appeals recognized the appropriateness of
the clear and present danger test. 594 F.2d at 369. However, a violation of the court rule
challenged in Hirschkop presumably could be punished by the contempt power. See Bauer, 522
F.2d at 248. The constitutional standard applicable to court rules can be less demanding because
the validity of court rules can be challenged by one prosecuted for violating them. See In re
Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). The validity of a court order, on the other hand, generally
cannot be questioned in a contempt proceeding for violating the order. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text. But not all contempt citations result from the violation of court orders.
Additionally, whether the conduct alleged to constitute contempt is constitutionally immune
from punishment or non-obstructive is always debatable in a contempt proceeding. Even if the
availability of appellate review of the constitutionality of a disciplinary rule may reduce the
chilling effect of a broad proscription on lawyers' extrajudicial speech, it does not provide
sufficient justification for extending lesser protection to expression than that ordinarily applicable
to speech-a clear and present danger or imminent threat of harm.
23. Unfortunately, such laws are not uncommon. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570
A.2d 416 (1990) (affirming that state contempt statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1(a) (West
1987), permits punishment for any conduct having a tendency to obstruct justice); Snow v.
Hawkes, 183 N.C. 363, 111 S.E. 621, 622 (1922). One argument that might be made against
facial invalidation is that unlike other laws, which entrust enforcement to the police, a judge
makes the initial determination of whether to charge someone with contempt. Presumably, this
judge will not prosecute for constitutionally protected conduct. Unlike police officers, trial
judges can be expected to draw the line between punishable and constitutionally immune
behavior correctly. Therefore, vigorous advocacy should not be chilled, the argument runs,
because attorneys can rely upon judges to charge them with contempt only when their conduct is
not protected by the Constitution.
The trial court either will draw the line correctly and not levy contempt charges for
constitutionally protected conduct, in which case we need not be concerned with overbreadth, or
it will cite conduct as contemptuous that is in fact constitutionally protected. In the latter case,
however, the trial court is not just deciding that the behavior in question comes within the
applicable definition of contempt. It is also determining that the behavior is unprotected by the
Constitution. Thus, at the trial level, a contempt statute cannot be overbroad because the line
demarcating conduct unprotected by the Constitution will always be the same as the line drawn
by the statute to define contemptuous behavior. However, the statute is overbroad if the appeals
court affirms the trial court's determination that the conduct at issue is punishable under the
statute, but concludes that the lower court utilized a constitutionally deficient standard or the
conduct is nevertheless protected by the Constitution.
Even if trial judges were always correct when they imposed sanctions for contempt, attorneys
still would not know before the citation that their conduct was properly punishable: that
determination would continue to be made only in hindsight. Because neither the judges nor the
attorneys have a very good idea of where the line is that divides obstructive conduct from
constitutionally protected advocacy, judges frequently punish behavior that is subsequently
found to be constitutionally immune. See, e.g., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (reversing
contempt citation of pro se litigant for accusing court of prejudice in his closing argument to
jury); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1964) (reversing contempt conviction of witness for
using the term "chicken shit" to describe assailant); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 980 & n.7 (9th
Cir. 1973) (reversing contempt conviction of prosecutor for engaging in constitutionally
protected advocacy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974). Moreover, the high reversal rate of




As to statutes that are on their face limited to obstruction, or so
limited by judicial construction, overbreadth would not pose any
problems if the courts could define with specificity the category of
behavior constituting an obstruction, or conversely, the category of
protected conduct which does not.24 However, if determining whether
certain conduct is obstructive can only be decided after the fact, on a
case-by-case basis, because application of the standard is too fact-spe-
cific to permit precise categorical articulation,25 the specificity seem-
ingly gained by reducing the statutes' overbreadth is lost to the
vagueness" of the standard.27 If the Constitution does not provide a
in part because the trial judge often feels himself to be the victim of the allegedly offensive
behavior. That is why reliance on the trial court's discretion in exercising the contempt power
cannot be an effective remedy to the self-censorship of attorneys caused by a vague or expansive
definition of prohibited conduct.
It should be clear, then, that courtroom conduct is no less likely to be deterred than other
expressive activity merely because a judge is responsible for enforcing the contempt power.
Therefore, a statute, such as that at issue in Exparte Krupps, 712 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987), which only authorized the courts to punish for
contempt but did not define the offense (TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 1911a, § l(a) (Vernon
1964)), and which was construed by the appellate courts of Texas as permitting punishment for
behavior that did not rise to the level of an actual or imminently threatened obstruction, see
supra note 21, should clearly be invalidated as overbroad.
24. Where a law suffers from casting too wide a net, courts can nevertheless save it with a
limiting construction that clearly cuts its unconstitutional applications. See, eg., Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967).
25. It is often the case in first amendment jurisprudence that a court cannot define in advance
the category of conduct protected by the Constitution, because the determination simply is too
fact specific. See, eg., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
26. See, eg., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964) (limiting an
overbroad enactment by judicial construction to exclude constitutionally protected activity
would make its application vague: "the plain words would thus become uncertain in meaning...
if courts proceeded on a case-by-case basis to separate out constitutional from unconstitutional
areas of coverage").
27. In these circumstances the lack of specificity in the system as a whole seems to remain
constant, with the same deterrent effect on constitutionally protected conduct. Because of this,
the Supreme Court has in the past been unwilling to attempt to save an overbroad law by limiting
it to a core of constitutionally unprotected expression. See, eg., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972) (invalidating for overbreadth state law sanctioning "opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace"). In that case and others, the Court has refused
to construe statutes that impose penalties for "offensive" or "opprobrious" language as limited to
fighting words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (referring to the standard
articulated in Chapliasky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has indicated that if the statutes themselves were limited in scope to fighting
words, they might well have been constitutional. See, e-g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1987). The difference in treatment probably is substantially due to federalism and separation-of-
powers concerns. When a federal court is asked to invalidate a state statute, it cannot construe
the law in a manner that is clearly inconsistent with the state's own authoritative interpretation
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sufficiently clear line informing attorneys whether their conduct is pro-
tected, and if attorneys' only guarantee of not being sanctioned for
what they believe is protected courtroom conduct is the faith that the
courts will subsequently sort out the punishable obstructions from the
permissible conduct, advocacy that courts actually would protect is
deterred.28 Because courts have been unable to describe any bright
line appropriately delineating the division between protected conduct
and obstruction,29 the contempt standard's vagueness is a critical
issue.3 °
of the statute. Compare Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding unconstitutional
state legislation providing for censorship of obscene films because of absence of sufficient
procedural protections) with United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)
(reinterpreting federal law proscribing importation of obscene photographs and authorizing
seizure by federal officials to read in previously absent procedural safeguards).
When faced with a challenge to federal laws, the Supreme Court has expressed concern for the
distinction between cosmetic surgery to save a statute, which it is willing to perform, and
wholesale revision, which it is not. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)
("Although [the] Supreme Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against
constitutional attack, it must not . . . carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a
statute."). Moreover, at least one member of the Court and two former Justices saw no problem
even in upholding an overbroad law simply by construing it not to apply to constitutionally
protected conduct. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-63 (1974) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.). In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,
110-11 (1971), the Court sustained against vagueness and overbreadth challenges the validity of
a statute making it an offense for a person with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance,
or alarm, to congregate with others in a public place and refuse to comply with a lawful police
order to disperse. There, the Court found that the law was not unconstitutionally broad largely
because the Kentucky statute had been construed by the state courts to apply only where there
was no bona fide intention to exercise a constitutional right, "in which event, by definition, the
statute infringes no protected speech or conduct." Id. at 111.
In light of these cases, and the difficulty that one would expect to encounter in asking the
judiciary to curtail their own prerogatives by striking a contempt statute limited to obstruction as
facially overbroad, there is probably little chance of winning an overbreadth or vagueness
challenge. Furthermore, as the remainder of this Article suggests, there are means available by
which the courts can effectively address the difficulties resulting from the lack of specificity that
inheres in the obstruction standard.
28. See, e.g., Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 (noting that the chilling effect of an overly broad
enactment on constitutionally protected conduct is not effectively remedied if "the contours of
regulation would have to be hammered out case-by-case and tested only by those hardy enough
to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation").
29. There is nearly universal agreement that the courts have failed to define with any
specificity the line that separates protected courtroom conduct from contemptuous misbehavior.
See, e.g., Brautigam, supra note 12, at 1526, 1529; Note, Criminal Law-Contempt-Conduct of
Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wisc. L. REV. 329, 343.
30. Remember that judicial authority to punish for contempt derives not only from statutory
grant but from the inherent power of the judiciary as well. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 485-86.
Query whether the standards governing contempt articulated pursuant to the courts' common
law power are also subject to vagueness and overbreadth challenge. Certainly, all the vices of a
vague law can exist with respect to a judicially created proscription. One commentator has
suggested that "the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a principle regulating the
permissible relationship between written law and the potential offender, than as a practical
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The constitutional infirmities of vagueness and ov'erbreadth reflect
concern with a regulation's failure to adequately distinguish punish-
instrument mediating between.. all the organs of public coercion of a state abd... the
institution of federal protection of the individual's private interests." Note, The Void-For-
Vagueness Doctrine in the United States Supreme Court 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 81 (1960)
(emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized in an analogous context that a court's failure
to clarify the circumstances under which an individual might be held in criminal contempt
required reversal of his conviction. In Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959),
the Supreme Court reversed a contempt citation against Scull for failure to comply with a court
order to answer questions put to him by a state legislative committee. The Court concluded that
the purposes of the committee's inquiry, as announced by its chairman, were so unclear as to
prevent any opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or any justifications on the
part of the committee for seeking the information Scull refused to give. Because the trial court
also failed to clarify these matters when it ordered Scull to answer the questions, the Supreme
Court held that he could not know with reasonable certainty he was committing a crime. Id at
352-53; see also, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (failure of Un-American
Activities Committee to provide sufficient basis for determining pertinency of questi6ns required
reversal of conviction for contempt of Congress resulting from defendant's refusal to answer, on
grounds of vagueness).
Moreover, numerous cases have reversed contempt convictions where the court failed to
provide adequate notice or warning to the contemnor that her conduct was deemed violative of
the court's order or contemptuous. See, eg., Local 191, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (party may not be held in contempt for
violation of vague order). If a court announces a definition of contempt, pursuant to its inherent
authority, that gives insufficient notice to participants in the trial process as to what conduct is
protected versus that which is punishable, or grants too much discretion to the courts to
determine what constitutes contempt on an ad hoc basis, the void-for-vagueness doctrine would
appear to require facial invalidation of the proscription. Courts have had little difficulty, in
invalidating court rules imposing disciplinary sanctions where the proscriptions contained
therein were not clear enough to provide sufficient notice. See, ag., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). For a discussion of the aspects of these cases related to
vagueness, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
To be sure, there is a real difference in the review of actions taken by a court in its legislative
role as opposed to those taken in its adjudicative role. See In re Oliveri'452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir.
1971). But, where courts essentially can legislate in the criminal arena through the process of
common law contempt adjudication, it is not out of the question to suggest that a court could
facially invalidate another court's pronouncement under the contempt power. See, eg., In re
Callan, 126 N.J. Super. 103 (rejecting attorneys' challenge that "the substantive common law
standard for the ofiense of contempt is vague and indefinite"), rev'd on other grounds, 66 N.J.
401, 331 A.2d 612 (1975). The modern doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth have had little
chance to interact with the judiciary's creation of common law crimes, of which contempt is the
last existing example in our law, since the prohibition of common law crimes by the Supreme
Court. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 245 (1943); United States v.- Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 216 (1875); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (abolishing
common-law crimes in federal system). In any event, the vagueness of any judicial definition of
contempt, as applied, surely presents a cognizable claim, and one to which courts are more likely
to respond.
Application of overbreadth doctrine to the courts' inherent power to punish for contempt is
similarly uncertain. Ordinarily, overbreadth measures the overlap between what a legislative
proscription punishes and what the courts determine is protected conduct under the
Constitution. Here, there is no legislative proscription: the court defines both what is punishable
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able and protected conduct.31 However, vagueness and overbreadth
are not conceptually equivalent doctrines. A law that is perfectly clear
and precise may nevertheless be overbroad if its proscription reaches a
substantial amount of conduct protected by the first amendment.32
The vagueness doctrine on the other hand, responds only to a lack of
clarity or precision,33 and is not limited to first amendment freedoms.
Laws that are so vague or indefinite that they do not give fair warn-
ing of what conduct is proscribed implicate three constitutional con-
siderations, all applicable to contempt. First, a law which is so
indefinite as to require people "of common intelligence [to] necessarily
under its inherent power and what is protected by the Constitution. See supra note 23. As with
vagueness, where a court is acting legislatively, through the promulgation of rules, its
proscriptions can be facially invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. See, e.g., Hirschkop,
594 F.2d 356; Bauer, 522 F.2d 242. With respect to case-by-case adjudication, however, the
reviewing court is likely to focus on the constitutional standard employed in the particular case
under review, whether the conduct at issue therein comes within the court's prohibition, and
whether the conduct is constitutionally protected. Where the reviewing court finds the conduct
in question to be proscribed by the lower court's standards for contempt, but nevertheless
protected by the Constitution (or a state's own constitution), the reviewing court will find the
lower court's standards to be overbroad, and reverse the conviction. Where the conviction is
based on an overbroad contempt statute, and a lower court's limitations fall to exclude
unconstitutional applications of the statute, or do so by rendering the statute too vague, see supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text, the appellate court's imposition of a new standard relates
back to the statute. The statute incorporating this new standard can still be facially invalidated.
In a prosecution pursuant to the court's inherent contempt power, an appellate court would
generally be faced with both an individual conviction for specific conduct and some kind of
statute-like pronouncement of the jurisdiction's definition of contempt. The appellate court
obviously could reverse the conviction without addressing the broader contempt standard. To
the extent the decision clearly applies to similar cases, the court could limit the reach of its
inherent power. Finally, if able, the court could and probably would choose to carve out a
precise category of protected conduct from the judicial proscription of contempt.
But where an appellate court is unable to precisely define a category of constitutionally
immune expression, and any effort to limit the statute would only replace overbreadth with
vagueness, facial invalidation of the standard would have little meaning. Presented with this
problem, the courts would continue to possess the inherent power to punish for contempt, but
could apply it in the absence of any specific standard. This practice would cause the same or
worse problem with respect to a lack of notice. Given the dearth of enviable options, courts
inclined to address the issue at all are likely to limit the construction of any judicial standard to
some variant of the "obstruction" or "imminent threat of obstruction" standard and sustain the
validity of that rule. In this case, the vagueness problems of those standards could be alleviated
by the recommendations suggested in the remainder of this Article.
31. See, e.g., Note, supra note 30 (characterizing the two doctrines as an "infinitely parallel
contrariety"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (invalidating law prohibiting
demonstrations as "unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope").
32. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 249-50 (1967); Cox, 379 U.S. at 551-52.
33. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 32. As with overbreadth, a law is not unconstitutionally
vague unless it may reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g.,
City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 458.
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guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,"34 violates due
process because it does not sufficiently notify individuals whether their
conduct is punishable.35 Second, the lack of specificity in a vague pro-
scription call deter protected activity because if an individual cannot
discern between immune and punishable conduct, the only safe course
is to avoid any behavior that the law could conceivably reach.36 The
risk of deterring protected conduct has moved the Supreme Court to
demand a greater precision and clarity of laws potentially chilling
speech than of laws in other areas.37 Third, vague standards delegate
an unacceptable level of discretion to those responsible for enforcing
the law, often resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory application.
This also constitutes a denial of due process, and can deter protected
expression.38
Even if a finding of obstruction required some showing of disruption
or demonstrable harm, the line separating protected from punishable
conduct would not be particularly bright. Questions would still
remain. For example, at what point might the delay caused by repeti-
tive arguing fairly be considered disruptive, or what level of interfer-
ence with the authority of the court is demonstrably damaging to the
administration of justice? But exercise of the contempt power does
not require such a showing because obstruction encompasses less tan-
gible harms than disruption or demonstrable harm.39 And where con-
34. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
35. See, eg., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971).
36. See eg., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) ("Those
•.. sensitive to the perils posed by... indefinite language, avoid the risk... only by restricting
their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited.").
37. See, eg., Smith, 415 U.S. at 573-74.
38. Cf. id. at 575 ("Statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections... [thereby] entrusting lawmaking
'to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.' " (quoting Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance "furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to
merit their displeasure' " (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98)); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971) (statute prohibiting "annoying" conduct contains an
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement).
39. Although "actual obstruction of justice" is an imprecise standard, the vagueness would be
magnified if the standard were expanded to include less injurious conduct under the imminent
threat of obstruction test. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 523-24 nn.177-79. Because
"obstruction" includes within its reach non-demonstrable harm, extending the scope of
prohibition to the imminence of such harm magnifies the vagueness of the category. Those
standards grounded on even less of a showing, such as a tendency to interfere with justice, are
more imprecise still. Moreover, to the extent these less restrictive standards are precise enough
to give fair notice of what conduct is proscribed, they would most likely be unconstitutionally
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duct is measured against a standard that need not be triggered by
demonstrable damage, the imprecision of the line is even greater.
Indeed, some courts have themselves explicitly recognized the inher-
ent vagueness of the "clear and present danger of obstruction" stan-
dard as utilized in the law of contempt.' As the Supreme Court of
overbroad. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (ordinance prohibiting speech
that "in any manner... interrupt[s]" a police officer held not vague but struck as overbroad).
40. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Both Hirschkop and
Bauer invalidated as unconstitutionally vague a number of disciplinary rules adopted by state
and federal courts that, as part of a larger scheme of prohibiting attorneys' extrajudicial
comments at various stages of a trial, might interfere with the administration of justice, and
proscribed public comment on any "other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of
the action." Bauer, which subjected the provision to the more demanding standard of a "serious
and imminent threat" of interference, held that it was still too uncertain to stand, concluding
that "[ifts chilling effect is obvious." 522 F.2d at 259. Hirschkop also determined that the rule
did not provide adequate notice and suggested that it delegated an unacceptable level of
discretion to those responsible for enforcing the law. 594 F.2d at 371.
Moreover, both courts questioned the sufficiency of the notice provided by the clear and
present danger of obstruction test in contempt cases. In Hirschkop, the court stated that in
several of the Supreme Court's contempt rulings, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), "the
contempt power of the court had been invoked and punishment imposed on the basis of vague
and general standards." 594 F.2d at 369. Furthermore, Hirschkop declined to construe the
disciplinary rules at issue as limited to a clear and present danger or serious and immediate harm
test because to do so would inject too much uncertainty into the rules as to whether particular
conduct is punishable. Id. at 368. Unfortunately, the court failed to realize that the reasonable
likelihood standard poses the same problems with respect to vagueness as the more stringent tests
it rejected. This failure derives largely from Hirschkop's focus upon the degree of likelihood of
interference with the administration of justice rather than the meaning of interference itself. To
the extent that the reasonable likelihood test reduces the uncertainty of the standard, it does so
only at the expense of increasing the scope of the proscription to the point of overbreadth.
The court in Bauer also understands the inherent vagueness of the imminent threat of
interference test, concluding that standard is not constitutionally sufficient by itself:
While the application of the [imminent threat of interference] standard to these rules can
eliminate overbreadth, the specific rules are also necessary in order to avoid vagueness. The
rules furnish the context necessary to determine what may constitute a "serious and
imminent threat" of interference with the fair administration of justice.
522 F.2d at 249-50. Hirschkop too relies on the "rules which are quite explicit in informing
[lawyers] what they may and may not say for publication," to provide the clarity necessary to
withstand constitutional attack. 594 F.2d at 369.
These cases echo the Supreme Court's own earlier intimations that the clear and present dan-
ger of obstruction standard in contempt cases is itself unavoidably uncertain. For example, in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1941), the Court noted that although the clear and
present danger formula provides a "working principle," it "does not comprehend the whole
problem." Questions still remain, the Court continued, with respect to determining when a dan-
ger shall be deemed clear and how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present. Id. at
261. These concerns are particularly poignant where the danger-obstruction of the administra-
tion of justice-is identifiable only after the rigorous balancing of competing interests. As the
Court acknowledged in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), in response to the question:
"What is meant by clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice? No definition
could give an answer." Id. at 348. Rather, the standard is given meaning by weighing "the right
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the United States conceded in Bridges v. California,4 1 the contempt
power is "based on a common law concept of the most general and
undefined nature." Even the standard of actual obstruction has been
acknowledged by some courts to be unclear.42 Less stringent stan-
dards employed in many contempt statutes, such as "misbehavior"
and "conduct tending to disrupt," only exacerbate all three infirmities
of a vague proscription.43 Absent an authoritative judicial construc-
tion limiting such prohibitions at least to the "imminent threat of
obstruction" test, these less stringent standards are probably unconsti-
tutionally vague.'
of free speech... against the danger [to the] courts" from the particular conduct in question. _Id
at 346.
These cases all strongly support the point that under the actual obstruction standard or the
clear and present danger formulation, whether specific conduct interferes enough with the
administration of justice to justify contempt sanctions can only be properly determined through
the application of appropriate variables.
41. 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
42. See, eg., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972) (obstruction of the
judicial process is "an elusive concept which does not lend itself to general statements").
43. As the scope of a criminal statute broadens, the vagueness of the proscription is often
reduced. To the extent the language of an expansive prohibition is plain and unambiguous, it
may provide adequate notice of what conduct is punishable. Of course, the problem with
expanding the range of prohibited behavior is that the conduct clearly proscribed under the
statute is more likely to be protected by the Constitution; therefore, vagueness concerns are
replaced with the threat of overbreadth. See, eg., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)
(city ordinance making it illegal to, in any manner, oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt a police
officer unconstitutionally overbroad but not vague). This is the converse of the relationship
between overbreadth and vagueness previously discussed. See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the evils of overbreadth and vagueness sometimes share one common element
that, contrary to the problem above, tends to synchronize increases in the breadth of a law with a
higher degree of vagueness. The Supreme Court has invalidated laws that grant officials
unfettered discretion to arrest or charge individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend
them on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds. See, eg., Hill, 482 U.S. at 451 (overbreadth);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (striking for vagueness a state law making it criminal
to publicly treat the United States flag contemptuously; such state law is "of such a standardless
sweep [that it] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections
... [thereby] entrusting law making 'to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on
his beat'"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1971) (statute prohibiting
"annoying" conduct contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement, and is both
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad). Additionally, the constitutional vices flowing from the
virtually unfettered discretion accorded trial judges to levy contempt charges based on subjective
standards and personal sensibilities is compounded greatly by the abbreviated procedural
protection used in summary contempt proceedings. In such proceedings, the judge is at once the
enforcement official, the prosecutor, and the court, and often the victim of perceived misconduct
as well. Cf United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) (authorizing use of summary
proceedings in criminal contempt case).
44. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1971) (upholding ordinance
proscribing noise tending to disturb peace of school session against vagueness challenge because
imprecision of language corrected by state judicial limitation of standard to imminent
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This is not to say that the obstruction standard does not apply
clearly to a core of unprotected conduct. When individuals attempt to
subvert judicial processes by illegal acts or acts wholly outside the
established rules of procedure, the line demarcating obstruction is
quite bright.45 For example, where an individual tampers with a
jury,' bribes a witness,47 or insults a judge,48 there is little question
that the administration of justice has been obstructed. Similarly,
where a defendant hurls an object at the prosecutor,49 or a number of
attorneys in a multi-defendant case exit the courtroom en masse delay-
ing the trial for several hours,5° it can hardly be argued that they did
not have fair notice that their conduct was punishable.51 Judicial con-
structions of the obstruction standard unanimously proscribe such
behavior.
At the risk of asking an overly simple question, why is it that we do
not have much difficulty in identifying these actions as obstructive? Is
obstruction of the administration of justice like Justice Stewart's view
of obscenity-we know it when we see it;52 or are there identifiable
characteristics that inform us such conduct is clearly obstructive? A
number of factors probably operate on an almost unconscious level to
evoke a consensus that these kinds of behavior are properly punishable
interference); see also Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)
("[Common law breach of peace is at its best a confusing offense that may imperil First
Amendment rights. But how infinitely more doubtful and uncertain are the boundaries of an
offense including any 'diversion tending to a breach of the peace... !'); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 372 (1947) (first amendment forbids punishment by contempt for comment on pending
cases in absence of a showing that the utterances created a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice).
45. Actual obstruction, like imminent threat of obstruction, may also include attempts to
block the judicial process or to prejudice the fairness of a proceeding. Such conduct need not
have an actual effect on the outcome of a trial in order to be actually obstructive. Thus, for
example, the attempt to bribe a juror has properly been found to constitute an actual obstruction
of justice. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 46.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1984); State v. Weinberg, 229
S.C. 286, 92 S.E.2d 842 (1956).
47. See, e.g., Exparte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
48. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
50. See United States v. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Case No. 10, 15 Trials of War
Criminals Before The Nueruberg Military Tribunals 996, 996-1013 (1949).
51. As to these individuals whose conduct falls squarely within the meaning of the statute,
standing would not exist to challenge the constitutionality of the contempt statute as vague on its
face or as it is applied to others. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753-58 (1974). However, as
to those individuals for whom fair notice is in fact lacking-the ensnared innocent-the
prohibition can be challenged as applied to them.
52. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define [hard-core pornography] .... But I know it when I see it ... ").
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as contempt.53 First, whatever one's view of the trial process, every-
one would most likely agree that it is difficult for the other participants
in the proceeding to do their jobs while dodging flying objects. More-
over, where conduct actually halts the trial for a substantial period,
justice is literally disrupted. Second, these kinds of misbehavior can in
no way be interpreted as the inevitable lapses of vigorous advocacy.
Rather, they represent gross departures from the ordinary range of
courtroom conduct, far beyond the bounds of what any judge would
find acceptable. Indeed, where the conduct is independently punish-
able as a crime, the actor is obviously on specific notice that his behav-
ior is obstructive. Third, determining the harm caused by the
misbehavior is not complicated by having to balance some counter-
vailing value of the conduct to the administration of justice. Such
behavior is so far beyond any permissible process of presenting one's
case as to fail to be even arguably advocative. Finally, however we
choose to define the requisite intent necessary to make an obstruction
punishable as contempt,54 it seems appropriate to infer it from these
actions.
Obstruction of the administration of justice, however, can be such
an amorphous harm that there is a broad area, short of the kinds of
conduct just noted, where any positioning of a line demarcating the
innermost reach of the contempt power would be arbitrary. Our sys-
tem requires attorneys to practice at the boundary of permissible advo-
cacy and to struggle with the trial court over the location of that
boundary. When courts find it necessary to punish excessive or repeti-
tive argumentation, disrespect, or improper argument or questioning
of a witness, it becomes easy to lose one's way with respect to what
conduct is punishable.55 The only bright line that can be drawn where
the value of the conduct at issue to the administration of justice con-
fficts with the competing needs of order and respect for the court is to
require immediate obedience to every ruling and order of the court.
Even that line, however, would not account for all circumstances in
which the contempt power might apply. For example, making an
53. Although we are speaking here about notice, these are also some of the factors that should
be considered in determining whether an attorney's conduct should be punishable as contempt.
Naturally, there is an inexorable connection between them. To the extent that the variables
governing the substantive determination of whether conduct is obstructive are clear and precise,
and can be applied prospectively to guide conduct, individuals can be fairly warned of the range
of conduct that is proscribed.
54. See infra Section V.
55. Justice Black characterized criminal contempt as the offense "with the most ill-defined
and elastic contours in our law." Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 200 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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argument to the jury grounded on racial prejudice, or insulting the
judge, could justify a contempt citation even though the conduct does
not violate a court directive. 6 More fundamentally, although man-
dating strict obedience to the court would provide a precise standard,
it would also be overly broad, drawing the line between advocacy and
obstruction in the wrong place.57
Those courts properly rejecting the "obey the court" standard draw
lines between clearly protected advocacy and violently disruptive
behavior all over the spectrum. Appellate courts, for example, have
affirmed contempt convictions for continuing to stand after one or two
orders to be seated. 8 Conversely, courts have reversed convictions for
excessive argumentation after numerous orders to stop, including sev-
eral warnings that the attorney would be held in contempt. 9 Simi-
larly, courts have both upheld and overturned contempt convictions
for an attorney's threats to refuse to obey a trial judge's order.'
Although, as a whole, appellate decisions defining the substantive
scope of the contempt power demonstrate a fair degree of sensitivity to
the value of vigorous advocacy and its vulnerability to deterrence by
56. One could posit an affirmative obligation of attorneys to consult with the court and allow
it to rule before making any argument or asking a question of a witness that the lawyer can fairly
anticipate might be objectionable, and reveal or suggest highly prejudicial information to the
jury. Lawyers, in fact, do have some such obligation. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying
text. There are problems, however, to this solution. First, it still does not address the issue of
disrespectful remarks to the judge. Second, it places attorneys in a dilemma of having to warn
opposing counsel to object to questions or arguments to which opposing counsel might not
otherwise object. Often, attorneys are far more aware of the objectionability of their own actions
than opposing counsel might be.
Finally, it is often a matter of judgment, which is easily skewed by an attorney's adversarial
posture, whether a particular action would require prior consultation with the court.
Nevertheless, where an attorney should be able to anticipate with a high degree of certainty a
legitimate objection by opposing counsel to proposed argument or questioning that poses a
realistic possibility of prejudicing the deliberative processes of the proceeding if the revelation to
the jury is deemed improper, the imposition of some duty to bring the matter to the court's
attention prior to engaging in such conduct is appropriate.
57. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 566-79.
58. See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 677 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1984).
59. See In re Natale, No. A-1549-84T5, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 27, 1986) (on file
with the Washington Law Review).
60. Compare United States v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1556 (lth Cir. 1985) (attorney's
statements that he would not appear and represent his clients on religious holidays despite court
order to contrary constitutes contempt), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986) with In re McConnell,
370 U.S. 230 (1962) (threats of attorney to violate direct court order to cease a line of
questioning, "until some bailiff stops us," not an obstruction of justice). Although the attorney
in Baldwin ultimately fulfilled his threat to not appear while the lawyer in McConnell eventually
acceded to the court's command, Baldwin is clear that the threats themselves were independently
contumacious. Moreover, the attorney's challenge to the court's authority in McConnell was far
more confrontational and disrespectful than in Baldwin.
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the power of contempt,6 these and many other examples62 illustrate
that the courts have not protected advocacy with any precision."3
The Supreme Court has been no exception. In the handful of cases
considering the contempt power's reach to punish courtroom conduct,
the Court has reversed the convictions and has been extremely sup-
portive of the advocate's duty to vigorously represent the client. The
Court has also recognized the inevitability both of minor excesses of
advocacy on the part of attorneys' and of occasional confusion
between personal offense and obstruction of justice on the part of
judges.65 However, the Court's decisions are devoid of any analysis of
the variables that should be used to distinguish legitimate advocacy or
innocuous conduct from obstructive misbehavior. Therefore, the
61. See, ag., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); In re
Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
62. Compare United States ex reL Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969)
(upholding contempt citations imposed on spectators who refused to comply with order to rise)
and In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972) (same as to defendant in criminal case) with
United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (failure to rise cannot constitute obstruction
because act of rising not essential to proceedings).
63. Some of the disparity in the courts' application of the contempt power must naturally be
attributable to the development of different standards in different jurisdictions. Given the elastic
nature of the obstruction standard, it is to some extent unavoidable, and perhaps to some extent
appropriate that individual jurisdictions express differences in determining when conduct
becomes contemptuous. There are likely to be geographical gradations of tolerance and
impatience for such behavior, especially where disrespect plays some role in the finding of
obstruction.
Moreover, the disparate treatment of similar conduct from jurisdiction to jurisdiction rarely
reflects any variation in the courts' analyses of contempt cases. Rather, it merely parallels the
kind of haphazard and arbitrary line drawing that goes on within the individual jurisdictions.
Because the different lines marking contemptuous behavior are based on ad hoc feelings for the
specific facts of each individual case, rather than on any principled analysis or balancing of the
conflicting values involved, there is little clarity or precision even within a single jurisdiction.
Indeed, within the same jurisdiction courts frequently treat seemingly similar cases quite
differently. Compare State v. Gonzales, 134 N.J. Super. 472, 341 A.2d 694 (App. Div.) (criminal
defendant held in contempt after directing "vulgarities" at court), aff'd, 69 N.J. 397, 354 A.2d
325 (1975) with State v. Jones, 105 N.J. Super. 493, 253 A.2d 193 (Essex County Ct. 1969)
(defendant's utterance of a vulgarity in open court held to have created no disorder). In addition,
numerous state and federal court contempt convictions appear to conflict with United States
Supreme Court precedents. Compare. eg., State ex reL Smith v. District Court, 677 P.2d 589
(Mont. 1984) (attorney held in contempt after failing to sit down after several warnings to do so)
with In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) (reversing contempt conviction for attorney's refusal
to stop arguing despite several orders to cease and for threat to court that attorney would
continue to question witness until "some bailiff stops us," in contradiction of court order for
silence).
64. See, ag., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
65. See, eg., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); cf
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("The vital point is that in sitting in judgment on
such a misbehaving lawyer the judge should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond
to a personal grievance.").
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Court fails to provide the kind of warning necessary either to guide the
lower courts or to remedy the chilling effect of an imprecise
proscription.66
Partially as a result of appellate court confusion over the application
of the obstruction standard, trial courts have been even more arbitrary
in drawing the line between protected conduct and contempt. 67  For
example, trial courts have held an attorney in contempt for refusing to
use her husband's surname in court,68 and others for appearing in
attire that offended the judge,69 smirking,70 and refusing to begin a
criminal trial when the attorney was at home and seriously ill with a
high fever.7" Threats of contempt are regularly made in response to
any conduct the judge might find annoying. In my own experience, I
have seen judges threaten contempt against attorneys for absentmind-
edly tapping a pen on counsel table, making a joke when no jury was
present, and using an innocuous expression that the judge did not
like.72 And, of course, threats of contempt and actual citations are
66. To the extent that the case-by-case development of standards and knowledge of the
courtroom customs provide some notice of what conduct is protected and what is punishable,
attorneys are more likely than other participants in the trial process to know the scope of the
proscription. Cf Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (in
view of contemporary standards of use of profane language, witness may have had no reason to
believe that use of phrase "chicken shit" would be disruptive of proper courtroom decorum).
67. Even if appellate courts were very precise in identifying the variables that distinguish
protected from punishable courtroom conduct, trial judges' perceptions of personal offense, and
their individual sensibilities as to etiquette and decorum may trigger citations for and threats of
contempt in response to conduct that is clearly unobstructive.
68. See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1988, § A, at 23, col. 2.
69. See, e.g., In re De Carlo, 141 N.J. Super. 42, 357 A.2d 273 (App. Div. 1976); Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 201-02 n.70 (1971). One commentator,
however, has strongly suggested that fundamental normative values may be furthered by the
rituals of dress. See W. ALLEN, GETrING EVEN 25 (1966) ("Eternal nothingness is o.k. if you're
dressed for it."). In all seriousness, the appropriateness of attorney dress is a good example of
how vague the unwritten rules of courtroom decorum are. At some point, perhaps only after a
warning, the manner in which an attorney dresses arguably can interfere with the administration
of justice. Short of such obviously inappropriate clothing, how can the effect of casual dress on
the processes of justice be measured, so that the proper line may be drawn? Other standards of
etiquette and decorum, which govern an attorney's tone of voice, facial expressions, and degree
of contentiousness towards the judge, are similarly incapable of distinguishing between protected
and punishable behavior except in the most extreme cases.
70. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin,
292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961) (reversing trial contempt citation for "sneering").
71. See In re Harris, Docket No. A-916-81 (N.J. June 23, 1982) (on file with the Washington
Law Review).
72. An assignment judge held in contempt a lawyer who answered a trial call for another
member of her firm by stating that the other attorney was "on his feet" in the court of another
county. The judge made it clear that the threat of contempt was not for the failure to appear but
for the expression, which, for some strange reason, he found to be "vulgar."
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employed with as much arbitrariness to curtail advocacy that the
judges find overzealous, confrontational, or merely disagreeable.73
At the same time, trial courts are extremely varied in the degree of
tolerance shown to misconduct in certain categories. In such cases,
they frequently are more hesitant to issue a citation than appellate
decisions would seem to indicate is appropriate.74 For example, the
antics of well-known attorneys, which have been punished when
engaged in by less experienced counsel, are often viewed by judges
with a begrudging admiration-an acceptance of a battle of wills and
wits."5 In addition, trial courts appear to be overly permissive with
attorneys', and particularly prosecutors', improper arguments and
questioning of witnesses.76 For the most part, permitting a broader
range of advocacy and courtroom conduct is beneficial, except when
an attorney's behavior prejudices the deliberative process against the
opposing litigant. Whether beneficial or not, however, attorneys often
have little idea whether their conduct will be treated as protected or
obstructive by either the trial or appellate court.
Furthermore, every day trial courts refrain from citing for contempt
the very same conduct that is sometimes found to be obstructive. This
uneven treatment not only adds to contempt's imprecision, but also
raises questions about the courts' need to exercise the contempt power
to deal with such conduct. If courts are sometimes capable of con-
ducting their business without resort to the contempt power in
response to particular behavior, they may not be justified in exercising
that power to punish the same behavior at other times.7 7
73. See, eg., cases cited supra note 61.
74. That trial courts threaten and cite for contempt much more than appellate courts are
willing to condone is obvious from the large number of decisions reversing contempt convictions.
That trial courts are also more tolerant of some categories of behavior is far less obvious because
few opinions ever result from such circumstances.
75. See eg., Gill, The Oral Tradition of Gerry Spence in Pring v. Penthouse, 17 Sw. U.L.
Rav. 693 (1988). As Professor Gill notes, during a trial against Penthouse magazine for libel,
Gerry Spence, one of the most famous and well-regarded trial attorneys in the country, wholly
ignored repeated court rulings to desist from referring to Penthouse as smut, sewage, filthy,
degrading, degenerate, and vile. Yet, rather than holding Spence in contempt for such continual
and potentially prejudicial violations of the Court's order, or even threatening him with a
contempt citation, the court seemed content merely to glorify such misconduct by characterizing
it as "Spencarian"[sic]. Id at 704.
76. See infra Section IV.E.
77. That many courts find it unnecessary to exercise the contempt power in response to
particular conduct is an indication that the judiciary can safeguard the administration of justice
by less drastic means. A court that responds to misbehavior with an admonishment or recess has
chosen a less restrictive alternative. Even if a court does nothing at all in the face of arguably
obstructive conduct, it is also using less restrictive alternatives to the contempt power:
alternatives that the court believes will further the goals of justice more than contempt.
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The trial courts' tolerance of arguably obstructive conduct may go
beyond obscuring the fair warning necessary to notify attorneys of
what is contemptuous conduct; it may also affect the actual standards
for defining an obstruction.78 If obstruction of justice were always an
78. In speaking of the courts' tolerance of some categories of behavior, it is necessary to
consider the distinction between a court's failure to impose contempt sanctions after warning the
actor that the conduct is obstructive, and failure to give any warning at all. The analysis set forth
in the text is obviously applicable where the court neither warns the actor nor cites the conduct
as contempt. The real question is whether that analysis applies when a court does warn an
attorney that her conduct is obstructive, but does not charge her with contempt.
Warnings will provide fair notice if the court directs them to the same conduct ultimately cited
as contempt. If a court fails to follow through with its threat to hold an individual in contempt
after repeating the conduct, however, the clarity of the notice is again obscured. This sort of
mixed message, which is not uncommon in trial practice, can be very confusing and lead to a
somewhat justifiable understanding that the original warnings may have been exaggerated as a
device for stifling opposition to the court's wishes.
As to the effect of warnings on the actual standards for determining whether conduct is
obstructive, where a judge warns an attorney that her behavior is contumacious, that conduct
can hardly be considered a permissible custom of courtroom practice. On the other hand, the
utilization of warnings rather than contempt charges may be an effective and less restrictive
alternative to contempt. Similarly, the use of warnings, as opposed to the imposition of contempt
charges, may indicate that the custom of trial practice is to caution against continuation of the
behavior, without exercising the contempt power. Thus, as with the question of notice, the
warning may reasonably be thought of as an exaggeration. These different interpretations of the
courts' restraint appropriately reflect an ambivalence toward conduct that we would like to
discourage but, absent special circumstances, would not like to punish as contemptuous. See
infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
To some degree, a special circumstance that would give rise to contempt can be the warning
itself. A warning may sometimes have the effect of elevating otherwise unobstructive behavior to
the level of contempt if it is repeated, because the refusal to obey the court may itself constitute
an obstruction. To the extent, then, that the prior warning does make a future violation
obstructive, the court's failure to use the contempt power after a repetition of the offensive
conduct is as if the court had never issued a warning at all. In other words, if particular behavior
is obstructive only after, and in part because of, a court's admonition that the conduct is
contumacious, the warning itself does not indicate that the conduct is obstructive; only a
violation of the warning after it is given would have such an effect. Therefore, the failure to
utilize the contempt power after a warning is similar to not issuing a contempt citation for
arguably obstructive behavior where no warning had been given in the first instance.
Nevertheless, we should not assume that conduct merely warned against is permissible
conduct simply because the court warns that conduct is contemptuous, without actually citing it
as such. The court's restraint should not be treated as immunizing the conduct from the
contempt power. In the long run, encouraging the use of warnings and judicial restraint rather
than the leveling of contempt charges will likely further the independence of the bar and the
vitality of advocacy. If the courts' use of warnings rather than contempt sanctions is treated as
legitimizing the behavior, however, courts will be forced to utilize the power of contempt in
circumstances where an admonition might otherwise have sufficed. Indeed, if warnings can be
ignored by the participants in a trial, they will not constitute a less restrictive alternative to
contempt proceedings, because they will not effectively achieve the courts' objectives. Thus, we
should give effect to warnings by the court in setting the limits on the scope of permissible
courtroom behavior.
This is not to say, however, that the violation of any court warning is necessarily obstructive.
On the contrary, a prior caution that certain conduct is contemptuous is but one of many factors
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unambiguous and demonstrable phenomenon, tolerance of obstructive
behavior would not affect the scope of contempt. But, because the
contours of the zone of contemptiious conduct are often diffuse, a
judge's indulgence of questionable behavior, and even more so, her
participation in or provocation of confrontational debate, can be fairly
interpreted as indicating that the behavior is not obstructive. In addi-
tion to the adequate'warning problem, the court's prior tolerance of
behavior presently sought to be punished as contempt raises serious
questions whether the contemnor acted with the requisite wrongful
intent.79
When these dynamics are viewed in the unique light shed by the law
of contempt, one can see that the use or non-use of the contempt
power may change the character of what we classify as an obstruction.
Obstruction has a self-defining quality: to the extent that disobedience
and challenge to the court's authority are considered to be obstructive,
anything we call obstructive tends to be self-fulfilling, because attor-
neys who continue to engage in that conduct after being warned that it
is deemed obstructive are violating the court's command."0 Con-
versely, when a judge permits certain behavior in the courtroom, the
combination of the vagueness of the obstruction standard, the judge's
omnipresence in observing the conduct, and her presumed ability to
distinguish between protected and obstructive behavior, should influ-
ence the definition of obstruction. That is, we must partially look to
the customs and norms of courtroom practice to help define and apply
the obstruction standard. In contrast, when dealing with a precise
proscription, such as a speed limit, the failure to prosecute every viola-
tion obviously does not affect the meaning of the proscription or pro-
vide a defense to those who are cited. Even where a prohibition is less
specific, such as a law against disorderly conduct, behavior that argua-
bly comes within the prohibition may not be prosecuted simply
because it goes undetected, or because the police devote their efforts to
higher priorities. Furthermore, a police officer's determination not to
issue a summons, even if it is based on a decision that the law is not
being violated, does not carry the kind of authoritative presumption of
correctness that a court's decision carries. But a trial judge witnesses
that should figure into the equation of whether an obstruction has occurred. But, it does mean
that the actions warned against should not be considered permissible because a court employs a
warning rather than wielding the contempt power.
79. See infra Section IV.D.
80. Conduct should not, however, be considered obstructive merely because a trial court
deems it so. Obstruction must be measured objectively rather than subjectively. See Raveson,
supra note 2, at 562-65 nn.295-302 and accompanying text.
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all conduct in the courtroom and is always in the position of determin-
ing whether conduct is obstructive. And there is little reason for a
judge to refrain from using the contempt power where she feels it is
necessary to protect the fairness and continuity of the proceedings.81
Therefore, permitting particular kinds of behavior, allowing a certain
level of aggressiveness in advocacy, and tolerating minor excesses of
vigorous representation, serve to incorporate such behavior as pro-
tected courtroom conduct. This is especially so where the nature of
the harm is disrespect or disobedience, as opposed to interference with
the deliberative process. 82  The court is likely to be sensitive, if not
oversensitive, to disorder, disrespect and disobedience. If the court
does not feel the need to wield its contempt power to maintain order
or vindicate its authority, its restraint indicates that such behavior is
an accepted (if unwelcome) aspect of courtroom practice.83 Thus, the
81. Courts are, or at least should be, concerned about not exercising the contempt power in
front of the jury, so as not to prejudice the attorney's cause. In addition, courts certainly want to
avoid having to delay the proceedings to deal with the contempt citation itself, or to hold a
summary hearing, and they have an interest grounded on judicial economy in avoiding a plenary
contempt trial before another judge. Hopefully, courts also want to protect the independence of
the bar and prevent any chilling of vigorous advocacy. But where a court believes use of the
contempt power is truly necessary to protect the proceedings and to deter future misconduct,
these potential downsides to the exercise of the contempt power can be minimized and are not
likely to dissuade a judge from exercising the contempt power.
82. With respect to an attorney's improper interference with the deliberative processes of a
trial, this Article argues that the courts should exercise the contempt power more freely in some
circumstances than they have in the past. See infra Section IV.E. However, the prior reluctance
of the courts generally to consider such conduct contemptuous arguably insulates the behavior
from the contempt power until it is treated by them more clearly and consistently as obstructive.
Nevertheless, a judge's tolerance of conduct that might be deemed disrespectful or defiant should
to some extent be reflected in the obstruction standards because, almost by definition, what a
court does not perceive as offensive is not obstructive. On the other hand, in determining
whether deliberative processes are obstructed, the judge's feelings and restraint are not so clearly
a factor in measuring the harm to the administration of justice.
83. Nevertheless, the circumstances of various trials differ enough that identical conduct,
which causes no obstruction in one proceeding, can be obstructive in another. For example, a
prejudicial remark to the jury about a criminal defendant is ordinarily more likely to be
obstructive than the same comment concerning a civil litigant. Similarly, in a trial where the
judge has had difficulty maintaining order, an attorney's disobedience or disrespectful remarks
can be more threatening to the administration of justice than in a perfectly peaceful proceeding.
Conversely, a capital case might require a broader latitude of advocacy for defense counsel than a
minor civil matter.
These kinds of differences may add to the appearance of inconsistent application of the
contempt power. This is especially true where, as is almost always the case, courts fail to
articulate these differences as bases for their decisions. However, the introduction of these
considerations as further variables in the obstruction determination probably also increases the
actual unevenness of how the contempt power is exercised. Once the nature and character of the
trial are at issue in the balancing process, trial judges are likely to feel that they have unfettered
discretion to cite conduct as contemptuous since every proceeding arguably presents unique
circumstances calling for exercise or restraint of the power. Moreover, when trial judges
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courts' tolerance84 of forensic behavior operates both to assist in iden-
tifying the boundary between obstructive and protected expression85
and to provide an objective measure of obstruction. Stated simply, the
consider the individual circumstances of particular proceedings in determining the propriety of
contempt sanctions, they are likely to receive greater deference from appellate courts because
trial judges are ostensibly in a better position to objectively assess the character of their own
proceedings.
Although individualized attributes of trials should be considered when deciding whether
particular conduct is obstructive, most of these differences can be generalized into broad
categories. See infra Section IV. To the extent this is not possible, it is perhaps incumbent upon
the trial judge to warn attorneys in advance that the unusual circumstances of the case require a
curtailment of the ordinary range of permissible expression. In any event, when the text speaks
of the similarity between courtroom conduct in different trials (or even at different times in the
same proceeding), the similarities must be measured against the considerations relevant to
determining whether the contempt power may be exercised appropriately. See infra Section III.
84. However, the exercise of the contempt power is not necessarily an objective measure that
the conduct is contemptuous. An attorney's aggressive advocacy, including heated debate with
the court and minor excesses of advocacy, such as mildly disrespectful remarks and continued
argument after orders to cease, may often trigger a contempt citation where there was no
obstruction of justice. The history of abuse of the contempt power makes that starkly clear.
Therefore, despite the use of the contempt power by many trial judges in similar circumstances,
such exercises of the power may reflect only a fulfillment of the expectation that many trial
judges will mistakenly cite conduct for contempt that is not actually interfering with the
administration of justice (other than by dint of the judges' subjective overreactions to the
behavior).
85. Indeed, there is a significant category of conduct that is contemptuous, if at all, only
because the courts say it is. With respect to behavior such as an attorney's failure to acquiesce
immediately to a court's order to cease arguing, the level of emotionality displayed in advocacy,
or the abrasiveness of the language used in argument, the harm to the administratibn of justice is
so amorphous that such conduct tends to be obstructive simply because it violates customs of
practice and the courts' insistence that such conduct is considered by them to be obstructive. See
Raveson, supra note 2, at 564 n.300 and accompanying text. A broad range of qualities of
advocacy are either beneficial or detrimental to the administration of justice. The courts'
encouragement or disfavor of these attributes change from time to time and from place to place.
In this sense, notice that particular conduct is obstructive is inseparable from the conduct's
obstructiveness: the normative standard merges with the notice. It is important, therefore, for
courts to refrain from categorizing conduct as obstructive unless it truly interferes with the
ability of the court to provide a fair and relatively efficient proceeding, independent of
classification.
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kinds of conduct that courts permit every day86 are unlikely87 to be
obstructive.a
The disparity and standardlessness with which judges apply the
contempt power can vary depending on the circumstances of the case.
To the extent that the proper application of the obstruction standard is
extremely fact specific, trial courts can, as a practical matter, virtually
ignore appellate opinions. However, that reaction to fact-specificity
cuts both ways. Appellate courts can ignore the actual practices in
trial courts if they may rely on factors so specific as to distinguish any
other case or custom.89 If determining whether particular behavior is
obstructive depends on such individualized circumstances as the lilt of
one's voice or one's facial expression, then each case is essentially a sui
generis decision, and there is little hope of providing fair notice. In
those circumstances, the substantive reach of the contempt power is
expanded or limited only by the discretion of the individual judges
exercising it. Therefore, the chilling effect on attorneys can be enor-
mous, and effective appellate review of a contempt conviction can be
almost impossible.
86. We have seen the courts' tolerance of various categories of forensic behavior objectifies
the standards for measuring obstructiveness. Another objective measure of the propriety of
courtroom conduct is the practice of attorneys themselves. Attorneys will generally be
disinclined to engage in obstructive behavior, such as repeatedly refusing to accede to the court's
command to cease argument with the judge or refrain from arguing a particular issue to the jury,
if it truly interferes with the fairness or continuity of a proceeding. The disincentives created by
the risks of alienating the judge or jury, of causing a mistrial or reversible prejudice, and of
incurring contempt charges, will almost always outweigh whatever benefits that kind of reckless
advocacy may bring. Thus, the bar's balance of the competing interests of the administration of
justice also helps delineate the proper boundary between advocacy and contempt.
87. One caveat to this observation, however, is that the courts probably underestimate the
obstructiveness of some categories of misconduct that may improperly influence the deliberative
processes of a trial. See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
88. Naturally, if an appellate court affirms a contempt conviction for particular misconduct,
the tolerance of such behavior in the future by trial courts in the same jurisdiction does not
indicate that the conduct is not obstructive. Rather, it indicates that the trial judge merely is
restraining herself from punishing obstructive conduct. On the other hand, after some period of
time, widespread tolerance by trial courts of conduct found to be obstructive by an appellate
court may fairly reflect the development of an evolving standard of the propriety of forensic
behavior, at least so long as there is no intervening appellate opinion reiterating its condemnation
of the conduct.
89. Indeed, contempt cases appear to place remarkably little reliance upon prior judicial
determinations with respect to conduct similar to that at issue. Rather, decisions most often cite
merely to the generic standards articulated in previous decisions, and independently analyze the
specific facts of their own cases with reference to those standards as if no court had ever
considered whether equivalent conduct was contemptuous.
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Many courts and commentators have suggested that contempt
determinations do indeed depend on such fact-specific findings.9" It is
certainly true that a sensitive balance of the individual facts of each
case is frequently necessary for a proper determination of whether
contempt was committed. Nevertheless, we should be very reluctant
to permit the fact-specificity of contempt decisions to serve as a scape-
goat for the arbitrariness that has always characterized this area of the
law and for the profession's failure to articulate more general princi-
ples adequately guiding attorneys' conduct in the courtroom. To some
degree, our perception of the fact-specificity of contempt findings may
emanate from the inconsistency of the courts' decisions rather than
vice versa.91
In fact, that inconsistency likely results from several other dynamics
wholly apart from whatever effect fact-specificity might have: the fail-
ure to develop an appropriate calculus for balancing the competing
interests involved; the near omnipotence of the trial judge who initi-
ates contempt proceedings, serves as the witness, trier, and is often the
victim of the contumacious conduct as well; the lack of other proce-
dural safeguards in summary contempt proceedings; and the absence
of effective mechanisms to control trial judges' discretion prior to the
issuance of a citation and during appellate review of contempt convic-
tions. Whatever the causes of the disparity, and however fact-sensitive
contempt determinations must be, it is necessary to more precisely
guide trial judges and attorneys regarding contempt and thereby
reduce the haphazard use of the contempt power with its inevitable
inhibition of vigorous advocacy.
The difficulty in defining obstruction and providing fair warning of
what conduct is contemptuous derives not from imprecise diction, but
from the failure to analyze properly (or in many instances, even to
recognize) the tensions between the competing goals and dynamics of
a trial. It is unlikely that contempt statutes or their judicial interpreta-
tions, or generic pronouncements by the courts of the common-law
90. See, eg., In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 557 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (contempt
holding depends on such elusive factors as tone of voice, facial expressions, and physical gestures
of contemnor); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990) (same); see also, United States v.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The tendency has been for courts to treat each
(contempt] case on its individual facts and there are, therefore, few decisions which aid in the
determination of the proper standards [governing contempt] ... in this case.").
91. Compare In re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d 237, 514 P.2d 1201, 1204, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1973)
(affirming contempt conviction of attorney for stating to judge: "This Court obviously doesn't
want to apply the law."), cert. denied, Buckley v. California, 418 U.S. 910 (1974) with United
States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing contempt conviction of pro se defendant
for calling judge a "blatant racist" and accusing the court of railroading him).
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definition of contempt, could be worded more precisely than the
"obstruction" standard. This means, for one thing, that there is little
chance a contempt statute will be found unconstitutionally vague on
its face. 92 It also means that it is really the case-by-case development
of the law of contempt that gives the obstruction standard true
meaning.
If we look at the use of "obstruction" in several other contexts, it is
readily apparent that in those areas the standard is accepted primarily
because the conflicting interests involved can be balanced with greater
ease. For example, courts have upheld, against facial attacks for
vagueness and overbreadth, numerous statutes that criminalize
obstruction of justice, picketing in a manner that obstructs the admin-
istration of justice, and obstruction of a police officer. 93 Applying the
obstruction standard to specific conduct is more difficult in some areas
than in others. Bribing a juror or inciting fraudulent litigation are
themselves crimes in many jurisdictions. Prosecuting these actions as
obstruction of justice usually does not require much interest balanc-
92. At least one court has considered and rejected a challenge on the grounds of vagueness to
the facial validity of a state contempt statute that prohibits "willful behavior ... tending to
interrupt the court", or "impair" its ability to function, and "willful disobedience of, resistance
of, or interference with" the court's command. See In re Paul, 28 N.C. App. 610, 222 S.E.2d 479,
485 (1976) (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-11, 5A-15), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 614, 223
S.E.2d 767 (1976). To the extent a legislature drafts a contempt statute with meticulous
specificity, it risks circumventing the legislative will by distinguishing the proscription from the
conduct in question. On the other hand, if a proscription is framed too generally, individuals will
be prosecuted for behavior outside the purpose of the legislation. Courts have reacted to this
tension by demonstrating a reluctance to invalidate laws where the statutes' proscriptions cannot
be articulated with greater precision. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972):
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing
criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and
sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.
Id. at 110; see also, United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). However, in the first amend-
ment area, the vice of vagueness does not flow merely from a lack of adequate notice. Because
the imprecision of a statute also can result in the substantial self-censorship or chilling of pro-
tected expression, the lack of specificity may also provide notice that is overly influential. It is
almost inconceivable, however, that the courts would invalidate contempt statutes as unconstitu-
tionally vague, thereby substantially limiting their own powers.
93. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 612 n.1 (1968) (law prohibiting "picketing
... in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and
from any [county] ... courthouses" clear and precise and not overly broad); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965) (statute making it a crime to picket near a state court with the intent of
interfering with or obstructing the administration of justice not vague or overbroad); State v.
Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280 (Ct. App. 1977) (offense of "obstructing public officer"
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad); State v. Torline, 215 Kan. 539, 527 P.2d 994 (1974)
(statute proscribing obstruction of due administration of justice neither vague nor overbroad);
State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426 P.2d 13 (1967) (statute punishing criminal conspiracy to
pervert or obstruct justice not unconstitutionally vague).
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ing.94  Determining whether an individual's verbal challenge to a
police officer obstructs the performance of her duties, on the. other
hand, is somewhat more difficult.9" Such speech is protected to some
extent by the Constitution, and may be immune from punishment
absent the presence of some physical act or exertion against the
officer.96 In this circumstance, we must be far more concerned with
the dangers of overbreadth, vagueness, and deterrence of protected
conduct. But as thorny as those concerns are in that context, they are
quite blunt in comparison to the more tangled conflict created by these
concerns in the area of contempt. As to contempt, the methods
employed to address these dangers in other contexts are either inappli-
cable or have not been utilized. Even more importantly, the tensions
at work in the law of contempt are in many ways substantially differ-
ent from those that govern the balancig of competing concerns in
other areas that prohibit obstructive conduct.
First, it is extremely difficult to determine whether particular
expression, especially advocacy, obstructs or even harms the goals of a
94. In many instances, the conduct that violates a statute providing a penalty for obstruction
of justice will also constitute contempt. Often, where that is so, as with destroying records that
have been subpoenaed by a grand jury, see United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir.
1975), vagueness is rarely if ever an issue and courts need have little concern for inappropriately
punishing or deterring constitutionally protected behavior. In some circumstances however,
applying the obstruction of justice standard to specific conduct under both an independent
statute punishing such obstructions and the contempt law is extremely uncertain. For example,
cases have repeatedly held that perjury by itself is insufficient to amount to contempt, see, eg., In
re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); United States v.
Essex, 407 F.2d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1969). Yet many appellate courts have in fact sustained
contempt convictions for perjury, finding special circumstances that amount to an obstruction in
what appears to be nothing more than the garden variety of false swearing. See, eg., Handler v.
Gordon, 140 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1943) (false answers of judgment debtor in proceeding to discover
his assets held to be obstruction because perjury was "manifest" and obstructed ability to locate
property). At first blush, it appears that there should not be any outcry of legitimate concern for
chilling this kind of behavior. However any witness who has testified on behalf of the losing
party may not have been believed by the fact-finder and would theoretically be subject to perjury
charges. Given our adversarial system of justice, equating perjury with obstruction may be
putting too high a premium on credibility as opposed to truthfulness.
95. See generally, Note, Types of Activities Encompassed By The Offense Of Obstructing A
Public Officer, 108 U. PA. L. Rtv. 388, 406-07 (1960):
[Clonduct involving only verbal challenge of an officer's authority or criticism of his actions
... operates, of course, to impair the working efficiency of government agents.... Yet the
countervailing danger that would lie in the stifling of all individual power to resist-the
danger of an omnipotent, unquestionable, officialdom-demands some sacrifice of efficiency
to the... forces of private opposition.... mhe strongest case for allowing challenge is
simply the imponderable risk of abuse.
96. See, eg., State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 1977) (state
statute proscribing resisting, delaying, coercing, or obstructing public officer not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad if limited to require some physical act other than mere
speech).
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trial or the administration of justice. The value of advocacy to the
ends of justice necessitates a delicate and acrobatic process of balanc-
ing the simultaneously positive and negative effects that specific advo-
cative expression has on the interests protected by the contempt
power. Unlike obstruction of a police officer, the constitutional values
of expression do not merely oppose competing governmental interests,
they also directly further those same interests. Indeed, to maximize
the ultimate goal of justice, advocative expression must at times be
permitted to interfere with other component values of justice, and
must frequently border on interfering with the administration of jus-
tice itself. Moreover, in other contexts where obstruction is criminal-
ized, there usually are much more objective indicia of interference
with important state interests, including a showing of some demon-
strable harm.
Second, unlike individuals choosing to picket or to confront a police
officer, an attorney engaging in advocacy does so not purely out of
predilection, but out of a professional duty to argue to the very limits
allowed by law. Attorneys are ethically obliged to argue with the
court, to challenge its actions, and to attempt to change its mind. All
of these duties will inevitably create tremendous conflict and tension
between the court and counsel. Moreover, attorneys are duty-bound
to protect the constitutional interests of their individual clients. Our
legal system explicitly relies on attorneys to ensure the proper develop-
ment and vindication of constitutional rights. Thus, when a court
considers punishing advocative expression, not only are first amend-
ment freedoms implicated, but rights under the fifth, sixth, and four-
teenth amendments, and the proper functioning of the judicial branch
are at issue as well.
Third, the universe of obstructive conduct in other areas is smaller
than that which constitutes contempt of court. Put another way,
courtroom proceedings can be more sensitive to interference from par-
ticipants in the trial process than from picketers, 97 and more vulnera-
97. The Supreme Court has often noted that the greater vulnerability of institutions such as
courts and schools, to obstruction even from picketers or noisy individuals outside the buildings,
justifies harsher restrictions on the time and place for that kind of expression. See, e.g., Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972) ("Expressive conduct may be constitutionally
protected at other places or times, but next to a school, while classes are in session, it may be
prohibited."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965) (because of special nature of place,
persons can be constitutionally prohibited from picketing "in or near" a courthouse, with the
intent of obstructing justice).
The problem with advocacy in a courtroom is that, unlike many other kinds of speech and
conduct that are subject to constitutional limitation, there simply is no other time or place for




ble to obstruction than are police officers from the same kinds of
expression. For example, the Supreme Court in City of Houston v.
HillS9 concluded that pure speech may not constitutionally be pun-
ished when it in any manner opposes or interrupts a police officer in
the execution of her duty, unless, at a minimum, it rises to the level of
"fighting words." 99 In spite of this holding, it is clear that speech
which does not consist of "fighting words" may obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice and be punished as contempt. With a judge, unlike a
police officer, the power to regulate conduct encompasses prevention
of dignitary harm, or interference with ritual, and maintenance of a
deliberative atmosphere as well. Thus, harm to the administration of
justice serious enough to warrant punishment can be far less egregious
and palpable.
The Supreme Court seems willing to permit punishment of one who
physically obstructs an officer by conduct that is largely expressive.
However, the Court has demanded that any such prohibition be more
narrowly tailored and provide greater substantive safeguards than the
blanket proscription of obstruction, which is the narrowest standard
utilized in contempt statutes. For example, the Court stated in Hill
that an individual who stands near an officer and persistently attempts
to engage the officer in conversation while the officer is directing traffic
at a busy intersection can be punished under a properly tailored
statute, "such as a disorderly conduct statute that makes it unlawful to
and the availability of another source from which the listeners receive that message are important
variables in determining whether governmental regulation of speech in a non-public forum is
constitutional. See eg., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 & n.12 (1972) leafleting of
anti-war literature in privately owned shopping mall is not immunized from regulation by first
amendment, in part because leafleteers had adequate alternative channels to disseminate
message). Although these factors are far less important where the government regulates
expression in a public forum, such as the streets outside a courthouse or school building, see, eg.,
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), the need to protect valuable advocacy in a
courtroom from unnecessary abridgement and deterrence is another quantum leap from that.
98. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
99. !d at 463 n.12 (striking down as overbroad an ordinance prohibiting speech that "in any
manner... interrupt[s]" an officer; "[t]he freedom verbally to challenge police action is not
without limits, of course; we have recognized that fighting words which 'by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace' are not constitutionally
protected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 [(1942)]"); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting use of obscene or opprobrious
language toward police officer in performance of duty as overbroad because it punished only
spoken words and was not limited in scope to fighting words). Moreover, it has been suggested
that even the "fighting words" exception articulated in Chaplinsky might require a narrower
application in cases involving speech addressed to a police officer, because "a properly trained
officer may reasonably be expected to 'exercise a higher degree of restraint' than the average
citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to 'fighting words."' Id. at 135 (Powell,
J., concurring) (citation omitted). This caution is applicable to judges as well.
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fail to disperse in response to a valid police order or to create a traffic
hazard."" °  Similarly, Hill noted that the government can criminalize
the conduct of a person who runs beside and rails at an officer who is
pursuing a felon in a public street by prohibiting the physical obstruc-
tion of the officer's investigation." 1 In these circumstances, it is the
greater specificity of the proscription, combined with the narrowing of
the category of punishable behavior, that provides the requisite cer-
tainty and safeguard against punishing and chilling protected expres-
sion. The constitutional necessity of narrow tailoring has been
100. 482 U.S. at 462 n. 11. One factor the Supreme Court, in several cases, considered to be
quite important in determining whether a proscription reaches constitutionally protected
conduct is whether the provision proscribes free speech alone, or proscribes expression mixed
with particular conduct. See, e.g., id. at 458-67 (striking ordinance making it a crime to oppose,
molest, abuse, or interrupt a police officer in execution of duty overbroad on its face, in part,
because enforceable part of ordinance deals not with core criminal conduct, but with speech);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (holding anti-picketing statute "on its face... a valid
law dealing with conduct subject to regulation ... and the fact that free speech is intermingled
with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection"); State v. Snodgrass, 117
Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Ct. App. 1977) (if terms "result" or "obstruct" in statute
proscribing resistance or obstruction of police officer interpreted not to require some physical act
other than mere speech, law is unconstitutionally overbroad). This factor cuts against a liberal
interpretation of the obstruction standard in contempt, and in favor of greater protection for in-
court expression. Courtroom expression, other than an occasional physical outburst, such as
hurling a book at the judge, is mostly comprised of pure speech. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has also demonstrated greater tolerance toward proscriptions that are not triggered by the
content of expression. Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding
anti-noise ordinance in part because does not license to punish anyone because of what she is
saying) with Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970)
(expulsion of high school students for writing material critical of school policies and authorities
infringed students' freedom of expression). Obviously, in a judicial proceeding, however, an
attorney is frequently punished precisely because of the content of her speech, as, for example,
where an attorney is disrespectful to the judge.
On the other hand, speech in a courtroom often is offensive not because of its content, but
because of its disruptive characteristics and because of the potentially obstructive effect on the
administration of justice of a refusal to obey the repeated directions of the court. Thus,
courtroom expression frequently is akin to the hypothetical posed by the Supreme Court in Hill,
of an individual persistently attempting to engage a busy officer in conversation. See infra note
101 and accompanying text. The qualification of requiring a valid police order as a prerequisite
to punishment highlights the critical importance of warnings in the context of contempt, but is
not wholly transferable to that area of the law. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
The Court's suggestion, in Hill, of proscribing a traffic hazard also loses much of its force as an
analogy to contempt because the potential harm is often far less ascertainable.
101. 482 U.S. 451, 462 n.ll.
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recognized in virtually all prohibitions of obstructive expression"°2
except contempt. 10 3
Of course, the case-by-case development of contempt law can nar-
row the construction of contempt statutes"° and thereby reduce their
breadth and uncertainty."0 5 But, with few exceptions, the courts' mea-
ger efforts to limit and clarify the scope of contempt have been hap-
hazard and unsuccessful, largely because the courts have failed to
identify appropriate variables to facilitate the accurate identification
and balancing of competing interests. As one of the best reasoned con-
tempt cases, United States v. Seale, acknowledges, "The Supreme
Court has touched upon the issue in very general terms, ... [but]
102. Se eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding against
vagueness and overbreadth challenges anti-noise ordinance prohibiting a person near a school in
session from willfully making "noise" or "diversion" that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace
or good order of the school session). The Grayned Court said:
The vagueness of [the terms utilized in the ordinance--"noises" and "diversions"], by
themselves, is dispelled by the ordinance's requirements that (1) the "noise" or "diversion"
be actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be a demonstrated causality
between the disruption that occurs and the "noise or diversion"; and (3) the acts be
"willfully" done.
Id at 112-14.
Similarly, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court sustained the validity of a
statute prohibiting picketing in or near a courthouse with the intent of obstructing the adminis-
tration of justice. The Court explicitly distinguished the "undefined nature" of the contempt
power from the anti-picketing law in question, which was "narrowly drawn to punish specific
conduct." 379 U.S. at 564; see also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (upholding a
statute making it a crime to picket "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere
with free ingress or egress to and from any... county... courthouses" as a specific ban on
particular conduct restricted at a certain time and place); State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570
P.2d 1280 (Ct. App. 1977) (upholding an obstruction of justice statute against vagueness and
overbreadth challenges by limiting construction to require some physical act other than mere
speech); supra note 40.
103. Indeed, some contempt decisions themselves recognize that the standards used to define
an obstruction in that context are too general. See, eg., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
260-61 (1941) (applying the imminent likelihood of serious obstruction standard to a contempt
statute directed at out-of-court publications because the state legislature "ha[d] not... found a
specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular kind of utterance"
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Obstruction [of
the judicial process] is an elusive concept which does not lend itself to general statements.")
104. Legislatures, too, could attempt to enact more precise rules of conduct to govern some
aspects of the contempt power, and narrow by statute the courts' power to impose sanctions.
Legislation is not likely to add appreciably to the certainty of those circumstances that require a
case-by-case application of normative values to specific facts, but legislation could define limits
for certain behaviors that arise often with little variation, ranging from the failure to rise when a
judge enters the court to perjury.
105. As discussed previously, attorneys are very likely to be aware of the sweeping scope and
imprecision of the standards governing the contempt power, as well as the potential sanctions for
any violation. Thus, if courts are able to narrow meaningfully the construction of contempt laws,
it is likely to have an unusually high remedial effect on the chilling of courtroom fervor.
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[b]eyond this, courts have assiduously avoided enunciating a
standard." 1o6
Many of the techniques used to narrow and clarify the obstruction
standard in other contexts are either unsatisfactory or underutilized in
contempt cases. For example, in order to limit the scope and enhance
the certainty of laws prohibiting obstruction of an officer (or disor-
derly conduct), courts have required that an officer warn an individual
that the conduct is obstructive and order her to stop. 10 7 To require a
judge to warn an attorney that conduct is obstructive, or borders on
contempt, could greatly reduce the imprecision of an otherwise vague
standard. However, attorneys, unlike individuals arguing with an
officer, are professionally obligated to test the court's resolve and to
attempt to change the court's mind. Thus, even when a judge warns
an attorney, the attorney may require some latitude to challenge the
parameters of the ruling or the ruling itself. The pressures of trial
practice may also require that when attorneys so challenge the court,
they be excused for the excesses such pressures inevitably produce. As
many contempt cases reflect, the line dividing protected and punish-
able courtroom conduct cannot be clearly drawn by a judge's
warning.10 8
Moreover, there is an additional layer of protection for the rights of
individuals who choose to challenge an officer's order to disperse: the
order must be lawful. " In contrast, the invalidity of a judge's order is
not generally a defense to charges of criminal contempt for violating
the order. I" Therefore, we might expect to see a higher level of acqui-
106. 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972).
107. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S.
104 (1972) (upholding against vagueness and overbreadth challenges a statute making it an
offense for a person with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm; to
congregate with others in a public place; and refuse to comply with a lawful police dispersal
order).
108. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 58-60.
109. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (reversing convictions of six black
persons for breach of the peace for peacefully playing basketball in a public park customarily
used only by whites and not dispersing when ordered to do so by the police, on the grounds that
the police officer's command violated the defendants' right to equal protection because it was
intended to enforce racial discrimination in the park); State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d
1280, 1288 (Ct. App. 1977) (statute criminalizing obstruction of officer in performance of his
duty implicitly limited to officer's lawful performance of duty); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347,
450 P.2d 33, 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969) (same). But see, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
404B(2), 13-2508 (1977) (abrogating the common law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest).
110. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 459 (1975); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
346-47 (1970); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 361 (7th Cir. 1972); see also, Note, Defiance
of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1970).
In certain cases, however, courts have concluded that orders to an attorney to cease arguing




escence and self-censorship by attorneys, under circumstances in
which vigorous advocacy would be far more likely to maximize the
mix of conflicting values in a trial.
The fourth reason the obstruction standard is so much more impre-
cise in the context of contempt is that the deterrent effect of broad and
imprecise contempt laws is greatly enhanced by the common practice
of trying contempts summarily, and by the deferential standards of
review applied by many appellate courts in contempt cases. The
expansive discretion of trial judges to determine what constitutes con-
tempt and then to try the charge themselves is substantively similar to
the grant of standardless discretion to other public officials to enforce
their own personal preferences. Such grants of standardless discretion
to other public officials have repeatedly been struck down by the
Supreme Court.111  Yet, the discretion of trial judges is even less
restrained as the contempt process fails to interpose a neutral judge to
guard against the abuse or mistaken use of that discretion. Moreover,
the contempt process denies the right to counsel and most other fun-
damental due process rights. Any relief from a trial judge's erroneous
exercise of the contempt power must await an appellate process of lim-
ited availability, which often cannot be counted upon to remedy
improper contempt convictions.112
guilty of criminal contempt. See, ag., Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 359 P.2d 274,
280-82, 10 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1961) (trial judge's order to an attorney to refrain from objecting in
the presence of the jury to the judge's voicing of opinions about the credibility of various
witnesses was not a lawful order); State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 430, 521 P.2d 668, 674 (1974) (the
court's power to silence an attorney does not begin until reasonable opportunity for appropriate
objection or other indicated advocacy can be afforded); People v. Kurz, 35 Mich. App. 643, 192
N.W.2d 594, 599-600 (1971) (trial judge's order that "no objection to any question shall be made
after the answer has been given" was beyond the power of trial court); see also infra notes 207-19
and accompanying text.
Also, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963), and George v. Clemmons, 373 U.S. 241 (1963),
both overturned contempt convictions for refusal to comply with a court order requiring
segregated seating in a courtroom.
111. See, eg., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance punishing sidewalk
assembly of three or more persons who "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by" held impermissibly vague because enforcement depended on the completely
subjective standard of "annoyance"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (breach of
peace ordinance construed by state courts to mean "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to
molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet" invalidated for granting too much discretion to
police).
112. See, eg., Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1974) (California law provides no
direct appeal of contempt conviction; contemnor must proceed by writ of habeas corpus or
petition for certiorari), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); In re Palmer, 265 N.C. 485, 144 S.E.2d
413 (1965); Luther v. Luther, 234 N.C. 429, 67 S.E.2d 345 (1951); Brizendine v. State, 103 Tenn.
677, 54 S.W. 982 (1899) (if contempt is in the presence of the court, the only appellate remedy is
by habeas corpus or petition for certiorari); Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890
(1956) (a contempt conviction may only be challenged by writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte
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Finally, many laws criminalizing obstruction of justice or a police
officer require that the intent to obstruct also be proved as an essential
element of the crime. The Supreme Court explicitly recognizes that
intent requirements help narrow the scope1 13 and dispel the vagueness
of such laws. Courts have almost universally read an intent require-
ment into contempt statutes.1 14 Yet, such statutes usually do not
include an intent requirement.' As will be discussed in greater
depth, an intent requirement usually provides far less protection in
contempt cases than in other crimes, because in contempt the requisite
intent most often can be inferred only from the conduct in question. 6
This is yet another dynamic that may well result in the heightening of
actual and perceived risk of punishment to attorneys for conduct that
they may reasonably consider perfectly appropriate and professionally
required.
III. DEFINING OBSTRUCTION TO PROPERLY BALANCE
THE COMPETING INTERESTS INVOLVED AND
REMEDY THE VICES OF VAGUENESS AND
OVERBREADTH
Not every excess of advocacy or each instance of disobedience to a
court's order should be considered obstructive of the administration of
justice.' 17 On the contrary, sometimes an attorney's conduct that goes
beyond what is generally considered appropriate and commendable or
that challenges the immediate wishes of the judge may actually benefit
the goals of justice. Other times, a lawyer's forensic behavior may
itself have little or no value as advocacy, but punishing it would be
destructive of the goals of trials by dampening vigorous advocacy. 118
Dancer, 171 Tex. Crim. 381, 350 S.W.2d 544 (1961) (if punishment consists only of a fine, there
is no restraint on contemnor's liberty and habeas corpus relief is unavailable).
113. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113-114 (1972) (imprecision of
terms "noises" and "diversions" remedied in part by ordinance's requirement that act be
"willfully" done); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 108-11 (1971) (disorderly conduct statute
making it an offense for person with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to
congregate with others in public and refuse to comply with police dispersal order narrowed to
constitutional dimensions in part by intent requirement).
114. See infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1988); MINN. STAr. ANN. § 588.01 (1988);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 33.010 (1983).
116. See infra Section V. In contrast, intent to obstruct justice in another context, such as
picketing of a courthouse, may be easier to establish without placing sole reliance on the conduct
itself. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1964) (Court looked to the testimony of
picketers as to the purpose of the demonstration rather than to the conduct of the picketers).




When determining what behavior by attorneys is generally condon-
able, courts must leave sufficient space for lawyers to fight with the
judge and to be aggressive. 19 Courts must insist that any proscrip-
tions, including their own, on obstructive or contemptuous conduct
must be narrow and precise enough that they neither punish nor
appear to punish constitutionally protected conduct, that they give
adequate notice of what expression is properly punishable, and that
they do not inhibit the exercise of the most vigorous level of advocacy
tolerable within our system of justice.
As to the first imperative, drawing the line correctly between pun-
ishable conduct and protected advocacy, the interests involved-advo-
cacy, order, respect, due process-are too important, open-ended, and
ill-defined, simply to balance against each other with any accuracy. 120
The only possibility of finding the optimal balance between all the
competing interests is to identify appropriate variables that will illumi-
nate and gauge the tensions resulting from the conflict between the
various goals of a trial and the rights of litigants and their attorneys as
they interact with each other in particular circumstances. These vari-
ables will assist in deciding both whether specific advocative expres-
sion is more beneficial to the ultimate goals of a judicial proceeding
than destructive, and the point at which such expression can be pro-
hibited at pain of penal sanction, where the harm to the trial may
outweigh the benefits.
Courts have two means of addressing the latter two imperatives:
increasing the clarity and properly restricting the scope of contempt
law to prevent self-censoring of valued advocacy. Courts can with-
draw any grant of standardless discretion to trial judges to determine
what conduct is contemptuous, and attempt to define the line between
protected and punishable conduct with sufficient precision that attor-
neys will know with greater certainty how far they can go. In addi-
tion, courts can create a buffer zone around protected advocacy,
119. It is important to understand that here we are talking about the degree of constitutional
protection that courts actually extend to courtroom expression, not merely whether statutory or
judicial enunciations of contempt proscriptions are vague, or overbroad in relation to the
constitutional immunity afforded such conduct.
120. Nevertheless, courts on a regular basis do engage in the balancing of just such interests
in determining whether expression is protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1971) (disorderly conduct statute not overbroad because it comes
into operation only when the individual's interest in expression is insignificant in comparison to
the public interests in preventing that expression or conduct at that time and place).
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narrowing the range of expression that can be proscribed by the con-
tempt power.12 1
These two techniques for reducing the chilling effect of potentially
vague and overbroad laws have a dynamic relationship. If courts are
capable of defining contempt standards with sufficient precision to give
adequate notice of what is punishable, there is correspondingly less
need for the maintenance of an insulating zone around the protected
conduct. Conversely, so long as the buffer zone is broad, valuable
advocacy is less subject to inhibition, even where contempt standards
are unclear. As an attorney's expression moves toward the end of the
zone where conduct may properly be punished, we can be less con-
cerned with the risk of deterring valuable conduct because the conduct
will diminish in value just as the resulting harm increases. As an
attorney's conduct begins to approach the limits of that zone, the line
beyond which she may be punished becomes implicitly clearer. Fur-
thermore, as the notice to attorneys that particular conduct is deemed
to be obstructive becomes clearer, the inference that the obstruction
was intentional becomes more supportable. We may still not know
exactly where that line is located, but at least we will know with
greater certainty where it is drawn, and why. Even where contempt
prohibitions are quite precise it is nevertheless necessary to have some
insulating zone surrounding the kinds of advocacy we wish to pro-
mote. If the minor lapses and excesses that inevitably result from zeal-
ous representation were punishable, attorneys could only protect
themselves from contempt charges by tempering the ardor of their
lawyering. 122
The enunciation of variables to facilitate the structuring of an accu-
rate balance of opposing interests is also indispensable to increasing
the clarity of and setting appropriate parameters to the line between
advocacy and contempt.
Accurate balancing of interests also narrows the area of prohibited
conduct and defines the contours of the protected zone. Through a
case-by-case application to recurring fact patterns, a system of balanc-
ing can be achieved that will provide a calculus with which, and a
121. Cf Note, Void-For-Vagueness, supra note 30, at 75 (primary thesis advanced by author is
that doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth "ha[ve] been used by the Supreme Court almost
invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms").




context within which a furious power, presently subject only to murky
limits, can be constrained to serve its salutary function.
123
Our ability to fulfill these prospects is limited, however, because the
variables involved are so numerous that significant uncertainty will at
times infect the process. Furthermore, because the concept of obstruc-
tion of justice is so amorphous, and the need for vigorous advocacy in
different circumstances so varied, there is an unavoidable arbitrariness
to individual decisions in close cases.
The value of developing particular balancing factors to increase the
precision of judicial decision-making and to guide the discretion of
trial judges is undermined by the fact that contempt decisions are usu-
ally made in the heat of the moment. Of course, in plenary contempt
proceedings and in appeals of contempt convictions variables can be
applied after-the-fact in a deliberate way. But for attorneys trying to
decide how far they can go with the vigor of their argument, and for
judges deciding whether to cite an attorney for contempt, these vari-
ables will not always lend themselves to split-second assessments.
None of this is to say that the use of carefully defined variables will
not give better notice of what conduct is prohibited and permissible
under the contempt power. Moreover, not all factors will be applica-
ble to a given situation; sometimes a very few will be sufficient to
determine with relative ease if an obstruction has occurred. But these
factors will often fail to guide judges precisely or warn attorneys ade-
quately, especially in the heat of courtroom drama. Furthermore, an
attorney cannot practice at the limits of laudable advocacy without
occasionally stepping over the line. Consequently, the development of
balancing factors is not sufficient to prevent the deterrence of what
should be protected advocacy. We must also narrow the range of the
conduct that contempt can be wielded to punish.
This clear need for an insulating buffer zone around valued advo-
cacy has been recognized in numerous cases. 124 Nevertheless, many
courts and commentators have urged that often only a fine line sepa-
rates the limits of commendable advocacy from the innermost reaches
123. Thus, the variables act much as detailed rules and regulations do to provide a context
that increases the clarity of otherwise vague proscriptions. For example, in Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), a general
proscription against attorneys' extrajudicial remarks about pending trials was made subject to
specific provisions relating to various stages of the trial process, such as investigation, trial, and
sentencing, as well as particular categories of comment, such as communications concerning
character, reputation, or prior criminal record. The court held that the inherent vagueness of the
"serious and imminent threat of interference with the fair administration of justice" standard
withstood constitutional challenge only because it was clarified sufficiently by the specific rules.
124. See, eg., cases cited infra note 139.
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of the contempt power. 125 The practice of some courts, of finding an
obstruction whenever an attorney continues to argue in the face of an
order to cease, illustrates this fine line. This approach permits the trial
judge to set what are frequently subjective limits on permissible advo-
cacy and to punish as an obstruction any crossing of the line.
To the extent particular advocacy, balanced against the harm it
might cause, is beneficial to the administration of justice, it should be
immune from the contempt power. We must, however, protect more
than clearly beneficial advocacy. While we must allow the definition
of obstruction to impose a limit on the expression of advocacy, it
would be inappropriate to view the boundaries of condonable advo-
cacy as characterizing the border of obstruction. That asymmetry
provides the breathing space for advocacy. Without this space, as
soon as advocacy becomes excessive, it becomes obstructive. And the
punishment of inevitable excesses of advocacy would deter attorneys
from fulfilling their ethical-and perhaps constitutional-duty to
practice at the outermost limits of proper representation. Such pun-
ishment would also too narrowly restrict the leeway needed to argue
with the court.
Thus, it is critical to distinguish between courtroom conduct that
we merely do not want to encourage as the norm of trial practice, and
that which obstructs the proceeding.126 Indeed, some advocacy actu-
ally may be impermissible, in the sense that it can be grounds for
125. See, e.g., People v. Ravitz, 26 Mich. App. 263, 182 N.W.2d 75, 76 (1971) (contempt of
attorney concerns the very fine line that separates the right of the trial judge to supervise all
aspects of any proceeding before him and to enforce this supervision by statutorily prescribed
punishment, and the right of an attorney to pursue with vigor and thoroughness the defense of a
client charged with a very serious offense).
126. See, e.g., In re Greenberg, 849 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1988) (attorney's "loud voice
and hand slamming during the heat of a long and hard fought trial, although annoying and not
condoned by this court, do not constitute the type of 'exceptional circumstances' that pose an
immediate threat to the judicial process"); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979)
(angry gesture of attorney in flinging papers on counsel table and breaking a water pitcher and
confrontational remarks of co-counsel to judge not condoned, but when considered in factual
setting, did not warrant contempt citation), rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); United States v.
Sopher, 347 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1965) (reversing the contempt conviction of a defense
attorney, who, in a criminal trial made misstatements of material fact to the jury because "loin
the record before us it is not clearly shown that [the attorney's] conduct although unjustifiable,
actually obstructed the district judge in the performance of judicial duty").
Conversely, even perfectly appropriate or somewhat questionable attorney behavior may
"cause" an actual "obstruction" or physical disruption of a trial if a witness, the judge, or
spectators react to it in some way that interferes with the trial. But, even where those kinds of
reactions can reasonably be anticipated by an attorney, unless her own actions are far enough
outside the accepted norms of practice to be judged misconduct, they should not be considered,
and under existing law probably are not considered, contemptuous. The incredibly powerful




reversible error, and yet not be obstructive. Where an attorney is not
violating an explicit warning or order of the court to refrain from par-
ticular expression, such as a specific line of questioning to a witness or
argument to the jury, and the conduct is not clearly violative of the
rules of evidence or trial practice, the conduct might not be an
obstruction justifying contempt sanctions even if it may require rever-
sal of the case. On the other hand, limitations on the scope of proper
advocacy, which are imposed by notions of fair play and substantive
justice, play a very important role in defining obstruction. They assist
in setting parameters to define what types of advocative expression are
beneficial, neutral, and detrimental to these aspects of our system of
justice. To the extent the regulation of advocacy through means other
than the contempt power is clarified (and there is a great need for that
in its own right), it will increase our understanding of how to balance
the value of advocacy against competing goals of justice and of the
distinction between condonable advocacy and punishable
obstruction.127
Distinguishing between condonable advocacy and punishable
obstruction imposes a buffer zone within which attorneys are properly
guided by considerations of what is likely to help or hurt the adminis-
tration of justice without fear of being held in contempt. For example,
when an attorney's argument with the judge is mildly discourteous, we
are the foreseeable consequences of exactly the kind of advocacy we want to encourage. As one
court noted:
It is not enough that the questions [asked by an attorney] were provocative or
inflammatory. If lawyers were barred from asking provocative and penetrating questions at
trial merely because they may provoke or inflame, then an essential goal of every fact finding
process-the discovery of the truth-would indeed be thwarted. In any trial where
emotions run high, we think it inevitable that some questions will provoke witnesses or
spectators or inflame their passions.
United States ex rel Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing contempt
conviction of attorney because arguably improper questions asked of a witness did not "rise to
level of misbehavior necessary to support a contempt citation"); accord, Offutt v. United States,
232 F.2d 69, 72, cerL denied, 351 U.S. 988, reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 860 (1956). Indeed, some
contempt statutes, themselves, contain this qualification. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1988)
(granting federal district judges the power to summarily punish "[mJisbehavior of any person...
[that] obstruct[s] the administration of justice") (emphasis added).
127. Additional sets of guidelines against which to measure the propriety or obstructiveness
of various courses of advocacy are provided by the codes of disciplinary rules and ethical
standards governing attorneys' conduct. See eg., In re Ungar, 160 N.J. Super. 322, 389 A.2d
995 (App. Div. 1978) ("[In putting questions to witnesses it is improper and unprofessional for
an attorney to allude to prejudicial irrelevancies and matters which he has no reason to believe
will be supported by admissible evidence." (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106(C)(1) (1978))). However, as with other standards controlling the
permissible scope of trial practice, violation of a disciplinary rule or ethical standards should not
be deemed a per se obstruction.
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do not want to suggest that it is a good thing, but neither do we want
to punish it.'28 Similarly, when an attorney continues to argue after
being ordered to cease, the conduct may sometimes be more valuable
than obstructive, sometimes not; however, sanctioning attorneys at the
point where the balance just tips toward obstruction can do more
damage to the goals of justice by stifling advocacy than if courts disap-
provingly tolerate some minimal level of interference with those goals.
It is crucial that any finding of contempt reflect a leap from the region
of valued and necessarily shielded behavior over an insulating chasm
to the region of unquestionably obstructive misconduct.
The insistence of some courts that the harm to the administration of
justice must be material or substantial before protected expression can
be punished by the contempt power,129 is, in effect, an attempt to con-
struct a buffer zone around such conduct. Likewise, some courts
require that interference with the court's business be "clearly shown"
to constitute contempt. 130  Finally, courts have also made efforts to
compensate for a fine line approach by noting that where the line
between vigorous representation and contemptuous behavior is close,
"doubts should be resolved in favor of vigorous advocacy."' 1 3 1 These
qualifications of the standard for contempt are helpful because they
correctly communicate the sense that vigorous advocacy should be
protected-that minor excesses of advocacy and reasonable conflict
with the court are not contemptuous. To some degree these standards
also recognize the positive value of advocacy as against minor interfer-
ence with other values of justice. 132 These standards, however, fail to
128. See supra text accompanying note 122; Raveson, supra note 2, at 553-57.
129. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1941) ("What finally emerges from
the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished."); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he standard to be
applied [in contempt cases] is one of material disruption or obstruction.").
130. See, e.g., Exparte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919).
131. See United States ex rel. Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing
contempt convictions for improper cross-examination and remarks criticizing the court made
during closing argument to the jury); see also United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th
Cir. 1981); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d
498 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
132. See, e.g., In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 397-401 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[W]here, as here, the
conduct complained of is that of an attorney engaged in the representation of a litigant, the
search for [the elements of contempt] must be made with full appreciation of the role of trial
counsel and his duty of zealous representation of his client's interests."). The Court underscored
the importance of the "extreme liberality necessary to a vital bar and thus the effective discovery
of truth through the adversary process," reasoning that "mere disrespect or insult cannot be
punished where it does not involve an actual and material obstruction. This is particularly true
with respect to attorneys where the 'heat of courtroom debate' may prompt statements which are




address the more fundamental issue of what an obstruction is, and
even seem to use the qualifications in part to avoid grappling with that
very difficult question. Indeed, the admonition that doubts should be
resolved in favor of vigorous advocacy carries with it the explicit
assumption that the division between such advocacy and contempt can
be a thin one, and therefore is virtually self-defeating as an effort to
secure sufficient breathing room. Thus the boundaries of the buffer
zone around protected advocacy must be laid by the same variables
that clarify obstruction's meaning.
Some of the factors discussed in the next section have also been sug-
gested by a few courts and commentators as appropriate considera-
tions for measuring the obstructiveness of conduct in the courtroom.
For example, professors Dorsen and Friedman suggest that the man-
ner in which a trial judge reacts to a problem should depend in part on
whether the disorder occurs frequently or over a period of time,
whether the incident occurs before a jury, the stage of the proceeding
when misconduct occurs, and whether there are mitigating circum-
stances, such as possible provocation by the prosecutor or judge. 133 In
In re Gustafson, 134 the Ninth Circuit noted that the relevant factors in
determining the issue of "material obstruction" in contempt adjudica-
tions include the reasonably expected reactions of those in the court-
room, the manner in which the remarks are delivered, any delay in the
proceeding caused by a disrespectful outburst, and the failure to heed
explicit directives of the court.1 35 Although these factors do have
some bearing on the obstructiveness of misconduct, they are for the
most part subsumed by larger policy considerations reflected in the
variables suggested here.
IV. VARIABLES IN DEFINING THE ZONE BETWEEN
ADVOCACY AND CONTEMPT
This section identifies ten factors that should assist in making the
determination whether an attorney's behavior is contemptuous. These
variables derive from the analysis presented throughout this Article;
some of the factors have already been identified explicitly, others have
been implied. Together, they ptovide a calculus for resolving the
issues we have been discussing: determining the value of an attorney's
expression as against other interests of the administration of justice,
133. See, N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 94 (1973).
134. 619 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1981) (en bane).
135. Id. at 1369.
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measuring the harm to justice, ascertaining the degree of breathing
room and the dimensions of the buffer zone necessary to protect vigor-
ous advocacy, and deciding whether an attorney acted with the requi-
site wrongful intent.
Each of the variables examined below embodies several of these
overlapping concerns; and conversely, each of the concerns is reflected
in many of the variables. For example, whether the misconduct con-
stitutes a pattern or is only a single incident affects the determination
of all four issues. Assessing whether an attorney acted with wrongful
intent can involve the application of numerous variables, such as:
whether the attorney was warned, engaged in a pattern of misconduct,
or was persistent in her refusal to obey the court; and whether her
conduct constituted a gross deviation from the norms of trial practice
or affected the deliberative processes of the trial. The factors set forth
below are ordered in a very rough approximation of their importance
and the frequency with which they are likely to be applicable.
A. Is the Conduct in Question Advocacy?
I have previously suggested that advocative expression in the court-
room should be granted the broadest possible latitude, even where it
may interfere to some extent with other values of our system of jus-
tice. 136 Conversely, where neither advocacy nor the inevitable minor
excesses of advocacy are involved, in-court expression is deserving of
less protection, and here, attorneys should be held to an even higher
standard than non-lawyers. 137 Thus, for example, conduct disrespect-
ful to the court generally should be better tolerated where it has some
advocative content than where it does not. Expression that is wholly
proper advocacy within the rules and necessity of trial practice is
immunized altogether from the contempt power, regardless of its effect
on the proceeding. 38
136. See, e.g., Raveson, supra note 2, at 549-58 nn.264-80. As will be discussed shortly, an
important exception to this, or more accurately a clarification of what is meant by advocacy, is
where an attorney's conduct unfairly prejudices another party to the proceeding. See infra
Subsection IV.E.
137. Cf In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[L]itigants not even making a
pretense of self-representation are not to be afforded the same latitude of speech and action as an
attorney."); TRIAL DISRUPTION STANDARDS at 13 (1970) ("[A] layman ... cannot be held to the
same standard of decorum... expected of a member of the bar.").
138. See Holt v. Virginia, 434 U.S. 842, 381 U.S. 131 (1965) (neither attorney charged with
contempt nor his counsel could, consistently with due process, be convicted for contempt for
filing motions for change of venue and disqualification of judge because of alleged bias, where
words used in motions were in no way offensive in themselves, and were wholly appropriate to




The concept that advocative expression has a value that helps to
shield it from the contempt power has found its clearest way into the
law of contempt through the principle of good faith, enunciated by the
Supreme Court in In re McConnell.139 There, the Court reversed the
contempt conviction of an attorney who, in contravention of the
judge's repeated orders to stop arguing and not to ask certain ques-
tions of a witness, threatened to continue to ask the questions "unless
some bailiff stop[ped him]," and concluded that it was "essential to a
fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest,
good-faith efforts to present their clients' cases.""
This "good faith" standard correctly reflects the recognition of
advocacy's worth as it conflicts with order, respect, and obedience to
the court, and thereby narrows the range of conduct punishable by
contempt.1 4 1 Furthermore, it helps to draw an appropriate distinction
between an attorney's threat to disobey a court order controlling the
revelation of information to the jury, 42 which is within the furthest
limits of permissible, albeit emphatic and contentious, attempts to per-
suade the judge, and actual disobedience, which simply exceeds those
limits. 43 In the latter case, the attorney is usurping one of the judge's
most vital roles, to prevent the introduction of prejudice into the fact-
finding process that may irreparably subvert justice.
139. 370 U.S. 230 (1962); see also, United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965);
Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961); Sprinkle v. Davis, I1I F.2d 925
(4th Cir. 1940).
140. 370 U.S. at 236.
141. The good faith standard also implies a rather broad definition of what should be deemed
advocative for purposes of balancing against competing interests.
142. Here, I distinguish between a court order regarding the cessation of argument with the
court and one that affects what the jury will hear. As to the former, a violation by continuing to
argue with the judge is in essence synonymous with the threat to continue; both contravene the
command to accept the court's ruling, remain silent and allow the trial to proceed. With respect
to the latter, there is a clear distinction between the threat and the actual disobedience.
143. McConnell, itself, understands that crucial difference. As the Court noted, "the bailiff
never had to interrupt the trial by arresting [the attorney], for the simple reason that after [his
threats to do so, the attorney] never did ask any more questions along the line which the judge
had forbidden." 370 U.S. at 236.
The distinction has also played a role, for the most part implicitly, in other contempt decisions
where attorneys have threatened but not consummated disobedience or disruption. The case that
probably carries it furthest is In re Logan, 52 N.J. 475, 246 A.2d 441 (1968), in which a criminal
defense attorney overreacted when the trial judge sustained an objection during his opening
argument to the jury. The defense attorney vehemently challenged the court's ruling, moved for
a mistrial, and threatened not to continue as counsel in the case. After a recess until the next
morning, the trial court declared a mistrial and adjudged the attorney guilty of contempt. In
reversing the conviction, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that although an unwarranted
refusal to continue with a trial would constitute an obstruction and, therefore, could support a
finding of contempt, the attorney first should have been permitted to retreat from his position.
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In the former circumstances, however, where an attorney in an
overemotional moment threatens to engage in behavior that could
obstruct a proceeding, she should be given an opportunity to withdraw
from that threat prior to being charged with contempt. So long as
such threats are not part of a continuous pattern of behavior, they
should not be considered contemptuous unless the threats are carried
out. These threats usually are nothing more than momentary lapses,
or demonstrations of emphasis, provoked by the heat of courtroom
debate, and are not themselves obstructive of justice. 1" The most
appropriate way for a court to deal with overemotional behavior in the
courtroom that is not truly obstructive is to call a recess to allow a
cooling-off period145 rather than resorting to contempt sanctions. The
delay necessitated by a recess should not itself be deemed an obstruc-
tion. Recesses are an integral part of trial practice, and the need for
occasional breaks from the tensions of trials is an unquestionably fore-
seeable aspect of that practice-not a deviation from or an obstruction
of the normal processes of justice.
But the "good faith" standard, which has been regarded by many
courts and commentators as providing sufficient (if not excessive) limi-
tation on the substantive scope of the contempt power, 146 is not ade-
quate by itself to fulfill that function. For one thing, it fails to create a
buffer zone broad enough to protect conduct that cannot fairly be said
to comprise a good faith effort to advocate, but should nevertheless be
shielded from punishment because the conduct is an unavoidable by-
product of zealous lawyering. The good faith test may even suggest
the opposite, that attorneys' in-court behavior which does not consti-
tute good faith representation, such as mildly disrespectful remarks to
the judge, is actually obstructive. Such conduct, however, should not
be treated as obstructive or intentional merely because it is not consid-
144. Other variables also come into play in reaching the conclusion that such conduct is not
obstructive. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., In re Logan, 52 N.J. 475, 246 A.2d 441 (1968).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965); Parmelee Transp. Co. v.
Keeshin 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961); Note, Criminal Law-Contempt-Conduct of Attorney




ered a good faith effort to advocate;' 4 7 and doing so improperly con-
fuses the limits of condonable advocacy with contempt. 14
8
An even larger shortcoming perhaps is that we really do not know
what good faith representation is. Thus, whatever protection the stan-
dard presently affords is lost to its inherent vagueness; 149 the test needs
the same clarification through the identification of appropriate vari-
ables and the case-by-case application of these variables as the courts'
proscription against obstruction. Indeed, many of the variables
delineating the boundaries of both are the same.
147. See, eg., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979) (reversing contempt
conviction of attorney for slamming papers down on counsel table and breaking water pitcher in
fit of anger over adverse ruling); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing
contempt convictions for multiple insults to the trial judge). But see In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d
813 (1974) (affirming contempt convictions following full trial), cert denied, Dellinger v. United
States, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
The possibility of courts drawing this incorrect inference is particularly troubling with respect
to proof of intent. In other contexts where good faith operates as a defense, such as the good
faith immunity of governmental officials from damages, see generally Hyman, Qualified
Immunity Reconsidered, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1409 (1981), and the good faith exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence
seized pursuant to warrant issued without probable cause need not be excluded if officer
executing warrant relied in good faith on the defective warrant when gathering evidence), it is
not necessary to prove wrongful intent in order to obtain judicial relief. Thus, the failure of the
government official or officer claiming good faith to carry her burden of proof does not establish
any element that the opposing party had to prove in order to obtain relief, With contempt, by
contrast, the contemnor's failure to establish a good faith attempt to advocate might well be
mistaken for the wrongful intent necessary to constitute an offense.
148. See, ag., United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965) (court reversed contempt
conviction of attorney for making misstatements of material fact and improper inferences to the
jury, despite court's willingness to concede that counsel's beliefs as to statements and inferences
were not reasonable, because there was insufficient evidence of wrongful intent).
149. The Supreme Court's brief discussion in McConnell makes it extremely difficult to apply
the good faith standard with any precision in other cases; its articulation of the standard is
somewhat tautological:
The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client's case strenuously and persistently
cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an
obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty.
370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962).
The federal courts' disparate application of the good faith standard bears this out. Compare
Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) (rephrasing remark to jury in nearly same manner after
objection to remark sustained upheld as contempt) with Steinberg v. United States, 162 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1947) (conviction of attorney for attempting to rephrase questions to witness to which
objections sustained reversed), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 808 (1947) and Caldwell v. United States,
28 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1928); Phelan v. Territory of Guam, 394 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1968) (attor-
ney's repeated exceptions to court's ruling curtailing scope of cross-examination and comment
held not contemptuous) with United States v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1938) (repeated
exceptions to court's demand that attorney refrain from similar valid objections contemptuous).
Surely, many, if not most, of the contempt convictions of attorneys for continuing to argue with a
judge after being ordered to cease were well within the meaning of good faith representation.
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Any serious attempt to analyze the precise limits of proper or con-
donable advocacy, or to identify the characteristics that distinguish
advocacy from non-advocacy is beyond the scope of this Article. Suf-
fice it to say that given the enormous value of the most vigorous advo-
cacy to our system of justice, the guidelines should be generous in
permitting the broadest latitude, except where it reasonably might
prejudice another party. Although the ends of the spectrum between
yelling at the judge to drop dead and arguing an evidentiary issue are
clear, the area in the middle can appear murky. Recently, for exam-
ple, the attorney representing Oliver North yelled at Judge Gerhard
Gesell after being admonished by the court to be quiet at the counsel
table. As noted by Judge Gesell, the court understood the need for
North's counsel to create a record of judicial bias for a subsequent
appeal.15° Most likely, the conduct was not contemptuous, but was it
perfectly proper advocacy? Similarly, is it condonable advocacy for an
attorney purposely to exhibit disapproval, disagreement, or frustration
with the court after an adverse ruling in the hope of influencing the
judge's later decisions?'
Ultimately, the question regarding these examples and countless
others like them, is whether the conduct is obstructive and therefore
punishable. But, the answer to that question depends in part on how
we measure the proper advocative value of the behavior, and whether
the conduct exceeds the bounds of its worth.
B. Is Contempt the Least Restrictive Alternative?
The sine qua non of the contempt power is the courts' need to pro-
tect themselves from serious and immediate interference with their
business.' 52 It is only this compelling need that justifies the regulation
of expression through the contempt power and the imposition of sum-
mary procedures to try contempts. The Supreme Court has corre-
spondingly interpreted the federal contempt statute "to safeguard
150. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1988, § A, at 10, col. 5. This incident also exemplifies the proper
understanding and reserve of a trial judge in not escalating tensions into the kind of
confrontation between court and counsel that often leads to contempt.
151. Compare, In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990) (affirming contempt
conviction for facial gestures of frustration after adverse ruling) with In re Marra, No.
A-1204-82T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Feb. 14, 1984) (on file with the Washington Law
Review) (reversing several contempt convictions of attorney for sarcastic and disrespectful
comments in response to unfavorable rulings of court). Contempt convictions for this kind of
behavior are quite common.
152. See, e.g., In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38, 45 (1961), where the court stated:
"The summary contempt power is indeed awesome. Its nature is harsh, for despite such
antidotes as may be invented, the court is at once the complainant, prosecutor, judge and




constitutional procedures by limiting courts, as Congress is limited in
contempt cases, to 'the least possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed.' "153 Some state courts also have recognized this limitation on
the contempt power.1 54 The federal courts, and the state courts that
have so restricted contempt, have done so with respect to both the
substantive reach of the power'55 and the procedures utilized in con-
tempt proceedings. 15
6
It is not entirely clear whether the basis for the state courts' adop-
tion of the "least possible power" restriction is statutorily or constitu-
tionally based.157 Nevertheless, the "least possible power" limitation
should be recognized and applied in all courts as a reformulation of
the "least restrictive alternative" approach that courts have long used
in balancing the extent to which expression is prohibited or deterred
against the competing state interests furthered by enforcement of the
inhibition." 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court's utilization of the concept
of less restrictive alternatives seems to have begun with the Court's
limitation of the congressional contempt power, as noted above.1 59
The Court has progressively expanded its practice of seeking less dras-
153. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (citing Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 231 (1821)); accord In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1962). As noted by the Court
in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917), the power of Congress to punish for contempt
rests only upon "the right to prevent acts which, in and of themselves, inherently obstruct or
prevent the discharge of legislative duty."
154. See, e.g., Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P.2d 681, cert. denied, 350 U.S.
876 (1955); In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533, 539-40 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124
(1981); Peltier v. Peltier, 120 R.I. 447, 388 A.2d 22 (1978).
155. See, eg., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); United States v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13
(7th Cir. 1972); In re Ungar, 160 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div. 1978).
156. See, eg., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 417
A.2d 533, 539 (1980) (dictum), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 1124 (1981). The argument for doing so
has been quite cogently made by Professor Sedler. See Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power
and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 87-90 (1976)
(arguing that the less-drastic-means test requires that if summary procedures are not clearly
necessary to prevent courtroom disruption, their use "should be held violative of due process of
law, or at least prohibited as a matter of policy").
157. See, eg., Yengo, 417 A.2d at 539 (1980) ("least possible power" limitation based on
potential for abuse in summary contempt proceedings).
158. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNs~rruroNAL LAW 840-849 (1988):
[MWhenever it can be demonstrated that the result of the government's rule or policy is to
limit in some significant degree the ease or effectiveness with which a speaker can reach a
specific audience with a particular message, the government should lose the case unless it
can establish that an important public objective unrelated to the message would be sacrificed
by any less restrictive alternative.
Spece, The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only Intermediate and Only
Means-focused Review in Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV. 111, 135 (1988);
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
159. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 1017 (1974).
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tic means to facilitate the balancing of constitutional rights and gov-
ernmental interests in a large variety of areas.' 6°
In essence, the "least possible power" limitation embodies the con-
cept that if the processes of a trial have sufficient flexibility to absorb
or counteract the interference with various goals of justice from advo-
cative expression without resort to contempt sanctions, contempt is
inappropriate.16 1  If a court does not use less restrictive means at its
disposal to protect the court's business from interference, it essentially
will have failed to provide sufficient breathing space for advocacy. 62
There are a number of ways judges can reduce the possibility that
lawyers will engage in excessive conduct, and prevent excessive behav-
ior that does occur from obstructing justice, diminishing the need for
contempt sanctions. A central purpose of the balancing process in
contempt cases should be to maximize the overall value of the compet-
ing goals of justice. The balancing process that determines whether
particular conduct is obstructive must therefore consider the availa-
bility of an alternative to the exercise of the contempt power that
would achieve the same benefits with less inhibition of advocacy.
On the other hand, courts must be extremely careful not to assume
that whenever a judge sustains an objection, or strikes statements from
160. See Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a
Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case
Study, 21 ARIz. L. RExV. 1049, 1053 (1979) (search for less drastic means is "a part of the Court's
analysis in virtually every field of constitutional adjudication").
161. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13-14 (7th Cir. 1972). The court in Oliver
reversed several contempt convictions of an attorney for asking an allegedly improper question of
a witness and making inappropriate remarks in closing argument to the jury. The Seventh
Circuit stated, "even if it was evidentially improper, we see no reason why the trial judge could
not-by use of the least power necessary-have stricken it from the record with an appropriate
instruction to the jury to disregard the question." Id. at 13; cf Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (examination of Nixon's documents at historical archives upheld as
least drastic means of accommodating public need for information therein); Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280 (1981) (revocation of passport of former CIA agent unconstitutional because less
restrictive alternatives available to serve governmental interests).
162. For example, many of the confrontations leading to contempt citations seem avoidable if
judges ensure adequate opportunities for attorneys to argue fully and forcefully. Similarly, it is
important for judges to inform attorneys fully of the bases for rulings. Trial courts also can
establish ground rules before trial to put attorneys on notice as to the judges' expectations of
their conduct and her own; hold conferences with counsel to anticipate substantive, evidentiary,
and procedural problems in the case, and to discuss and alleviate existing tensions; set a fair trial
schedule permitting time for preparation and unexpected circumstances; use recesses to reduce
courtroom stresses; encourage more frequent briefing on critical issues and use of motions in
limine to clarify the course of the proceeding; assign a second judge in complex or controversial
cases to consult with the primary judge on difficult rulings and on questions of orderliness,
decorum, and the like, and to serve as a check on the primary judge's own emotional involvement
in the matter; and impose the court's moral authority through examples of competence,
intellectual honesty, and composure.
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the record, or instructs the jury to disregard something it has heard or
seen, these actions can effectively remedy the introduction of prejudice
into the decision-making process. Not only are such remedial actions
often unsuccessful, they may even emphasize the improper remarks
for the jury and make them more memorable. Thus, such measures
should not be applied automatically as less drastic alternatives to the
contempt power. If the prejudice from improper revelations of argu-
ment or information to the jury is minimal, however, and actions by
the court are likely to prevent the decision-making process from being
tainted, the use of the contempt power probably is not appropriate.
But, where the attorney's improper disclosure flagrantly violates the
rules of evidence or trial practice, and is sufficiently prejudicial that
the court's subsequent actions cannot reasonably guarantee that the
outcome of the trial will not be adversely affected, contempt is an
appropriate sanction. Indeed, in these circumstances, the contempt
power should be utilized more readily than it generally is at present.
One question that remains is how effective must the less drastic
alternative be for the court to be required to use it instead of the con-
tempt power? Although the answer must eventually evolve from a
case-by-case consideration of contempt citations in varied circum-
stances, the effectiveness of an alternative measure depends in large
part upon how we characterize the governmental interest to be pro-
tected. Consider, for example, a proscription against disseminating
literature door to door. If a court defines the purpose of the law as
ensuring that individuals in their homes should be spared any unin-
vited intrusion, it could not be fulfilled by a less drastic alternative. If,
on the other hand, the aim of the regulation is the prevention of unrea-
sonable or clearly unwanted intrusion, the purpose can be adequately
achieved by punishing individuals who call at home in defiance of the
previously expressed will of the occupant. 163
Applying this analysis to the law of contempt, if we characterize the
government's interest as protecting the court's dignity, or maintaining
163. See, eg., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943), from which this hypothetical
comes. There, the Court invalidated such an ordinance as applied to the dissemination of
religious circulars, by defining the ordinance's purpose narrowly. Part of the Court's analysis
was an assessment of the importance of the interest asserted by the government. Thus, in the
instant example, the Court necessarily concluded that any interest of the state in preventing all
uninvited intrusions was not weighty enough to justify the extent of the prohibition in question;
see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (invalidating anti-lealletting ordinances as
applied to religious and political literature). "If it is said that [the less drastic means of punishing
litterers and trespassers] are less efficient and convenient [than the law at issue], the answer is
that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and
press." Id.
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absolute control over a trial, few less drastic alternatives will be found
sufficiently effective to replace the contempt power. If the interest
sought to be protected is justice, with all its component parts, includ-
ing advocacy, a wider selection of less restrictive alternatives will be
available and will militate against use of the contempt power. Even if
the government's interest is characterized as total control over a trial,
however, the judge's ability to use ethical suasion and the authority of
her office, as well as other means less drastic than contempt, often will
alleviate the need for the contempt power.t 64 In fact, because the
unnecessary use of contempt sanctions is as likely to engender disre-
spect as respect for the court, less restrictive alternatives may at times
more effectively control a trial than the use of the contempt power. If
the governmental interest is characterized as the whole of the adminis-
tration of justice, less drastic means frequently will achieve that pur-
pose in response to conduct that threatens the court's interests in
respect, obedience, and order far more effectively than a contempt
citation. 165
C. Gross Deviation from the Norms of Trial Practice
One measure of what is appropriate, excessive, or obstructive in a
courtroom is the general experience of trial practitioners. Just as the
level of practice of a profession is an indication of the minimal stan-
dard of adequate representation in malpractice cases, 1 6 6 and claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, 167 so too should the norms of trial
164. For example, many of the confrontations leading to contempt citations seem avoidable if
judges ensure adequate opportunities for attorneys to argue fully and forcefully. Similarly, it is
important for judges to inform attorneys fully of the bases for rulings. Trial courts can also
establish ground rules before trial to put attorneys on notice regarding the judge's expectations of
attorney conduct, hold conferences with counsel to anticipate substantive evidentiary and
procedural problems, and to discuss and alleviate tensions. Trial courts can also establish fair
trial schedules permitting time for preparation and unexpected circumstances, use recesses to
reduce courtroom stress, provide for more frequent briefing on critical issues, and use in limine
motions to clarify the course of proceedings. It is also possible for courts to assign a second judge
in complex and controversial cases. This would serve as a check on the primary judge's
emotional involvement and impose the court's moral authority through the example of
competence, intellectual honesty, and composure.
165. Some courts mistakenly define the purpose behind the contempt power as the inhibition
of any conduct a judge deems destructive to justice. Under this characterization of the
government's interest, no less drastic means could be remotely as effective, for it is precisely
because of the harshness and arbitrariness of the power that contempt is such a powerful
deterrent. That is at the heart of what is wrong with the power. Thus, that purpose must be
deemed insufficiently important or legitimate to justify such an expansive view of the contempt
power. See supra note 163.
166. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 162 n.46 (4th ed. 1971).





practice be considered in determining the outer limits of permissible
and vigorous advocacy. Presumably, attorneys for the most part do
not often intentionally obstruct the administration of justice. Indeed,
there usually is little incentive for an attorney or any other participant
in a judicial proceeding to be obstructive. 68 The risk of antagonizing
a judge or alienating a jury combined with the risk of contempt sanc-
tions usually provides a deterrent so that intentionally obstructive con-
duct is rare.169 In many trials, and in virtually all serious and lengthy
proceedings, however, there are confrontations between the court and
counsel, repetitive or excessive argument after orders to cease arguing,
and lapses of composure that breach decorum and sometimes suggest
disrespect for the court. If these excesses of emotion or inevitable
lapses are features of every-day trial practice they ought not be consid-
ered the kind of conduct that constitutes contempt. 170  The contempt
168. Professors Dorsen and Friedman concluded after a comprehensive survey that there was
"no serious quantitative problem of disruption in American courts." N. DORSEN & L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 133, at 6. Attorneys presumably make an effort to comply with ethical
obligations not to obstruct judicial proceedings. See, eg., Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d
291, 359 P.2d 274, 10 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1961), where the court stated:
The very fact that each of opposing counsel is dedicated, within the high obligations of his
profession, to protect the interests of his client and at the same time to "maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers" should provide the questing judge with a
ready source of help in his difficult problems.
359 P.2d at 281 (citation omitted) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6068 (West 1990)).
169. See, eg., Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mem, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981).
170. These kinds of momentary lapses, which almost no attorney can avoid entirely in serious
trial practice, are a common feature of judicial proceedings. See eg., In re McConnell, 370 U.S.
230 (1962) (attorney threatened to continue asking questions of witness in violation of court's
order until stopped by a bailiff); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979) (attorney
slammed papers down on counsel table and broke water pitcher in reaction to adverse ruling),
rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); George v. Toal, 6 IlM. App. 3d 329, 286 N.E.2d 41 (1972)
(reversing contempt of attorney for shouting at opposing counsel: "May I complete my GOD
DAMN statement?"). These inevitable by-products of courtroom tensions and aggressive
advocacy usually should not be seen as contemptuous, for some combination of the variables
suggested in this Article: advocacy is often involved in such incidents; they are single occurrences
rather than repeated patterns; they do not adversely affect the deliberative processes of a trial;
they tend to be inadvertent or reflexive rather than deliberate and intentional; they are not gross
departures from the norms of trial practice because such incidents occur occasionally in most
trials and are committed from time to time by most attorneys; they frequently involve some
provocation by the judge or opposing counsel; and less restrictive and equally effective
alternatives to contempt are almost always available to remedy any harm caused by the excesses.
Even where such a lapse cannot reasonably be viewed as advocative, these other factors most
often militate against considering it contemptuous. These lapses are rarely anything more than
minor ventings of pent-up emotions or frustration, directed, at times, as much at the attorney
herself as at the court or opposing counsel. See, eg., George 286 N.E.2d at 42 (reversing
contempt of attorney for single vulgarity in course of hotly contested trial outside of hearing of
jury).
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power should be reserved for obstructions resulting from gross devia-
tions from the standards of ordinary trial practice. 1 '
Four important policy considerations would be served by the appli-
cation of a gross deviation standard. First, measuring the conduct of
potential contemnors against the norm of common practice provides a
more objective measure of whether the conduct is obstructive. If the
behavior in question is common to most trials, surely it is a more tena-
ble conclusion that punishing such conduct is not necessary to the
courts' self-preservation than that most trials are being obstructed.
Moreover, if the rules or norms governing attorneys' behavior are not
well settled, unless conduct breaks the rules egregiously, it seems inap-
propriate to deem the conduct obstructive.172
Second, comparing the conduct of contemnors to the norms of gen-
eral trial practice would also build into the calculus of contempt sensi-
tivity to evolving standards and techniques of advocacy. As with
analogous comparisons in professional malpractice cases, 173 a relevant
standard of reference may be practice in a geographical community or
within a subset of trial practice, such as criminal practice generally
(or, more specifically, capital cases174). Similarly, some allowance
should be made for inexperienced attorneys when measured against
the practice of more seasoned trial practitioners. It takes considerable
time and effort to find one's voice as a trial lawyer to the point where
171. See, e.g., People v. Kurz, 35 Mich. App. 643, 651, 192 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1971):
Unless a lawyer's conduct manifestly transgresses that which is permissible it may not be
the subject of charges of contempt. Any other rule would have a chilling effect on the
constitutional right to effective representation and advocacy. In any case of doubt the doubt
should be resolved in the client's favor so that there will be adequate breathing room for
courageous, vigorous, zealous advocacy.
These standards obviously should be applied independently with respect to the various roles of
all the different participants in the trial process. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345,
366-67 (7th Cir. 1972) ("misbehavior" that will support contempt conviction is conduct inappro-
priate to the "particular role of the actor, be he judge, juror, party, witness, counsel, or specta-
tor").
As noted earlier, codes of ethics and disciplinary rules also properly provide a standard of
reference for an attorney's courtroom conduct. See supra note 127. Only a gross departure from
the rules of ethics should trigger the use of contempt sanctions. See, e.g., In re Hinds, 90 N.J.
604, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (1982) (disciplinary rule sanctioning attorney conduct "prejudicial to the
administration of justice" applied only in situations involving conduct flagrantly violative of
accepted professional norms).
172. This may be particularly true where contempt sanctions are imposed for prejudicial
conduct that does not result in a mistrial or reversal of the verdict, because the harm to justice in
such circumstances is less clear.
173. See, e.g., Moore v. Reynolds, 63 N.C. App. 160, 303 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1983).
174. In these latter categories of cases, we might expect to find a more vigorous level of
practice generally on the part of the defense bar, and a greater number of minor excesses and
lapses due to the emotionally charged nature of the proceedings.
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one is able to balance successfully in a serious case vigorous represen-
tation with an attorney's obligation not to exceed the limits of the
law. 175
Third, reference to the general practices of courtroom behavior will
ensure that the contemnor has reasonable prior notice that her behav-
ior is obstructive. 176 Moreover, an attorney's wrongful intent can be
fairly presumed only from patent misconduct. Attorneys have no
ready gauge that tells them precisely when they are committing con-
tempt. Rather, they must look for guidance not only to the cases in
which contempts have been upheld, but also to the countless trials in
which aggressive and even excessive advocacy has not been cited as
contempt. A court's decision not to press contempt charges for
aggressive advocacy may be interpreted as an indication that the
behavior is not contemptuous; otherwise the court would have found it
necessary to punish the conduct to ensure order. Given the great diffi-
culty in defining contempt, judicial determinations not to cite for con-
tempt may create reasonable expectations that similar behavior is not
contemptuous. 177
Indeed, there is a great deal of lore concerning some of our most
respected trial attorneys that demonstrates an admiration for aggres-
sive and excessive advocacy. 178  Although some of the conduct
175. Similarly, an attorney's experience plays a significant role with respect to her
understanding of what conduct is expected of her.
176. This kind of notice is different from the notice given when the judge warns an individual
that her behavior is considered obstructive. Even where a judge issues such a warning, it may
still be proper not to accede immediately to the judge's command, and failure to heed the
warning may be excusable, and not contemptuous. See infra Section IV.D. A judge's warning,
unlike the notice that is provided by the norms of practice, does not have the same indicia of
objectivity to guide attorneys' conduct.
177. One also might view the warnings given in other cases as setting limits on the scope of
permissible advocacy, but with the understanding that it may be necessary to establish the limits
and give notice of them before holding an individual in contempt for transgressing them. See,
e.g., State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d. 188, 290 (1987) (putting prosecutors "on notice
that in the future" violations of special ethical rules in capital cases will be referred by state
supreme codrt for disciplinary action).
178. Earl Rogers, a well known American defense attorney of the early part of this century,
was quite adept at using his face to achieve desired effects. According to one writer, Rogers'
scornful stare at a state's witness was sufficiently disconcerting to draw from the witness exactly
the kind of defensive response he sought. A. COHN & J. CHisoLM, TAKE THE WrrNEss! 77-78
(1934).
Likewise, Clarence Darrow, perhaps the most revered trial lawyer in American history,
utilized trial tactics that undoubtedly would lead to contempt citations against mortal lawyers.
Among his ploys was a habit of talking (apparently spontaneously) to the jury from counsel table
while a state's witness was testifying. For example, while Harry Orchard testified for the state
during the murder trial of "Big" Bill Haywood, Darrow suddenly cried out from counsel table,
"Sometimes I think I am dreaming in this case." I. STONE, CLARENCE DARRow FOR THE
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described in these accounts has been considered contemptuous, much
of it is revered as the work of master practitioners. 179 When such con-
duct is emulated by others, a court should be reluctant to view it as
obstructive and contemptuous.
180
There is a fourth policy consideration furthered by application of a
gross deviation standard. So long as contempt is limited to the fla-
grant transgressions of accepted trial practice rules, we need be far less
concerned with chilling valuable advocative expression.
There is a danger, however, in looking to the general practice to
define contempt. If the normal level of practice falls short of the limits
that should define the most aggressive permissible advocacy because,
for example, of the deterrent effect of the contempt power, an attorney
practicing at the appropriate limits might be viewed as being obstruc-
tive and contemptuous.'811 Thus, while a gross deviation from the nor-
mal standards of trial practice should generally be considered a
prerequisite to a finding of contempt, that does not mean that every
large deviation from those standards is obstructive. To the contrary,
such deviations may sometimes extend aggressive advocacy to new
limits without being obstructive, and even more often may be excusa-
ble under the circumstances of the particular proceeding. Indeed, an
attorney's flagrant departure from the norms of practice may at times
be required by her obligations as counsel, in circumstances where the
gross excesses of other participants in the trial process, including the
judge, threaten the integrity of the trial. 82
DEFENSE 318-19 (1941). Neither Rogers nor Darrow were cited for contempt for these
incidences.
179. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 75.
180. The suggestion was offered earlier that allowances should be made for less experienced
attorneys. In practice, however, more experienced attorneys, and particularly the best reputed,
are often excused for conduct that less well-known attorneys could not dare without serious risk
of sanction. Probably, this is due in part to the fact that older attorneys have ongoing and
longer-standing professional, if not personal, relationships with the judges before whom they
appear, and in part because the profession (including judges) looks to the most experienced
attorneys to set the standard for permissible advocacy. Thus, courts should consider that when
these attorneys are not cited for contempt, it affects what is considered contemptuous and the
quality of notice to the bar of what is considered non-punishable.
181. The converse possibility-that if the general level of practice is obstructive, courts would
not be able to punish obstructive conduct as contempt-should not be a problem. Courts can
reset the limits of advocacy by giving notice that obstructive conduct that had not previously
been treated as contempt will in the future be punishable.
182. See, e.g., Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 359 P.2d 274, 280, 10 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1961):
It may be that... [ilt is unheard of... for counsel to interrupt the judge when the jury is
being instructed. But it is also well nigh unheard of for the trial judge, after the jury have
deliberated for three weeks in a capital (or any other) case, to recall them and express to
them his opinion that the defendants testified falsely and prosecution witnesses told the
Vol. 65:743, 1990
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Finally, an additional aspect of the issue whether an attorney's
behavior is flagrantly excessive is whether the behavior is verbal or
non-verbal. The vast majority of contempt citations are issued in
response to verbal behavior. However, a significant percentage of con-
tempt convictions do punish non-verbal actions. 8 3 When an attorney
is physically violent"8 or a defendant throws an object at the judge,i8 5
the obstructiveness and contemptuous intent of the actions generally
are quite clear. Similarly, where non-verbal gestures, are used as a sub-
stitute for language, such as sticking out one's tongue at the judge,
they are no different from disrespectful remarks with the same mean-
ing. On the other hand, some non-verbal actions may be obstructive
but not contemptuous when an adequate explanation justifies the con-
duct. For example, when an attorney fails to appear during a trial,
whether the failure to appear is contemptuous or not depends on
whether the absence is excusable. " 6 The difficult issue with regard to
non-verbal conduct is when tone of voice, physical gestures, or facial
expressions, which are not clear substitutes for speech,. are interpreted
as disrespectful and therefore deemed obstructive and contemptuous
themselves, or are considered contemptuous in combination with
other conduct, such as argument or remarks to the court.
187
One of the most obvious problems with finding non-verbal expres-
sions contemptuous is their ambiguity. What is meant by a "smirk,"
or the screwing up of one's face, or body language? This ambiguity
makes the determination of contempt almost entirely dependent upon
the trial judge's subjective perceptions of disrespect; physical gestures
truth .... It is clear that under the circumstances of the case at bench [defense counsel], if
not required to make, was at least justified in presenting, immediate objection.
183. See, eg., In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990) (affirming conviction for
disrespectful facial expressions).
184. In re Vincenti, 92 N.J. 591, 458 A.2d 1268, 1275 (1983) (attorney disciplined for, among
other things, intentionally bumping another attorney with his stomach and shoulder).
185. See eg., Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 435 Pa. 290, 255 A.2d 548 (1969) (contemnor
convicted for throwing book at trial judge), rev'd, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971).
186. See, eg., In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 124,417 A.2d 533, 540 (1980) (generally, absence of
attorney alone does not constitute contempt; an essential element of the offense is the inadequacy
of the explanation), cert denied, 447 U.S. 1124 (1981).
187. See eg., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 370 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Of course, the
manner in which insulting remarks, not obstructive of themselves, are leveled may accomplish an
obstruction."); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1980) (Skillman, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part); cf Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191, 1198
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (motion to overturn jury verdict on ground that trial judge called attorney
"insolent" in jury's presence denied: "What this trial lawyer . . . fails to reveal is that his
comment [to the court] was uttered belligerently, his facial expression recorded contempt, his
movements depicted disdain for the trial judge .. "), aff'd mem, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981).
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and vocal inflections simply are not reviewable by an appellate court
because they do not appear with any accuracy on the record. Mild
disrespect is a tenuous enough basis for contempt charges when it is
unequivocal. Where the disrespect must itself be gleaned from
momentary physical gestures, that difficulty and the potential for mis-
interpretation due to personalization by the judge are greatly
increased.
Facial expressions and physical gestures may often be unwitting and
inadvertent as well, raising serious questions about whether the attor-
ney intended to obstruct justice. More importantly, the degree of con-
trol required not to speak is far less than that necessary to remain
physically impassive throughout a trial. 88 That kind of exquisite con-
trol may be possible only at the price of stifling emotional ardor and
chilling vigorous advocacy.
Moreover, it may be entirely proper for attorneys to react physically
and demonstrate emotion during a trial as an aspect of their advocacy,
as long as the gestures or expressions are not overtly disrespectful of
the court, disruptive, or prejudicial to a party. 1 89 Too ready a resort to
the contempt power therefore could chill not only the necessary emo-
tion of attorneys but deprive them of an accepted means of advocative
expression as well.
Although attorneys should be free to demonstrate some disagree-
ment with the court through physical expressions and even to react
non-verbally to the testimony of witnesses and the argument of oppos-
ing counsel, physical gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice
should not be completely insulated from the contempt power.
Momentary signs of frustration in reaction to a court's rulings perhaps
should never be considered contemptuous, but clear patterns of audi-
ble laughter, finger pointing, and smirking, especially after warnings to
cease, at some point can become sufficiently disruptive or disrespectful
188. Indeed, it is commonplace for judges to make facial grimaces and other physical
gestures, and even verbal remarks, indicating their agreement or disagreement with, or approval
or disapproval of, statements by witnesses and attorneys. These reactions can add the authority
of the court to one side or the other in a trial, and have a profound impact on the jury's
determination of a case. The fact that judges exhibit this kind of behavior as often as they do is
another indication of how difficult it is to exercise total control over one's every reaction in the
tumult of trial practice.
189. Sir Thomas Erskine, an eighteenth century English barrister who defended Thomas
Paine, argued for the propriety of emotionality in advocacy:
If an advocate entertains sentiments injurious to the defence he is engaged in, he is not
only justified, but bound in duty, to conceal them; so, on the other hand, if his own genuine
sentiments or any thing connected with his character or situation, can add strength to his
professional assistance, he is bound to throw them into the scale.




to obstruct the proceeding.'9 0 Given the greater ambiguity and lesser
volition and intent usually associated with non-verbal gestures and
expressions, however, courts should show more restraint when evalu-
ating whether such conduct is contemptuous than when evaluating
verbal expressions of presumably similar content.
D. Notice and Warnings
Because the limits of condonable advocacy and the standards for
defining contempt are at best uncertain, whether an attorney is on
notice that conduct is within the prohibition of contempt laws is criti-
cal. When an attorney is on notice that her conduct exceeds the outer-
most bounds of tolerable expression, either because the violation of the
norms of trial practice is clear or because of a warning by the judge,
not only is the problem of fairness under the doctrine of vagueness
ameliorated, but an inference of wrongful intent can more readily be
drawn. Furthermore, where a court actually warns an attorney not to
continue engaging in specific conduct, 191 the refusal to comply brings
into play an additional element of potentially obstructive behavior-
disobedience to the court's command.
192
Where a contempt charge is leveled for violation of a court's ruling
or order, the court's command must be clear and clearly breached for
the conduct to be contemptuous. 193 Although many court orders are
unambiguous, others may leave room for interpretation or even
become inapplicable at later points in a trial. For example, evidence
that presently is irrelevant and excluded by the court might later
become relevant upon the introduction of other evidence or because an
adversary opens the door to its admission. It is also not uncommon
190. See, eg., In re Stanley, 102 NJ. 244, 507 A.2d 1168 (1986) (continuous repetition of all
of these forms of conduct along with sarcastic comments to the court found contemptuous and
deserving of disciplinary action).
191. I draw no principled distinction here between a "warning" by the court as opposed to an
"order," nor do I think such a distinction is appropriate. Where the warning is clear, it expresses
the court's command with all the authority of an order. In both instances, however, whether the
court explicitly threatens contempt sanctions may be important. See infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
In addition, where a court issues an "order" adjudicating the substantive rights of a party, the
failure of a litigant to comply with the order triggers another set of issues concerning contempt as
a tool to enforce litigant's rights and the court's power, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
192. The same might be said of patent violations of clear rules of trial practice, whether set by
a trial judge or by the appellate courts. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
193. See, eg., State ex rel City of Pacific v. Buford, 534 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (to
support charge of contempt for disobedience of a court order, the order will not be expanded by
implication, but must be so specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt as to its
meaning).
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for judges to make inconsistent rulings.1 94 In circumstances such as
these, aggressive advocacy may demand that attorneys make efforts
artfully to avoid strict compliance with an order harmful to their cli-
ents' cases. That does not mean, of course, that attorneys are free to
ignore rulings of the court. It does suggest, however, that room for
reasonable doubt with regard to a ruling should be resolved by further
subjecting it to the adversarial process, not by making this behavior
punishable by contempt and thus encouraging self-censorship. 95
On the other hand, where it is clear that a prior court ruling might
realistically be violated by the revelation of potentially prejudicial
information to the jury, attorneys probably do have an ethical obliga-
tion to inform the court and allow the judge to determine the admissi-
bility prior to the revelation.1 9 6 For example, an attorney should
discuss ahead of time with the judge her intention to make a certain
closing argument that might be excluded by a prior ruling. Similarly,
questions which themselves reveal potentially inadmissible and preju-
dicial information to the jury should be asked first out of the presence
of the jury to give the judge a chance to rule on the admissibility of the
answer, and thus on the propriety of the question. However, an attor-
ney probably has no duty to clear questions with the court that do not
reveal information to the jury where a prior ruling does not unambigu-
ously disallow them; and attorneys certainly should not be subject to
the contempt power for doing so."' The imposition of such a duty
would improperly shift the role of an attorney from an advocate to
that of a neutral officer of the court.
19 8
There are more difficult questions. When should a warning be a
prerequisite to a contempt citation, and when is the violation of a clear
warning or order in itself obstructive? As to the first question, given
the difficulty of defining with any precision the reaches of the con-
194. Nor is it unusual for a court, or, after a question to a witness was found to be
objectionable because it would elicit an inadmissible response, to allow the question to be
reworded notwithstanding the fact that the same response was called for.
195. The degree of clarity of an order often depends on the stage of the trial. Some orders
that may have originally seemed ambiguous or unclear in scope are likely to become clearer as
the trial progresses, as the parties and the court become more familiar with the facts and legal
issues involved in a particular case, and after many of the evidentiary questions framed by the
issues in the trial are resolved by the court.
196. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 251 n.275.
197. See, e.g., In re Ungar, 160 N.J. Super. 322, 389 A.2d 995, 1000-01 (App. Div. 1978)
(reversing contempt conviction of attorney for asking improper question of witness because no
evidence of bad faith).
198. Indeed, often attorneys see the problems in their own cases far more clearly than either
opposing counsel or the court. Thus, it would be unfair to require revelation of those problems
unless the failure to do so could cause prejudice.
Vol. 65:743, 1990
Advocacy and Contempt
tempt power, warnings give specific notice to potential contemnors
that, in the judge's opinion, the conduct in question is improper. If no
warning or ruling is issued by the court to set specific limits on an
attorney's conduct, the court should be less willing to consider the
behavior contemptuous.
This is not to say that a contempt citation always is improper in the
absence of a prior warning. Some kinds of misbehavior, such as a
gross insult to the court, or the revelation of clearly inadmissible and
highly prejudicial evidence to the jury, are so egregious as not to
require a warning; 199 attorneys are on notice that such conduct is con-
temptuous by their knowledge that, under any standard, this behavior
is obstructive of a trial.2 °
Where the transgression of a norm of trial procedure or the obstruc-
tiveness of an attorney's expression is less clear, however, warnings
may provide the requisite degree of certainty lacking in the law of
contempt.201
199. See, eg., United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1965) (affirming contempt
conviction of attorney for grossly disrespectful statements to the court, despite the fact that no
explicit warning was given: "[w]hile warnings have been given by Courts in some of the cases,
and we deem this practice generally desirable, we do not believe warnings were essential where,
as here, the conduct was clearly contemptuous"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966); see also
MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952);
Tarrant v. State, 537 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (although a trial judge is generally
required to caution an attorney that her actions can result in a contempt citation, repeated
attacks against the personal integrity and credibility of opposing counsel are contemptuous on
their face and a warning is not required), review denied, 544 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1989) (en bane).
200. See, eg., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding contempt
conviction of an attorney for substituting, without the court's knowledge, another person in place
of the defendant at the counsel table; the court rejected the attorney's argument that he could not
be held in contempt for violating the custom and practice of which he lacked notice because lack
of awareness too improbable), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Gordon v. United States, 592
F.2d 1215 (1st Cir.) (where criminal defendant stated he did not recognize totally corrupt,
flimflam kangaroo court proceedings and accused the court of engaging in flagrant, outrageous,
criminal misuse of judicial process, the conduct was self-noticing and no warning was necessary
as a prerequisite to a contempt citation), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979); United States v.
Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1965) (affirming contempt conviction of an attorney who had
charged that the trial court was conducting a drumhead court-martial, and a star chamber
proceeding, and that the trial judge's rulings smacked of Stalinism and Hitlerism, the Sixth
Circuit noted that although warnings are generally desirable, they are not essential where
conduct is clearly contemptuous), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966).
201. See, eg., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1973) (reversing contempt conviction of
witness for using phrase "chicken shit" as characterization of person he believed had assaulted
him). In Eaton, in a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated:
[B]efore there is resort to the summary remedy of criminal contempt, the court at least owes
the party concerned some sort of notice or warning. No doubt there are circumstances in
which a courtroom outburst is so egregious as to justify a summary response by the judge
without specific warning, but this is surely not such a case.
Id at 701.
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Some courts, therefore, have properly required that where an attor-
ney might otherwise not have adequate notice of her conduct's
obstructiveness, the court must give a warning prior to any exercise of
the contempt power.2"' Some courts have gone a step further by sug-
gesting that, where an individual's behavior is not such a flagrant
transgression of the rules of trial practice as to be self-evident, a court
warning is a prerequisite to contempt.20 3 Such warnings state the trial
judge's view of the limits of courtroom conduct more emphatically
than orders simply to refrain from specific behavior.
Absent one or both of these types of warnings, it is difficult to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that an attorney acted with wrongful
intent except with respect to the most flagrant obstructions. Thus, a
warning that particular behavior is considered contemptuous, accom-
panied by a reasonable opportunity to cease the behavior, z° would
advance the interests of justice in response to all but the most egre-
gious misconduct. In the absence of a clear pattern of misbehavior,
moreover, such warnings would appear to be appropriate after each
individual incident prior to issuing a contempt citation. On the other
hand, where a pattern of obstructive conduct is involved, a sufficiently
strong inference of wrongful intent may fairly be drawn if a warning
was given at some point; failure to warn on the actual occasion for
202. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (although
language of Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require that warning be
given before court exercises its summary contempt power, courts have recognized that such
warnings are preferable); In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969)
(reversing attorney's contempt convictions for addressing remarks in sarcastic voice,
accompanied by disrespectful gestures, to judge and a witness). The Hallinan court said:
It appears appropriate to once more emphasize... that "[t]he heat of courtroom debate,
particularly where liberty is concerned, often gives rise to persistence on the part of counsel.
If the words used by counsel are respectful and pertinent to the matter before the court, it is
not unnecessarily burdensome to require the judge first to warn the attorney that his tone
and facial expressions are offensive and tend to interrupt the due course of the proceeding.
Otherwise, attorneys could be subjected to fines and jail sentences because of personal
annoyance and pique on the part of trial judges; and these penalties could be rendered
unassailable ... by ... recitals in the orders of contempt respecting the demeanor of the
contemnor."
459 P.2d at 299.
203. See, e.g., In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272, 1276 (4th Cir.) (where contemnor engages in
repeated pattern of misconduct, in which each isolated instance is insufficient by itself to
constitute contempt, trial court must provide fair warning that a contempt conviction may
ultimately result from a "last-straw" repetition of identified conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834
(1980); United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial judge should have
explicitly warned the contemnor that refusal to answer a question could be found contemptuous
in a summary proceeding); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 366 (7th Cir. 1972) (failure of
court to warn contemnor that borderline conduct is considered contemptuous could be fatal to
conviction when behavior could not reasonably be believed by contemnor to be improper).
204. See infra Subsection G.
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which a contempt charge is leveled should not be a prerequisite to
conviction.2"5 Warnings are especially necessary where the behavior
complained of consists of tone of voice, physical gestures, or facial
expressions, which may be entirely inadvertent.20 6 Requiring a warn-
ing and a chance to refrain from engaging in the offensive conduct
would ensure that only behavior which is intentionally defiant of the
court's authority is treated as obstructive.
One important exception, however, is that an unambiguous warning
not to disclose potentially prejudicial information or argument to a
jury should not have to include a specific threat of contempt.20 7 The
importance of protecting the deliberative processes of a trial justifies
imputing notice, at least to seasoned trial attorneys, of the obstructive
effect of such misconduct. Indeed, the vulnerability and the critical
significance of the integrity of a jury's decision-making put attorneys
on notice that a deliberate attempt to place improper information
before the jury, in violation of a clear order, is obstructive.
Finally, the most difficult issue with respect to court warnings is
whether an individual's failure to comply with one is itself contemptu-
ous, or whether the violation of a warning or order elevates the
obstructiveness of otherwise borderline conduct to the level of con-
tempt. Courts have held that even where an attorney's behavior is not
itself obstructive, failure to comply with a court's warning to cease the
behavior does constitute contempt. For example, in State ex rel.
Smith v. District Court, 20 8 an attorney stood up and interrupted oppos-
ing counsel in the course of arguing a motion to the trial court.
Despite being ordered several times by the court to be seated, the
attorney remained standing and was summarily convicted of
contempt.20 9
205. See, eg., In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272 (4th Cir.) (because contemnor was explicitly
told after extensive pattern of misbehavior that further interruptions of the judge or unwarranted
remarks to witness would result in confinement, contemnor need not have been specifically
warned about the last incident, which may be used by court to charge the entire course of like
antecedent conduct), cert denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
206. See, eg., In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
207. See eg., United States v. Renfroe, 634 F. Supp. 1536 (W.D. Pa.) (experienced attorney
need not be specifically warned that behavior was contemptuous when he has been advised by
court on several occasions that argument made in closing to jury was improper), aff'd mer., 806
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1986).
208. 210 Mont. 344, 677 P.2d 589 (1984).
209. The Supreme Court of Montana upheld the conviction, noting that:
It should be emphasized that Mr. Smith is not being punished for exercising his right as
an attorney to stand up, represent his client's interests and object to testimony. This
conduct in and of itself is not contemptible. However, the further refusal to sit down when
so ordered by the court clearly can constitute contempt.
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On the other hand, courts also have reversed contempt convictions
where attorneys and pro se litigants had been cited for failing to stop
arguing despite repeated orders to do so.E 1 The conflict between these
lines of authority reflects the very essence of the tension between advo-
cacy and contempt. Does the trial court's word state the absolute
limit of advocacy, beyond which an attorney is acting contemptuously,
and if not, what does? Although conduct such as arguing with the
court would never constitute contempt if the judge did not order the
conduct to stop, such conduct does become obstructive in contraven-
tion of the court's repeated orders to cease. Similarly, when a single
incident of misconduct, such as laughing at the judge or slamming
papers down on counsel table, is insufficient to constitute contempt,
but a repeated pattern of such behavior would obstruct the proceed-
ing, should a single warning to desist from the conduct be adequate to
charge contempt for the next occurrence?
The answers to these questions lie in understanding that although
warnings often are necessary to provide notice to attorneys in order to
prevent vagueness, warnings do not resolve the constitutional infirmity
of vesting virtually unchecked discretion in the hands of the officials
enforcing contempt laws. Nor, more importantly, does determinative
reliance on warnings, or more precisely on the limits drawn in individ-
ual cases by trial judges, maximize the aims of justice in the mix of
competing values at a trial. To be sure, the limits a trial court places
on expression in the court are an important and proper factor in deter-
mining whether conduct is obstructive. But there also must be other
objective measures of the propriety or obstructiveness of counsel's
actions besides the trial judge's own personal standards.21 Nor is it
Id. at 591; see also People v. Boynton, 154 Mich. App. 245, 397 N.W.2d 191 (affirming contempt
conviction of attorney for continuing to argue with the trial court over the scope of a ruling after
court warned that further discussion would result in contempt citation), appeal denied, 426
Mich. 878 (1986).
210. See, e.g., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); In
re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975); State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 430, 521 P.2d 668 (1974).
211. See, e.g., Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 399 (reversing numerous contempt convictions of
attorneys for persisting in continuing argument on motions and rulings after express orders by
the trial judge to cease). The Dellinger court said:
While McConnell cannot be read as an immunization for all conduct undertaken by an
attorney in good faith representation of his client, it does require that attorneys be given
great latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy. Appellate courts must ensure that trial
judges . . . are not left free to manipulate the balance between vigorous advocacy and
obstructions so as to chill effective advocacy when deciding lawyer contempts.
Id. at 398; see also People v. Ravitz, 26 Mich. App. 263, 182 N.W.2d 75 (1970). In Ravitz the
trial judge held in contempt an attorney who, during an extremely vigorous cross-examination of
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appropriate for a court to prohibit-through the threat of contempt-
any excess of emotion by a participant in the trial process. The milieu
of trial practice is too emotionally laden, and some outbursts too inad-
vertent, inevitable and unobstructive, to permit such warnings them-
selves to define the reach of the contempt power.212 The very purpose
of using objective criteria to determine the reach of the contempt
power would be soundly defeated if the requisite quantum of objective
obstructiveness could be derived solely from an attorney's failure to
obey the court's warning.
As noted earlier, a number of courts have approached this issue by
attempting to draw an absolute, mechanical distinction between a
"lawful" order of the court, the disobedience of which constitutes con-
tempt, and an order that exceeds the court's powers, which can be
disobeyed with impunity.2"' In these cases, contempt convictions for
continuing to argue with the trial court after being told by the court to
cease were reversed. Although the courts' instincts were correct, the
particular device chosen to implement them is somewhat misguided.
Obviously, these cases do not mean that all orders which would be
reversed by an appellate court, or even those which are unquestionably
incorrect, are "unlawful. '214 If attorneys had no enforceable obliga-
an elderly witness in an effort to discredit her identification of his client, rephrased questions
previously asked despite several cautions from the court to refrain from doing so. The subjectiv-
ity of the trial court's standards as to the proper scope of cross-examination and the determina-
tion of contempt is revealed and magnified in a statement by the judge that reflected the tension
between the court and this particular attorney: "Just a minute witness-we have had trouble
with you before, Mr. Ravitz, in this Court and you complained to the University of Michigan
and other places about the way I conduct examinations." Id at 77-78.
Thus, it was easier than it often is for the appellate court, in reversing the contempt convic-
tions, to conclude that the trial judge did not "exercise the degree of restraint which is imposed
upon ... the judiciary with its attendant summary power to punish for contempt." Ia at 78.
Unfortunately, even this level of subjectivization of the standards for contempt, based on prior
relationships and resentments, is not unusual given the ill-defined and virtually unchecked nature
of the courts' power.
212. See, ag., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing contempt
convictions for continuing to argue with the court after orders to cease). The Seale court stated,
"[w]e do not say that automaton-like reflexive obedience to the court's orders is necessary to
avoid a contempt citation. The law does not expect inhuman responsiveness. A certain amount
of leeway must be allowed." Id.
213. See cases cited supra note 110; see also Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463,
163 P. 237 (1917) (order refusing to allow attorney active participation in the trial was unlawful
and failure to comply does not constitute contempt).
214. In other contexts, courts have held that certain judicial orders are unlawful because the
court lacks jurisdiction to enter them, and therefore a violation of the order is not punishable as
contempt. See ag., Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316, 318 (1951) (attorney
could not be held in contempt for refusing to answer trial court's question of whether attorney
was a member of the Communist Party because court lacked jurisdiction to ask question). For
example, orders to compel testimony that violate a witness' fifth amendment privilege against
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tion to obey those kinds of orders, trial judges would lose the degree of
control they should appropriately have over a trial. Rather, when the
cases refer to unlawful or invalid orders, they must mean a court's
wholesale negation of the valid role of attorneys to advocate.2z 5
A trial court's denial of an attorney's role and obligations is most
glaring where the judge does not permit an attorney to argue at all.
Such an order or warning by the court, however, is not technically
"unlawful," as if the court lacked jurisdiction to make it or because it
is unconstitutional. But such an order should not be enforceable by
the contempt power because it wholly interferes with the attorney's
obligations and proper function in our system of trial practice. An
attorney who violates this order is only doing exactly what we demand
in representing her client and protecting the administration of
justice.216
self-incrimination have been held to be "unlawful" in that sense. See, e.g., Maffie v. United
States, 209 F.2d 225, 226 (1st Cir. 1954) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)).
Where such an order does not violate the privilege, however, a witness' refusal to testify can be
punished by contempt sanctions. Thus, the courts' nomenclature of "unlawful" orders in this
context permits consideration of the validity of the underlying order in a contempt proceeding
for violating the order. See, e.g., Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87; United States v. De Lucia, 256
F.2d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 1958) (defendant entitled to claim fifth amendment privilege in the
context of a pending denaturalization proceeding when defendant's answers would furnish
evidence needed by the government to prosecute defendant for a federal crime). The only real
justification, however, for singling out judicial orders that impinge upon the self-incrimination
privilege derives not from the constitutional norm protected by the privilege, but from the
inadequacy of appellate review of such orders, prior to an individual's choice either to violate
them or irrevocably reveal privileged information. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 572-73,
nn.320-22 and accompanying text. Indeed, judicial decisions discussing whether particular court
orders are unlawful and beyond a court's jurisdiction or merely erroneous, are very haphazard.
See Rodgers, The Elusive Search for the Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal
Contempt Proceedings, 49 B.U.L. REv. 251, 272-78 (1969); Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to
Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948-1949).
215. As the Supreme Court of California noted:
The judge . . . should always appreciate that in the trial of a lawsuit the court is not
composed of himself alone . . . . Each [the judge, the prosecutor, and the counsel for
defendant] has his role and each in our scheme of things is equally essential to the concept of
due process .... A fair trial is the product of the contributions of the judge and of all
participating attorneys.
Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 359 P.2d 274, 280-81, 10 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1961)
(reversing contempt convictions of attorney who, against the court's express order, objected
when the trial judge interrupted the jury's deliberations in a homicide prosecution after three
weeks, and informed jury of judge's views on comparative credibility of certain witnesses).
216. See Cooper, 55 Cal. 2d at 302, 359 P.2d at 280. The Cooper court concluded:
It is clear that under the circumstances of the case at bench [the attorney], if not required
to make, was at least justified in presenting, immediate objection to the . . . procedure
followed by the judge, which included, firstly, the interruption by the judge of the jury's
deliberations, secondly, the substance of the judge's statement and, thirdly, the manner of its
preparation (without participation of counsel) and presentation (without previous notice to
counsel or opportunity given them to interpose objections). In view of these unusual
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These same considerations often are present, however, even when
the court is not preventing an attorney from arguing altogether, but is
prohibiting a lawyer from completing an argument, making an addi-
tional point, or attempting to probe the outer parameters or steadfast-
ness of a court's ruling. There is no principled line to draw between
these connected bands on the spectrum of advocacy; under the latter
circumstances, a court would be negating the attorney's role just in the
former, by not extending adequate leeway to argue. Here, the appro-
priateness, and perhaps even the duty, of defying a court's warning to
stop arguing makes contempt sanctions inappropriate.2 17 This is par-
ticularly true because there frequently may be no effective appellate
remedy to protect the parties' interests if the trial judge errs in making
a ruling.2 18
circumstances, [the attorney] must indeed have been surprised to discover, when he
attempted to protect his client's interest in a respectful manner, that he had instead
jeopardized such interest by putting himself in a situation where he was held in contempt in
the presence of the jury.
IaM
217. Se4 eg., State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 430, 521 P.2d 668 (1974) (reversing contempt
conviction of attorney who continued to argue after being ordered to remain silent and be
seated). The court in Pokini stated:
A lawyer, when engaged in the trial of a case, is not only vested with the right, but, under
his oath as such officer of the court, is charged with the duty of safe-guarding the interests of
his client in the trial of an issue involving such interests. For this purpose, in a trial, it is his
sworn duty, when the cause requires it, to offer testimony.. . in support of his case in
accordance with his theory of the case, to object to testimony offered by his adversary, to
interrogate witnesses, and to present and argue to the court his objections or points touching
the legal propriety of impropriety of the testimony or of particular questions propounded to
the witnesses. If, in discharging this duty, he happens to be persistent or vehement or both
in the presentation of his points, he is still, nevertheless, within his legitimate rights as an
attorney, so long as his language is not offensive or in contravention of the common rules of
decorum and propriety. As well may be expected in forensic polemics, he cannot always be
right, and may wholly be wrong in his position upon the legal question under argument and
to the mind of the court so plainly wrong that the latter may conceive that it requires no
enlightenment from the argument of counsel. But, whether right or wrong, he has the right
to an opportunity to present his theory of the case on any occasion where the exigency of the
pending point in his judgment requires or justifies it.
Id. at 674 (quoting Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 163 P. 237, 242 (Sup. Ct.
1917)); see also Cooper, 359 P.2d at 281 ("It scarcely seems necessary to point out that when an
attorney is presenting an objection or motion in contested litigation he is engaged in a trial, and
reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his motion is as fundamental as is the right to
counsel." (citation omitted)); In re Sanborn, 208 Kan. 4, 490 P.2d 598, 608 (1971) (reversing
contempt conviction of attorney for arguing with court against order not to do so). In Sanborn,
the court noted the difficult balance between the duties of the judge and counsel because of
"aggressive advocacy on each side appropriate to the heat of the particular skirmish." Id at
608-09; see also Exparte Shortridge, 5 Cal. App. 371, 90 P. 478, 481 (1907) (reversing contempt
conviction of attorney for arguing to court on behalf of absent client after court ordered him to
cease).
218. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 571-76.
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To some degree, then, although the inquiry into whether a trial
court's order is "lawful" may not be particularly helpful, looking to
see whether the court's action is egregiously incorrect can help deter-
mine the breathing room needed by an advocate attempting to protect
the client's interests. While a judge's erroneous order does not justify
outrageously obstructive conduct by counsel, it is understandable that
an attorney would feel an obligation to advocate to the furthest limits
in response to a judge's flagrantly erroneous rulings or conduct that
might hopelessly prejudice the client's case, 2 19 and argue less vehe-
mently where the court is clearly correct.22°
Because it is better for the ends of justice that attorneys sometimes
be permitted to ignore a court's warning, and because it also is not
very clear exactly when that is the case, attorneys must have sufficient
latitude to advocate in the face of a warning to cease, without fear of
punishment. A warning by the court should help to establish the lim-
its of that leeway. Indeed, a warning is a critical factor in determining
whether particular advocacy is condonable or not; but the warning
should not be decisive of whether any violation of the warning is con-
temptuous. To make that determination, we must look at all of the
variables influencing that decision.22'
219. See, e.g., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 231-33 (1962) (trial judge's erroneous ruling
and order that attorney could not place offers of proof on the record placed contemnor in
dilemma between obeying the court's direction and his obligation to create an adequate record
for appellate review and, therefore, excused the attorney's belligerent threat of disobedience);
Cooper, 359 P.2d at 280 (extraordinary circumstances of trial judge interrupting jury
deliberations after three weeks in homicide trial to instruct jurors of judge's own views of
comparative credibility of witnesses excused and perhaps required defense counsel to interrupt
the judge with objections).
220. An attorney's excessive reaction to a clearly correct ruling of the court, however, does
not necessarily render the conduct obstructive. See, e.g., In re Logan, 52 N.J. 475, 246 A.2d 441,
442 (1968) (contempt conviction of attorney who refused to continue trial after judge sustained
proper objection to his opening reversed because court did not give attorney a chance to continue
trial after a cooling-off period). Such excesses may be no more than the excusable lapses that
occasionally are unavoidable in the course of trial practice. See supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
221. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972). As the Seventh Circuit
recognized in In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975), the line between when an attorney's continued argument
in the face of warnings to cease is permissible advocacy and when it is punishable obstruction
"[a]dmittedly ... defies strict delineation." The Dellinger court's ambivalence with respect to
this issue, or perhaps more accurately, its frustration with not being able to resolve the issue with
greater precision, is apparent in the opinion. For example, Dellinger rejects the holding of the
Supreme Court of California in Cooper v. Superior Court that "'Ithe power to silence an
attorney does not begin until reasonable opportunity for appropriate objection or other indicated
advocacy has been afforded.'" 359 P.2d at 278. The Dellinger court deemed appellate review a
sufficient deterrent to judges from arbitrarily cutting off argument, and reversal a sufficient
corrective where a trial judge prejudicially denies counsel adequate opportunity to argue. The
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E. Misconduct That May Affect a Trial's Deliberative Processes
Where an attorney clearly exceeds the limits of permissible advo-
cacy and prejudices another party in the proceeding, the misconduct
generally should be viewed as significantly more obstructive than simi-
lar behavior that' has no adverse impact on a trial's deliberative
processes.222 Unfortunately, our understanding of the appropriate
limits of advocacy (short of use of the contempt power) is not
extremely clear. Courts and commentators disagree on a plethora of
issues concerning the ethics and propriety of many kinds of advocacy.
For example, there are both supporters and critics of trial attorneys'
common practices of discrediting accurate testimony, presenting the
testimony of a witness that the lawyer believes to be perjured, and
counseling a client in such a manner as to faeilitite perjured testi-
mony.223 Similarly, people disagree about, and trial judges have diver-
gent standards for, the permissible scope of opening and closing
arguments to the jury.
court stated elsewhere: "attorneys may [not] press their positions beyond the court's insistent
direction to desist .... The necessity for orderly administration ofjustice compels the view that
the judge must have the power to set limits on argument." 461 F.2d at 399.
At the same time, however, Dellinger states:
[w]here the judge is arbitrary or affords counsel inadequate opportunity to argue his
position, counsel must be given substantial leeway in pressing his contention, for it is
through such colloquy that the judge may recognize his mistake and prevent error from
infecting the record. It is, after all, the full intellectual exchange of ideas and positions that
best facilitates the resolution of disputes.
Id Dellinger's identification of the competing tensions here is exactly on the mark. The Dellin-
ger court's attempt to resolve these tensions incorporates a number of the variables suggested
here, although in a slightly eviscerated form: (1) some sort of buffer zone around advocacy ("by
our resolving doubts in favor of advocacy, an independent and unintimidated bar can be main-
tained while actual obstruction is dealt with appropriately,"), id at 398; (2) the need for trial
judges to avoid inhibiting valuable advocacy ("We simply encourage judges to exercise tolerance
in determining [the] limits [on argument] and to distinguish carefully between hesitating,
begrudging obedience and open defiance."), iad at 399; and (3) the distinction between an order
or warning of the court and the court's "insistent direction to desist," id) But in the end even
Dellinger, one of the highwater marks in the protection of advocacy from the power of contempt,
relies too much on the efficacy of appellate review and too little upon the other variables that
assist in determining whether conduct is obstructive to precisely identify the contours of the zone
necessary to provide adequate breathing room for advocacy.
222. Cf. State ex rel Spencer v. Howe, 281 Or. 599, 576 P.2d 4, 6 (1978) (statute defining
contempt of court for witness' refusal to answer reflects important policy "to distinguish sharply
between the gravity of those acts of contempt that disrupt proceedings or prejudice the 'right or
remedy' of a party to a proceeding and other acts defined as contempt which do not result in such
disruption or prejudice").
223. Compare Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966) with Noonan, The Purposes ofAdvocacy
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. RaV. 1485, 1487-91 (1966).
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For many of these issues, the contempt power does not and need not
play much of a role. The availability of case-related sanctions, such as
mistrial or reversal, will sometimes deter excessive or improper advo-
cacy. Moreover, courts have a wide range of tools at their disposal to
compensate for violations of procedural justice and minor threats of
prejudice to a trial's deliberative processes. More often than not, these
kinds of violations of the norms of practice will not sufficiently distort
the administration of justice to rise to the level of an obstruction. Jus-
tice is resilient enough to absorb much of the give-and-take of advoca-
tive excess and trial error. Instructions from the judge, the
counterarguments of opposing counsel, other evidence, and the com-
mon sense of the jury all work to prevent much of attorneys' improper
advocacy from affecting the outcome of a trial.224 Where they do not,
there is always appellate review.
The problem is, however, that the court, opposing counsel, and
appellate review often may not provide an effective remedy for trial
error. The harmless-error doctrine prevents many excesses of advo-
cacy, which may have affected the deliberative processes of a trial,
from constituting a basis for reversal.225 Thus, appellate review not
only fails to ensure that forensic misconduct does not taint a jury's
decision-making, but also fails to deter such misconduct.226 Where
224. This concept is very much like that adopted by courts to excuse most perjury from the
reach of contempt. See, e.g., In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (reversing contempt
conviction for perjury). In Michael the court held:
All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment
not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate
objective of a trial. It need not necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process.
For the function of trial is to sift the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence, and to do
so the fact-finding tribunal must hear both truthful and false witnesses.
Id. at 227-28; see also Dobbs, supra note 69, at 194 ("The lying witness is one of the things the
system is designed to cope with through devices such as cross-examination."). Where the ordi-
nary processes of a trial may not expose and rectify improprieties, however, it is more important
to use the contempt power for that purpose and as a deterrent. Thus, for example, when an
attorney suborns perjury or tampers with documents, courts are less reluctant to use contempt to
punish such misconduct. See, e.g., In re Melody, 86 Ill. App. 2d 437, 229 N.E.2d 873 (1967)
(contempt conviction for suborning witnesses' oaths to forged will), rev'd on other grounds, 42 Ill.
2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104 (1969); People v. Gerrard, 15 Ill. App. 2d 301, 146 N.E.2d 229 (1957)
(contempt is appropriate for an attorney who encouraged court reporter to change transcript to
conform to attorney's memory, but where no willful contempt was proven); Butterfield v. State,
144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1944) (holding attorney in contempt for substituting forged page
in a pleading).
225. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 575-76, n.327-31 and accompanying text.
226. See id. at notes 445-55 and accompanying text. Similarly, the threat of mistrial also may
be an ineffective deterrent. Courts are often reluctant to call a mistrial, especially towards the
end of a protracted and serious matter. See United States v. Lowery, 733 F.2d 441, 445 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984). Furthermore, attorneys may, at times, even try to create
conditions justifying a mistrial, as an alternative to a probable verdict against them.
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improper advocacy does not affect the outcome of a case, appellate
review and case-related remedies do nothing to inhibit blatant miscon-
duct that could have had that effect-such remedies do not address the
violation of the norms of procedural fairness. Even if an attorney's
misconduct does result in a reversal, there may be little deterrent effect
on future misbehavior.
For these reasons, where an attorney violates a clear rule of evi-
dence or trial practice, producing a high potential for prejudice, con-
tempt ought to be considered an appropriate remedy.227 Courts have
in fact utilized the contempt power for this purpose where the only
offensive quality of an attorney's conduct was its potential for unfair
influence on a jury's decision-making.2"' Many more decisions hold
that the combination of placing prejudicial argument or information
before the jury, coupled with disobedience of a judge's order not to do
so, or disrespect to the court, is contemptuous.229 In these circum-
stances, the leeway that otherwise should be given to attorneys to
advocate vigorously and fight with the court is properly restricted
230
227. This suggestion is the converse of the earlier argument that the lack of an effective
appellate remedy should increase the courts' tolerance of vigorous advocacy. See Raveson, supra
note 2, at 567-79. Here, it is urged that the potential failings of appellate review justify sterner
restrictions on a particular class of courtroom expression. Both concerns, however, emanate
from the same basic interest in protecting the integrity of the results of a trial. Both theories
regulate the permissible range of advocacy where the deliberative process is not adequately
safeguarded by other mechanisms in the judicial system.
228. See, eg., Lowery, 733 F.2d 441 (attorney held in contempt for asking improper question
on cross-examination); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (contempt
conviction of attorney upheld for substituting someone at counsel table for his client with intent
to cause misidentification), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d
842, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (misconduct included asking questions that were highly prejudicial to
the witness and for which there was no foundation), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 11 (1954);
United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court dismissed indictment after
concluding that remedies for prosecutor's presentation of double hearsay and erroneous
information to grand jury are contempt or dismissal of indictment); Alexander v. Chapman, 289
Ark. 238, 711 S.W.2d 765 (1986) (contempt sanctions may be imposed upon counsel for asking
improper leading questions).
In these cases, and others like them, the obstructiveness of the attorney's conduct derived
solely from the improper interference with the deliberative process. The attorneys had not
previously been ordered by the court to desist from the behavior; nor was the conduct insulting
to the judge.
229. See, eg., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (contempt citation
appropriate where prosecutor makes flagrantly improper summation, in violation of court order
to desist), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880, 886 (9th
Cir. 1950) (persistent improper cross-examination despite rulings of the court), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 952 (1951); In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Hawk v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 128, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 726 (1974) (improper impeachment of
witness by attempting to show he was in jail), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
230. Nonetheless, it should be noted that although some misbehavior, such as disrespect to
the court or disorder, may rarely threaten to prejudice another party, if the misbehavior is severe
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out of considerations of fairness to the opposing party. Attorneys'
obligation to struggle with the judge and opposing counsel to further
their clients' interests does not imply permission to ignore established
rules of practice to the detriment of opposing parties. But where the
violation of accepted standards of trial practice is not clear, or the
revelation to the jury is not substantially prejudicial, the accommoda-
tion and encouragement of zealous representation require that the
behavior not be treated as contempt.2 3
What is surprising, however, is the scarcity with which the con-
tempt power is used to punish flagrantly improper behavior that is
prejudicial to an opposing party.232 Prejudicial argument to a jury or
questions to a witness that clearly exceed the proper bounds of advo-
cacy pose a much greater threat to the fairness of a trial, and probably
to the public's and the bar's respect for the court as an institution of
justice, than most of the conduct for which attorneys actually are held
in contempt.233 And in this, we can detect an ironic consistency. The
relative paucity of contempt sanctions for conduct prejudicial to an
opposing party probably stems from the same roots as the surfeit of
contempt sanctions for non-prejudicial but mildly disrespectful or dis-
enough it may violate another party's right to a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 278 S.C. 296,
295 S.E.2d 627, 629-30, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
231. See, e.g., Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1973) (contempt citation against
prosecutor for improper argument to jury reversed, because argument could not have affected the
defendant adversely when jury made critical determination regarding his guilt), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1161 (1974); United States v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972) (contempt conviction
for asking improper questions to witness overturned; the court noted, "the lack of any finding by
the district judge that Oliver knew or should have known that the questions exceeded the bounds
of conduct appropriate to his role as trial counsel we think substantiates our view that Oliver's
conduct did not exceed the 'outermost limits' of vigorous advocacy"); United States v. Sopher,
347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965) (misstatements of material facts by attorney in closing argument to
jury not contemptuous because court lacked positive evidence of a deliberate intent to pursue a
course of improper argument); In re Ungar, 160 N.J. Super. 322, 331, 389 A.2d 995, 1000-01
(App. Div. 1978) (attorney may be held in contempt for asking a question designed to mislead
the jury or prejudice an adverse party, but contempt conviction reversed because attorney's
mistaken belief that factual basis existed for asking prejudicial questions negated inference of
wrongful intent).
232. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 585-89. This is especially surprising because many courts
decry such abusive litigation practices and even seem to recognize that contempt sanctions may
be the only practical means of controlling them. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168
(1986); United States v. Cox, 664 F.2d 257 (1 th Cir. 1981); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d
1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
233. For example, compare Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 n.12 (prosecutor who in closing
argument expressed personal opinion about defendant's guilt, called defendant an "animal," and
said he could see defendant with his face blown away by a shotgun not charged with contempt;
Supreme Court held defendant was not deprived of fair trial) with In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570
A.2d 416 (1990) (defense attorney held in contempt for momentarily laughing under his breath




orderly behavior. Both phenomena reflect a undervaluation of the
importance of fairness in process and outcome compared to the more
ritualistic aspects of the judicial process. Thus, not only does the
courts' reluctance to exercise the contempt power to punish prejudicial
misconduct diminish the integrity of a trial in a particular case, and
the deterrence of such misbehavior in the future, it also undermines
the value of advocacy itself, as balanced against other goals of justice.
The worth of vigorous and proper advocacy lies precisely in protecting
the very same interests in the justness and fairness of a judicial
proceeding.234
What also seems strange about courts' collective attitude is that mis-
conduct which is both blatant and prejudicial can easily be regarded as
disobedient to the courts' commands (through settled law of appellate
courts) and disrespectful of the inherent authority of the trial judge,
who is charged with the enforcement of those commands. Thus, even
if the contempt power were unrelated to the function of safeguarding
the decisional processes of a trial,235 which can be protected by case-
related remedies, one would expect that absolute disregard for the
ground rules by which the court operates would trigger more frequent
imposition of sanctions.236 The fact that it does not reveals a tension
234. The inadequacy of the courts' protection of vigorous advocacy has not escaped the
notice of commentators in other contexts. For example, Professor Rudovsky complains of the
lack of judicial commitment to the ideal of truly effective assistance of counsel. See Rudovsky,
The Right to Counsel Under Attack 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1965, 1972 (1988) ("While we are
increasing our ethical demands on defense counsel, we denigrate the central purpose of the sixth
amendment: meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.").
235. The dynamics of a trial are designed to deal with prejudicial misconduct, without need
for resort to the contempt power. Most courts have accepted this theory to immunize most
perjury from contempt sanctions. See supra note 94. In fact, as discussed in the text, contempt is
also inappropriate where a proceeding can absorb prejudicial misconduct because the violation of
accepted norms of practice is not flagrant, or the prejudice is insignificant. Moreover, with
respect to perjury, unlike the prejudicial behavior of a lawyer, the criminal penalties available to
punish false testimony under oath should be an adequate deterrent. Using the contempt power
to punish perjury in a system where truth often is measured in light of the results of a trial can
inhibit the level of participation and candor needed from witnesses at a trial. See supra note 94.
Conversely, so long as an attorney's prejudicial misconduct is only punished when the violation
of practice rules is clear, valuable advocacy should not be chilled.
236. An argument, however, can be tendered that it is the immediacy of the defiance of a trial
court's direct order that adds to the obstructiveness of that misconduct, and more clearly reveals
a wrongful intent. Indeed, the immediacy of defiance is a factor that should be weighed in
determining whether an obstruction occurred. See infra notes 253-61. Nevertheless, even if the
purpose of contempt is not to protect against the interjection of prejudice per se, a rule of trial
practice should be unambiguous, and violation of the rule must be flagrant to constitute
contempt. Moreover, where an attorney's behavior can affect the outcome of a trial, the attorney
should know she must be more deliberate in her expression. In such case, grossly prejudicial
misconduct can again be fairly viewed as intentional and outside the permissible range of battling
over a court's ruling. Finally, where the effect of misconduct is considered in determining
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at the heart of the contempt power that strains the substance and pro-
cedures of the law: judges impose most contempt sanctions for con-
duct that they regard as threatening to their own authority, or
insulting to their dignity. Such reactions by trial courts to perceptions
of personal affront or offense to personal sensibilities pervades the law
of contempt.237 A great number of contempt convictions are over-
turned because appellate courts said that the conduct in question did
not obstruct the proceedings, or that the trial judge was personally
embroiled in the matter and was, therefore, ineligible to try the con-
tempt summarily. 238 This is the flip side of the coin of undervaluing
advocacy in relation to obedience, order and respect.
One factor that can profoundly affect whether the deliberative
processes of a trial might be obstructed is the presence or absence of
the jury when misconduct occurs. Most misconduct that improperly
influences the decision-making processes of a trial, such as the revela-
tion of inadmissible and prejudicial information, is of concern only
when the jury is present to observe the conduct. Judges presumably
are capable of preventing prejudicial information from infecting their
own decision-making, because judges frequently must hear inadmissi-
ble and prejudicial facts and argument when ruling on their admissi-
bility. The truth-finding function of a trial can be seriously impaired
by misconduct such as insulting the judge sufficiently to interfere with
the judge's ability to function, or by failing to comply with a sequestra-
tion order for witnesses. But even these examples of misbehavior are
considerably more obstructive when they are viewed by the jury, or
ultimately affect the information that the jury hears. For example, an
attorney who improperly intimidates or insults a witness during cross-
examination may obstruct the search for truth by adversely affecting
whether conduct is contemptuous, that factor makes up for the fact that the behavior is not in
immediate defiance of a direct order from the trial court.
237. Overestimation of th6 value of respect for the court in comparison to the fairness and
outcome-oriented goals of justice probably derives in part from the history of the contempt
power, which "evolved from the divine law of kings, and its aspects of obedience, cooperation,
and respect toward government bodies." R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 11 (1963). At
the same time, however, the desire of the judiciary to ensure its own dignity and authority surely
played a role in the unfolding of that history. Indeed, it continues to play a major role. As the
Supreme Court noted in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952):
It is almost inevitable that any contempt of a court committed in the presence of the judge
during a trial will be an offense against his dignity and authority. At a trial the court is so
much the judge and the judge so much the court that the two terms are used
interchangeably in countless opinions in this Court and generally in the literature of the law,
and contempt of the one is contempt of the other.
238. E.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 15 (1954) (reversing contempt conviction




the witness' performance. Were the cross-examination to take place
with the jury present, the search for truth might be further hampered
by a lowered estimation of the witness in the jurors' eyes.
Obstructive conduct that is disrespectful to the court is enhanced
when it occurs in front of the jury. As discussed earlier, the offensive
character of disrespectful remarks to a judge derives largely from the
potential of conduct to taint the deliberative processes of a proceed-
ing.239 To the extent that the obstructive quality of disrespect inheres
in the harm done to the perception of a judicial proceeding as a sacro-
sanct ritual, the demonstration of disrespect in front of a jury is more
obstructive not only because it occurs before a larger audience whose
esteem for the judicial system may be tarnished, but also because dis-
respect in the presence of the jury is a greater incursion upon the for-
mal ritual of judicial proceedings. For this reason, and because of the
potential adverse impact an attorney's misconduct can have on a jury's
decision-making, lawyers are on notice to be more careful when the
jury is in the courtroom. Thus .an attorney's misconduct in front of
the jury often permits a more probative inference of wrongful intent.
The need for order also may be greater when the jury is present.
Disruption and disorder can be confusing to jurors and thereby affect
the deliberative process. Moreover, disorder, like disrespect, can affect
the jurors' perception of ritual in the courtroom. Finally, the need to
prevent delays is generally more important in a jury trial, where the
jurors might have to give up additional days from their lives if cumula-
tive disruptions extend the length of the trial.
Considering the significance of the jury's presence to a determina-
tion of obstruction, it is surprising that most courts ignore the issue
and some have gone so far as to deny any connection whatsoever.2 4°
Nevertheless, a few courts recognize that misconduct occurring
239. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 370 (7th Cir. 1972) ("A showing of
imminent prejudice to a fair and dispassionate proceeding is, therefore, necessary to support a
contempt based upon mere disrespect or insult."); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mer., 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838
(1981). The Dixon court said:
The disrespectful approach is bound to bring on judicial retort if the jury is not to be
"lost"--i.e., if its members are (or even one is) made to look upon the judge as "weak," they
are very likely to pay little attention (even without disclosure) to the law charged by an
infirm judicial officer, one for whom they have lost respect.
Id. at 1198.
240. See, eg., United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir. 1965) (upholding contempt
conviction of attorney for disrespectful remarks to court because "[t]he fact that all except one of
[the remarks] did not take place in the presence of the jury did not make them any the less
contemptuous"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966); In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 530 A.2d
1260, 1281 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990); State v. Gonzalez, 134
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outside the jury's presence is less likely to be contumacious.2 4  A
greater number have intimated the relevance of this factor by mention-
ing whether or not a jury was in the courtroom. 24 2
F. Pattern or Single Incident
All other things being equal, an isolated instance of misconduct is
less likely to obstruct justice than a pattern of misbehavior. Similarly,
several incidents during the course of a one-day trial will be more
obstructive than the same number of incidents distributed out over the
length of a longer proceeding.243 Of course, misbehavior is not neces-
sarily obstructive merely because it is repeated. Conversely, even a
single incident, if sufficiently obstructive, can constitute contempt.
But in a close case, repetition of the offending conduct may be one key
to determining whether the conduct obstructed the administration of
justice. For example, arguing with the judge on one or two occasions
after a ruling probably would not be obstructive. But repeating this
behavior throughout the duration of a trial may sufficiently obstruct
the efficiency of the proceeding as to constitute contempt. 24  Simi-
larly, if a judge has issued warnings to an offending individual to cease
misbehavior, a pattern of misconduct also suggests more direct defi-
ance of the court's authority, which may constitute obstruction.2 45
N.J. Super. 472, 341 A.2d 694, 697 (App. Div.), vacated in part and aff'd in part, 69 N.J. 397,
354 A.2d 325 (1975).
241. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 647 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 446
U.S. 754 (1980); Dixon, 490 F. Supp. at 1198 (trial attorneys have right to object to trial judge's
questions, but must be respectful; "[tihis is especially imperative when the jury is present");
George v. Toal, 6 Ill. App. 3d 329, 286 N.E.2d 41 (that remarks were made outside presence of
jury could be considered in assessing contemptuous effect of conduct); cf United States v. Marra,
482 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]hile an orderly refusal [to testify] in the added presence
of the jury may increase the chance of demoralization of the court's authority that fact alone...
does not usually embarrass the court sufficiently to warrant summary contempt procedure.").
242. See, e.g., MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 162 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 953 (1952).
243. Professors Dorsen and Friedman also make this point. See N. DORSEN & L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 133, at 94.
244. See, e.g., Schiffer, 351 F.2d at 94 (affirming as contempt a pattern of disrespectful
conduct toward judge):
In the present case the evidence must be viewed in the background of a bitterly contested
trial charged with emotions, where things are sometimes said that should have remained
unsaid. Here, however, we do not have an isolated outburst in the heat of a trial, but rather
deliberate, continuous and repeated acts, extending throughout the trial, which were wholly
unwarranted.
245. See, e.g., Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974).
The Weiss court held:
Due process requires, we think, something more serious than a minor disagreement, such
as may often and understandably follow an attorney's failure strictly to comply with this
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Isolated instances of misbehavior certainly can obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. But such misconduct must be egregious, such as
physical violence, gross disrespect, or prejudicial argument to a jury
clearly exceeding the scope of the issues in a case. Mere delay result-
ing from a single instance of excessive argumentation, minor disre-
spect demonstrated by a momentary lapse of composure after an
adverse ruling,'4 or a single failure to heed an instruction of the court
to remain silent, would rarely be considered an obstruction of justice
by the vast majority of the bench and bar. Some courts have held that
such conduct does constitute contempt.247 Better reasoned decisions,
however, properly demonstrate a greater tolerance for what is often
nothing more than a transient loss of composure brought on by the
pressures of trial practice,24 with no real adverse effect on the admin-
istration of justice. Even an overt insult aimed at the judge, at least
when uttered by a non-attorney,249 is not terribly obstructive if it is the
product of a single emotional outburst, rather than a pattern of con-
duct repeated throughout the proceedings.250 Moreover, to the extent
that one justification for the contempt power is to prevent misconduct
from recurring, an isolated instance of misbehavior provides little basis
for inferring that the offensive conduct will continue.
Behavior which is not excessive or offensive, even if it borders on
being so, should never be considered obstructive regardless of how
type of order, before a contempt citation can be issued. In general, the misconduct must
entail a persistent disregard for the court's authority that the attorney could have avoided
through a reasonable, good faith effort.
Id. at 980-81 (citation omitted).
246. See, eg., In re Logan, 52 N.J. 475, 246 A.2d 441, 442 (1968) (attorney refused to
continue with trial after court sustained objection to his opening statement to jury).
247. See, eg., People v. Boynton, 154 Mich. App. 245, 397 N.W.2d 191 (questioning court's
evidentiary ruling after warning to cease held contemptuous), appeal denied, 426 Mich. 878
(1986); In re Daniels, 118 NJ. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990) (affirming contempt conviction of
attorney for smirking at judge after adverse ruling).
248. See, eg., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 374-76 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing four
contempt convictions as legally insufficient, including remarks that the judge was a "blatant
racist", was "railroading" the defendant and that "they got you [the judge] running around here
violating my constitutional rights.")
249. See State v. Jones, 105 N.J. Super. 493, 253 A.2d 193, 199 (Essex County Ct. 1969)
(defendant's utterance in court of profanity at the judge not contempt, because his action
"created no disturbance or disorder in the courtroom, and... the proceeding then in progress
continued uninterrupted").
250. See; eg., In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272 (4th Cir.) (affirming contempt conviction of pro
se defendant for pattern of conduct, when individual incidents themselves were insufficient to
justify sanctions), cert denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); Tarrant v. State, 537 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (affirming contempt conviction of attorney because his "continued improper and
unethical behavior was not an isolated incident of improper behavior"), review denied, 544 So. 2d
201 (Fla. 1989) (en banc); Jones, 253 A.2d at 199 (single utterance of profanity by pro se
defendant did not sufficiently interfere with trial as to warrant contempt sanctions).
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often it is repeated. For example, conduct at the outermost bounds of
protected advocacy should not only be permissible, but also
encouraged. However, isolated instances of misconduct that are
excessive but not obstructive seem properly punishable when the
whole pattern of instances obstructs a proceeding. Thus, for example,
interrupting the judge once or refusing to sit down when ordered to do
so might not be per se obstructive. But as part of a pattern of similar
conduct, including such behavior as evading questions from the court,
badgering witnesses, being disrespectful, and stationing a stenographer
alongside the official court reporter, all during a single two-hour hear-
ing, the conduct becomes contemptuous.25
A pattern of misbehavior also may allow a court to draw an infer-
ence of wrongful intent more readily than an isolated occurrence of
offensive behavior. Despite the fervent emotionality of many trials,
litigants and especially attorneys must maintain some degree of con-
trol over emotional excesses such as shouting, disrespect, and refusal
to stop arguing. At some point, repeated violations of that norm of
composure are no longer excusable. Indeed, even conduct for which a
contemnor is not cited for contempt may fairly be considered by the
court in determining the intent of contemptuous conduct.252 How-
ever, inference of wrongful intent may be justifiable only where the
obstructive qualities of the behavior are clear or where the judge has
warned the actor not to continue. In the absence of one of these fac-
tors, the contemnor may have a reasonable basis for believing that her
conduct is not contumacious.
251. Many cases have upheld contempt findings for patterns of misbehavior where many of
the individual acts making up the pattern would be unlikely to be considered contemptuous by
themselves. See, e.g., United States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d 1017, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (when
attempts to confuse the court by repeated interruptions and diversions regarding irrelevant
matters failed, defendant resorted to insults in the judge's presence, including characterizing the
proceeding as an "inquisition," stating that the judge was guilty of dereliction of his duty and
should be indicted, and anti-Semitic references to opposing counsel, accompanied by a raised
voice and an "insolent, belligerent display"); In re Stanley, 102 N.J. 244, 507 A.2d 1168 (1986)
(pattern of laughing, smirking, and pointing finger at judge, coupled with sarcastic comments
held contemptuous).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
855 (1986):
Although courts cannot uphold the contempt if the cited conduct is not contumacious but
other uncited conduct is or has been, [Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698-99 (1974)],
a court can nevertheless look at the cited conduct in the context of other closely related
behavior in the case to determine if that conduct is in fact contumacious.
See also Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d at 1025-26 & n.7; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir.
1972) (the trial judge was aware that defendant had done many things to the trial judge in other
proceedings for which defendant was not issued a contempt citation), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th




G. Immediacy and Persistence of Defiance
The immediate refusal to obey direct and repeated orders of the
court often has the flavor of open challenge and defiance of the judge's
authority and ability to control the proceeding.253 It is one thing to
try to avoid an adverse evidentiary ruling with a new theory of admis-
sibility, or to make a mildly sarcastic or disrespectful comment, and
quite another to immediately disobey an unambiguous order of the
court. This distinction probably accounts in large part for cases
upholding contempt convictions for conduct that would otherwise
seem to interfere only slightly with the court's business.254
Where advocacy is involved, however, there must be some latitude
for an attorney to argue with the judge in order to attempt to change
the judge's mind. That is why some courts appropriately distinguish
between threats by attorneys to disobey the court and actual defi-
ance. 25 5 Of course, even threats to disobey the court, attempts to per-
suade a judge to retract a ruling, and objections or offers of proof to
protect the record are often in defiance of court orders to remain
silent. And although attorneys need some room to protest,256 when it
appears that the court is adamant in its repeated demand, persistent
refusal to comply can indeed become obstructive and can fairly be
deemed intentional.257
253. See, eg., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975) (summary contempt
conviction of recalcitrant witness justified because the "face-to-face refusal to comply with the
court's order itself constituted an affront to the court"); In re McDonald, 819 F.2d 1020, 1025
(11th Cir. 1987) (affirming contempt conviction of attorney because his "face-to-face refusal to
comply with the court's order" created an actual obstruction of justice).
254. See, eg., People v. Boynton, 154 Mich. App. 245, 247, 397 N.W.2d 191, 193 (1986)
(affirming contempt conviction of attorney who continued to argue with judge in an apparent
attempt to understand the scope of an order, despite warnings to stop arguing and a threat of
contempt), appeal denied, 426 Mich. 878 (1986); State ex rel Smith v. District Court, 210 Mont.
344, 677 P.2d 589 (1984) (upholding contempt conviction of attorney who refused to obey
several successive orders to sit down); State v. Goeller, 263 N.W.2d 135 (N.D. 1978) (two
criminal defendants during a short arraignment repeatedly giggled, laughed, and smirked at the
judge, despite numerous orders to cease). In most cases like these, because the only obstructive
conduct involved is the contemnors' defiance of the court's authority, the need for any use of the
contempt power could have been avoided with little detriment to the administration of justice,
had the court not insisted on such tight control to begin with.
255. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
256. See, eg., In re Sanborn, 208 Kan. 4, 490 P.2d 598, 608 (1971). The Sanborn court
reversed the contempt conviction of a prosecuting attorney for continuing to argue about a
ruling after being ordered to stop. The court noted that it did not see "hostility or defiance
toward the court on [the attorney's] part, anything abusive or insulting, [or] undue persistence in
opposing any ruling. . . ." Id (Emphasis added).
257. See, eg., Boynton, 397 N.W.2d at 193. The Boynton court affirmed the contempt
conviction of an attorney who continued to argue with the court in an effort to understand the
judge's evidentiary ruling after several orders to stop arguing, including a threat of contempt.
Washington Law Review
The problem is that it is impossible to determine that point with any
precision. Nevertheless, as with much of the law of contempt, the
ends of the spectrum are clear. When an attorney has had ample
opportunity to argue with the court and the court is persistent in its
demand for obedience to its orders, little harm is done to the protec-
tion of valuable advocacy if an attorney's immediate defiance is pun-
ished as contempt. On the other hand, the middle range between a
court's foreclosure of any argument and counsel's disobedience of an
insistent repeated command is shadowy, at best. Conduct within that
zone should be shielded from the contempt power even if it might be
appropriate to discourage the conduct. Furthermore, trial courts
should always permit attorneys sufficient opportunity to address the
court, on the record, and avoid direct orders that would create circum-
stances in which confrontations between court and counsel are likely
to occur.
The immediacy of an individual's defiance of a court's directive can,
however, cut both ways. Where a judge is directly ordering an attor-
ney to do or stop doing something, immediate refusal to accede to the
court's command indicates an intentional flouting of judicial author-
ity. At the same time, immediate retorts to a command of silence in a
heated atmosphere can be reflexive and unintentional, and may result
solely from frustration rather than challenge. The synthesis of the
seeming contradiction rests in the recognition of the frequent need for
some cooling-off period before subjecting an attorney to the litmus test
of immediate and persistent disobedience. This partially explains why
some courts immunize mere threats of disobedience from the con-
tempt power and reverse convictions of contempt for disobeying an
order to cease2 58 or responding to a judge's provocation. 59
Conversely, conduct is considerably less obstructive where an attor-
ney disobeys a court directive not particularly important to the integ-
rity or continuity of a proceeding, some time after the order was
issued. Thus, for example, where a judge issued ground rules for a
trial that neither counsel should address each other, fail to state the
The appellate court concluded: "By the time the court declared that further discussion would
result in a contempt order,... counsel had fully advocated his position. Violation of that ruling
could not reasonably be said to have been in the name of advocacy.")
258. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text; In re Logan, 52 N.J. 475, 246 A.2d 441,
442 (1968) (reversing conviction of attorney for refusing to continue with trial after court
sustained objection to his opening statement to the jury). In Logan, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the contempt conviction because, although "the trial court correctly offered
defendant a cooling-off period," it failed to "inquire the next morning whether defendant
remained adamant... " nor "order[ed] defendant to go ahead."




grounds for all objections "succinctly" and with "perspicuity," argue a
matter after it had been ruled on by the court, or object to any ques-
tion before the question had been stated completely, and the court fur-
ther warned counsel that any violation of the rules would be treated as
contempt, more than one hundred transgressions of these rules
throughout the course of trial by one attorney were not deemed by the
appellate court to be sufficiently obstructive or intentional as to consti-
tute contempt.26 ° Courts cannot command the level of exquisite con-
trol needed by an attorney to avoid the inadvertent violation of orders
like these; such control, if it is achievable at all, can come only at the
expense of attorneys wholly shifting their concentration from the sub-
stance to the form of a trial, and cultivating an air of emotional
detachment antithetical to the interests of justice.
Of course, the trial court's directives in the above-described case
were not themselves of great consequence to the proper administration
of justice. But even with respect to orders like these, the degree of
obstructiveness from an attorney disobeying them would be greater
where such defiance occurred immediately after the court's order.2 6 1
Even inadvertent conduct begins to look like willful defiance of
authority once it is pointed out by the court and the attorney is
ordered to cease. On the other hand, an attorney's failure to obey a
court's order might be contemptuous months after the order was
given, if the directive addressed a critical issue in the trial, such as the
admissibility of prior offenses in a criminal case. Control over the
handling of potentially prejudicial information can reasonably be
expected of all attorneys, because the processes for and consequences
of revealing the information require great deliberateness.
H. The Nature or Seriousness of the Issue or the Case
The importance of a particular issue in a case and the gravity of the
case as a whole are factors that should influence both the scope of
permissible advocacy and what lapses of decorum are excusable.
Surely, for example, an attorney fighting to keep her client from being
executed should be permitted greater leeway of advocacy without fear
of contempt, than counsel challenging a traffic ticket.262 Or should
260. See People v. Kurz, 35 Mich. App. 643, 192 N.W.2d 594 (1971).
261. This is especially true where, as in the hypothetical, the attorney would have the
opportunity to object or argue after opposing counsel's question was completed.
262. Undoubtedly, the seriousness of the underlying issues in the case and the corresponding
pressures on the advocates partly explains why a disproportionate percentage of contempt
citations occur in serious criminal, political, and civil rights trials. See Raveson, supra note 2, at
583 nn.346--4, 587 n.362 and accompanying text.
823
Washington Law Review
she? On the one hand, where the consequences to the litigants or to
society as a whole-as in, for example, class action civil rights cases-
are momentous, attorneys must have the greatest flexibility in arguing
for their causes. On the other hand, precisely because these issues are
critical, it is extremely important that they be decided correctly.
Thus, to the extent that expanding the limits of advocacy by limit-
ing the reach of the contempt power interferes with the deliberative
processes of the trial, the importance of the case may militate against a
more cramped scope of the contempt power. When the arguably con-
temptuous conduct affects only the routine order of a proceeding and
not the truth-finding processes, however, there is no interference with
correct disposition of the issues. In those circumstances, when impor-
tant questions are at stake, the reasons justifying heightened tolerance
for excesses of advocacy are not undercut by the possibility of preju-
dice to the proper outcome of the case.
Furthermore, even where excessive advocacy may pose a risk of
prejudice to the deliberative processes of justice, the interests of both
parties-and therefore the interests in the correct disposition of the
case-are not necessarily symmetrical. For example, in criminal
cases, the burdens of proof and the constitutional rights afforded
defendants are designed to ensure that error is weighted against con-
viction. In criminal actions, some of the constitutional protections to
which defendants are entitled protect a vigorousness of advocacy that
at times transcends the normal rules of trial practice. The due process,
compulsory process, and confrontation clauses all have been read at
times to permit a criminal defense to override longstanding rules of
advocacy governing other aspects of the trial process.263 The policies
embodied in these constitutional provisions also should be a factor in
delineating the zone between the limits of advocacy in criminal cases
and the corresponding reach of the contempt power.z 4
263. Considerations of fairness, the differing roles of a prosecutor and defense attorney, and
the constitutional guarantees of the sixth amendment should provide greater latitude for the
advocacy of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases. See, e.g., Weiss v. Burr, 484
F.2d 973, 980 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) ("a prosecutor ... representing the public ... should not
necessarily have all the leeway in presenting his cases that the sixth amendment... guarantees to
defense attorneys"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974); cf Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 343
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) ("The State is not entitled to the due process of law .... "),
appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 805 (1987).
264. To be sure, there are cases of great importance to the particular parties that are not
weighted on one side, such as child custody disputes or actions for large sums of money. In these
kinds of cases, there should still be greater leeway for vigorous advocacy when there is no
harmful effect upon the truth-finding function of the trial. But when excesses of advocacy
prejudice the deliberative process, no rationale favors a more limited scope of the contempt




Some cases also may be more susceptible to obstruction than
others.26 For example, a trial involving racially motivated murder
might easily be tainted by an attorney's attempts to stir any potential
of prejudice in the jury. More routinely, where the evidence in an
action is close to equipoise, the outcome of the case could be affected
more easily by attorneys making improper arguments, or revealing
inadmissible information to the jury. Other cases, such as well publi-
cized political trials in which the courtrooms are crowded, may be
more sensitive to disruption by spectators 66 than from the misconduct
of the litigants or their attorneys. 67 In the latter circumstances, how-
ever, we must exercise great care not to permit spectators to enjoy a
"heckler's veto," or inadvertently to restrain the advocacy and expres-
sion of those they support. 6 s
Momentous cases generate greater emotion.269 More ardent emo-
tions, in turn, result in more lapses of composure and decorum. These
265. The Supreme Court also has suggested that the nature of the case may affect whether
out-of-court publications present a clear and present danger of obstruction to the administration
of justice. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 378 (1947):
There is a suggestion that the case is different from Bridges v. State of Calffornia, 314 U.S.
252 (1941), in that we have here only private litigation, while in the Bridges case labor
controversies were involved, some of them being criminal cases. The thought apparently is
that the range of permissible comment is greater where the pending case generates a public
concern. The nature of the case may, of course, be relevant in determining whether the clear
and present danger test is satisfied.
266. How susceptible the audience is to incitement has sometimes been a factor that courts
consider in determining whether speech poses a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
against which the government can legislate. Se4 eg., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316-18
(1951) (speech attempting to arouse African-Americans against whites in a racially mixed crowd
not protected by the first amendment).
267. See, ag., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 370 (7th Cir. 1972) ("In determining
whether . . . disrespectful remarks so imperil the proceeding [as to constitute a material
obstruction], 'the reasonably to be expected reactions of those in the courtroom to the words or
acts under scrutiny are relevant."' (quoting Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806, 810
(7th Cir. 1961)); In re Sanborn, 208 Kan. 4, 490 P.2d 598, 609 (1971) (noting presence of
"volatile, partisan audience" as one of elements affecting balance between vigorousness of
advocacy and trial court's control).
268. An obviously better and less restrictive alternative to inhibiting the vigorousness of
advocacy in reaction to the conduct of spectators is to chastise the spectators themselves, remove
them from the courtroom, or even hold them in contempt.
269. Many commentators have explained the misconduct that frequently occurred in many of
the big political trials of the 1960s and early 1970s as intentional disruptions of the judicial
process. See, eg., Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 212-13 (1971) (lawyers
claiming theirs is a "political trial" seem to find irrelevant "rules of evidence, canons of ethics
and codes of professional conduct"). Undoubtedly, some of the excesses marking those trials
were intentional. For example, during the Chicago Seven trial, when several of the defendants
came to court dressed in judge's robes it could hardly be characterized as emotional lapse.
Nevertheless, much of the apparent misconduct in those trials was unquestionably attributable to
the importance of and deep commitment to the issues at stake.
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lapses occur not because of disrespect for the court or intent to
obstruct, but simply because the stress of a serious, lengthy trial is
bound occasionally to trigger emotional outbursts by participants.
Thus, courts should be more willing to tolerate lapses of composure in
cases where critical interests are at stake, especially when the out-
bursts do not obstruct the court's search for truth.
The special importance of some issues, such as the death penalty, is
universal. But other questions may be unusually meaningful to the
lawyers in a particular trial. For example, an attorney might become
more personally involved in a matter in which she has had a long-
standing relationship with an ongoing controversy, 27 or an attorney
might feel a heightened sense of personal responsibility on a certain
issue because of a tactical decision the attorney made, that now threat-
ens to harm the client's interests. 71 Where that kind of personal
involvement is present and objectively reasonable, a greater degree of
tolerance for emotional excesses should guide the court's use of the
contempt power.272
270. Few things are as frustrating to an attorney in a courtroom as when the attorney is
intimately familiar with the complex facts of a case but is not given a fair opportunity to convey
them adequately to the court.
271. For example, in In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990), a public defender had
entered into a stipulation with the prosecutor on behalf of his client, which provided that the
results of a polygraph test to be conducted by the state's expert would be admissible in evidence,
that the results of any other polygraph test would not be admissible, and that the defendant could
not put on another expert to refute the state's expert. Daniels had sought this stipulation because
the defendant had passed "with flying colors" a polygraph test administered by the public
defender's expert, who advised Daniels that in his long experience no one who passed so
convincingly had ever failed a subsequent test. The prosecutor agreed in return for Daniels'
stipulation that if the defendant passed the state's test, all charges would be dismissed. The
defendant failed the state's test, and this was the only evidence the jury would hear under the
terms of the stipulation. Faced with the dire consequences to his client, Daniels struggled
stubbornly with the judge to have the stipulation voided or modified. It was during the course of
argument over a number of Daniels' suggestions for ameliorating the devastating impact of the
stipulation, that after a long string of adverse rulings from the court, Daniels covered his eyes
and shook his head in frustration. He was summarily held in contempt for these gestures and
sentenced to two days in jail.
It was quite clear from the transcript of these proceedings that the vehemence of Daniels'
arguments, as well as his gestures of disappointment or disagreement, stemmed from deep
feelings of responsibility for having negotiated an agreement for his client that backfired so
terribly, and that his frustration was directed at least as much, if not more, against himself than
at the judge.
272. Of course, it will not always be obvious to a judge that the attorney is personally
involved in the manner discussed in the text. But where that kind of involvement is apparent, or
where the attorney offers such circumstances to the court in mitigation of her actions, they
should be factored into the determination of whether the conduct is contemptuous. Moreover,
the relevance of such circumstances demonstrates the necessity for holding a hearing, rather than




I Participation or Provocation by the Judge
Sometimes disrespectful or insulting remarks by counsel or a party
are provoked by the judge's own improper statements.273 In those cir-
cumstances, it hardly seems appropriate to charge the attorney with
obstructing the proceeding. Even assuming that the disrespectful
reply was obstructive, the court must bear the lion's share of responsi-
bility for obstructing the proceedings by inciting a response. On the
other hand, an argument can be made that a judge's lapse does not
justify an insulting response by counsel. But the question is not
whether a disrespectful remark made in response to provocation
should be condoned; the question is whether it is intentionally obstruc-
tive. And where the court itself has already interrupted the ritualistic
decorum of a trial by insulting a participant, a response in kind does
not have the obstructive impact that it might if made unprovoked.
Moreover, debate at trial is not like the considered argument presented
in briefs; it is spontaneous and reflexive. It is expecting too much of
any trial participant to silently suffer the abuse of the court.2 74 Such
abuse should negate the wrongful intent of counsel.2 75
Opposing counsel may also provoke attorneys or witnesses.
Although the judge normally should be the arbiter of disputes between
participants in a judicial proceeding, often the judge may be unaware
of the opposing counsel's provocation, and the offended party may be
disinclined to involve the court in a minor matter irrelevant to the
disposition of the case.2 76 Even when the court is aware of an attor-
ney's provocative behavior, little may be done to stop the conduct. In
273. Sea -g., In re Abse, 251 A.2d 655 (D.C. 1969); O'Brien v. State, 261 Wis. 470, 572, 53
N.W.2d 534, 535 (1952).
274. See, eg., In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1972) (where judge has charged
attorney in courtroom with unprofessional conduct, attorney has right to make respectful reply
despite court's order not to do so), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); Absg 251 A.2d at 656; People v. Ravitz, 26 Mich. App. 263, 182 N.W.2d 75 (1970)
(where attorney's retort to judge, for which he was held in contempt, was provoked by court's
questioning of attorney's motives in prolonging the examination of a witness, retort did not
constitute contempt); cf United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1965) (noting, in
atffrming contempt conviction of attorney for disrespectful remarks, that the trial court had
"infinite patience" and "did not engage in wrangling or bickering with counsel"), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1003 (1966).
275. Where a response greatly exceeds the provocation, however, contempt may well be
appropriate. No verbal abuse by the court, for example, should give carte blanche to any
individual to respond with physical violence, or a prolonged tirade.
276. For example, I was told by co-counsel for the defendant in a highly publicized criminal
trial that the senior defense attorney continually made derogatory remarks under his breath to
the less-experienced prosecuting attorney, who refrained from "telling" the judge because he did
not want to appear to need the court's intervention.
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these circumstances, there must be some recognition of greater justifi-
cation for behavioral excesses by the provoked attorney.
In addition, the errors of a trial judge, or opposing counsel, may
obligate an attorney to reply in an effort to protect the client's inter-
ests.2 77 There, too, an attorney's advocative response to the potential
threat to a trial's fairness makes conduct that might, in other circum-
stances, seem excessive or obstructive, appropriate or at least not
contemptuous.278
Subtler than actual provocation by a judge, the participation of the
court in heated argument or barbed repartee-the willingness to "slug
it out" with counsel-also should be considered in determining
whether obstruction has occurred. A judge can encourage excesses of
advocacy by setting a tone that permits excessive argumentation or
sarcastic banter.279 A judge's consenting participation in that kind of
give and take should be viewed as actually raising the limits on the
kind of expression that is permitted in the proceeding and therefore as
constricting the reach of the contempt power 2 0 to punish such
conduct.28
J. The Inadequacy of Appellate Review
It has been suggested that the potential inadequacy of an appellate
remedy may raise the value of trial advocacy as compared to other
interests of the administration of justice.28 2 It is often difficult to pre-
dict during the tumult of a trial whether appellate review is likely to be
277. See, e.g., Moore v. Reynolds, 63 N.C. App. 160, 303 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1983).
278. See supra note 138.
279. See, e.g., In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1972) (when trial court coupled
numerous directives to cease argument with rejoinder or a statement that calls for a response by
the attorneys, the attorneys' replies cannot subsequently be viewed as contemptuous violations of
the orders), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
280. Although the Seventh Circuit in Dellinger recognized that counsel's retort, in violation
of an order to remain silent, in response to the trial court's provocation was proper if respectful,
461 F.2d at 399, it also concluded that "impropriety on the part of the trial judge cannot justify
or excuse contemptuous conduct." 461 F.2d at 401. Instead, such judicial provocation should
be considered only "in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of any penalty." Id.
Dellinger is certainly correct that an egregiously disrespectful rejoinder to a provocative
comment by the court should not be insulated from the contempt power. The court, however,
fails to recognize that the same fluidity in the obstruction standard that requires us to treat some
violations of court orders as non-contemptuous also permits flexibility of the standard where the
judge is antagonizing and provoking counsel.
281. Indications of provocation by the judge not only should restrict the substantive reach of
the contempt power, but also demonstrate a level of personal embroilment or lack of objectivity
that should preclude the judge from trying any contempt summarily. See, e.g., Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (reversing and remanding summary contempt conviction where judge
who heard the case had become personally embroiled with attorney throughout course of trial).
282. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 566-79.
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Advocacy and Contempt
effective as to a particular issue. Indeed, that is a significant factor in
choosing to afford greater leeway to advocacy in the trial court.
Nevertheless, on some occasions it is clear that appellate review can-
not provide a sufficient remedy for trial court error. This inadequacy
can stem from vesting in the trial court discretion to decide certain
questions that are unlikely to be reversed because of deferential stan-
dards of review. Alternatively, there simply may be no time to appeal,
or the specific issue might not be cognizable by an appellate court.2" 3
For example, in Thomas v. Collins,2" 4 the Supreme Court reversed a
contempt conviction on first amendment grounds where the defendant
had violated a judicial injunction served several hours before the
enjoined speech was scheduled. When an attorney is in court, fighting
the issuance of such a restraining order, knowing that there is no time
for further review, greater latitude for advocative expression and
breaches of order and decorum should be tolerated. In such cases, the
need for attorneys to fully argue their causes and engage in searching
dialogue with the judge, combined with the increased likelihood of
emotional stress, justifies allowing advocacy to interfere more with
competing values of justice.28 5
283. See eg., In re Abse, 251 A.2d 655 (D.C. 1969) (attorney charged by trial judge with
unprofessional conduct insisted upon right to answer charges until he was held in contempt);
People v. Harrington, 301 1I1. App. 185, 21 N.E.2d 903 (1939) (holding it proper for an attorney
to interrupt unrelated judicial proceedings in order to make emergency applications in another
action).
284. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
285. There is an interesting structural relationship among the degree of latitude that should
be afforded trial court advocacy, the availability of appellate review prior to violation of a court
order, and a contemnor's ability to challenge the validity of a court order in a contempt
proceeding for violation of the order. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), discussed
above, the Supreme Court reversed a contempt conviction for an admitted violation of a
restraining order, by treating the injunction as an unconstitutional application of a state statute
requiring a permit prior to soliciting membership in a union, pursuant to which the injunction
was granted. Although the Court did not rely on the unavailability of further judicial review of
the injunction to justify reversal of the contempt conviction, one commentator suggests two
reasons that Thomas does not stand for the proposition that a contemnor may always challenge
the constitutional validity of a statute's application in a contempt proceeding. See Kuhns,
Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power. New Roles for the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73
MICH. L. REv. 483, 507 n.114 (1975). First, it was suggested in a later case, by the author of the
plurality opinion in Thomas, that the result in Thomas was largely in response to the
unavailability of judicial review. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 351-52 (1947)
(Rutledge J., dissenting). Second, after Thomas, the Court did not permit a contemnor who
violated a valid registration ordinance that had been unconstitutionally applied to him to raise
the invalid application as a defense to the contempt. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953). In Poulos, although the Court did not explicitly rely on the fact that the defendant had
time to seek judicial review of a permit denial, the Court implied that was a factor in its
reasoning. The Court has in various contexts suggested that the unavailability of judicial review
makes it appropriate to consider the validity of the underlying proscription in a contempt
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V. INTENT
Although few statutes expressly include wrongful intent as an ele-
ment of contempt, the vast majority of contempt decisions require
some form of intent to obstruct.286 A number of these impose the
further requirement that intent be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
as a matter of constitutional mandate.287 Courts and commentators
have argued strongly about two issues with respect to the role of intent
in contempt cases: first, whether there must be an explicit finding of
wrongful intent;288 and second, whether the standard of intent should
be subjective-requiring that the contemnor actually intended the act
to obstruct the judicial process or at a minimum was aware that her
proceeding for violating the order. See Kuhns, supra; see, e.g., Carroll v. President & Commrs.
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 692-93 (1962), discussed
in, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 n.6 (majority opinion), 332-33 n.9 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting), and in, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 517, 522 (1968); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love,
252 U.S. 331, 337 (1920); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906).
Where a contemnor is permitted to challenge the validity of an underlying proscription in a
contempt proceeding for violation of a court order because pre-violation review is unavailable,
the need for allowing advocacy to override competing values of otherwise equal weight is
arguably lessened. Under these circumstances, however, a contemnor would at least have to be
aware that a post-violation challenge to the prohibition was permissible, in order to avoid the
deterrence of protected expression. Unfortunately, the availability of post-violation review of the
validity of an underlying court order in a contempt proceeding is not widespread or predictable,
especially where the order originates with the court itself rather than being issued to enforce a
statute. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
More importantly, protected expression is likely to be inhibited even where the validity of an
underlying proscription can be raised as a defense in a contempt hearing. If the prohibition in
question is found to be proper on its face and as applied, intentional violation of the prohibition
will generally be considered contemptuous. There are few situations where a contemnor is given
a second chance after violation of a court order to comply with the order and annul a criminal
contempt citation, after the validity of the order has been upheld. See id. Therefore, the need for
greater leeway in advocating, where pre-violation judicial review or appeal is not available or will
be ineffective, remains important.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir. 1972) (noting that virtually
every decision under the federal contempt statute, which contains no intent requirement,
mandates some finding of wrongful intent); In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38, 46 (1961)
(although state contempt statute does not make intent an element, contempt "must be knowing
and willful and evidence an intent to flout the authority of the Court").
287. See, e.g., Hawk v. Cardoza, 575 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1978) ("We infer that fourteenth
amendment due process ... does demand some showing of intent for conviction of criminal
contempt."). However, a number of courts often disregard the need to prove intent, or appear to
be unaware that intent may even be an issue. See Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A
Suggestion that Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S.
CAL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1966).
288. Compare Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (where "clearly
blameworthy" conduct is at issue, "a finding of contumacious intent is not always a prerequisite
to a contempt conviction" under the federal statute), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956) with




conduct probably was obstructive,289 or objective-requiring merely
that the contemnor should have known the conduct was obstruc-
tive.2 90 The debate is an important one. Its importance, however, lies
not simply in resolving the question in isolation, but in understanding
its integral relationship to two other issues-the role intent plays in
actually defining whether conduct is obstructive, and the practical
problems of proving specific intent in the context of contempt.
The actor's intent is a necessary part of determining whether the
administration of justice has been obstructed. For example, where an
attorney arguing with the court is engaged in good faith efforts to
represent a client, as opposed to gratuitously insulting the judge, the
attorney's conduct should be subject to greater insulation from the
contempt power. This additional protection derives both from the sal-
utary rather than wrongful intent of the lawyer, and from the positive
effects, or at least the lack of serious harm, to justice. Indeed, whether
expression is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action" is, along with the possibility of producing such harm, a key to
determining whether speech is protected generally under the clear and
present danger test.291 But the "direction" of expression and the spe-
cific intent of the actor neither share an identity nor are wholly
independent. They are both indicators of the propriety of an attorney's
conduct-whether behavior is productive or destructive to the admin-
istration of justice.
Consider, for example, an attorney who makes a clearly irrelevant
and highly prejudicial argument to the jury, or who absolutely refuses
to stop arguing with the judge despite repeated, insistent orders to
cease. Surely these are the kinds of misconduct, when sufficiently
egregious, that should be punished as contempt, even if the attorney
honestly but mistakenly believes that she is aiding the administration
289. See, eg., Falstaff Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 782 (9th Cir. 1983)
(m cases of criminal contempt, willful disobedience must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
and "willful" means deliberate or intentional violations); In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) ("Knowledge that one's act is wrongful and a purpose to nevertheless do the act are
prerequisites to criminal contempt, as to most other crimes."); United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d
415, 418 (7th Cir. 1965) (noting absence of "positive evidence of a deliberate intent to pursue a
course of improper argument or prohibited conduct").
290. See, eg., United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 368 (7th Cir. 1972). Some courts have gone so far as to conclude that it is
sufficient if the contemnor's actions were volitional, that is, the conduct was not accidental. See,
eg., United States v. Polizzi, 323 F. Supp. 222, 226 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 450 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.
1971); Currie v. Schwalbach, 132 Wis. 2d 29, 390 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Ct. App. 1986) (it is the
conduct which must be intentional, not its effect upon the proceedings), aff'd, 139 Wis. 2d 544,
407 N.W.2d 862 (1987).
291. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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of justice and has no intention of obstructing it.29 2 It is not rare for
attorneys who conduct themselves in this manner to believe that they
are acting within the bounds of legitimate advocacy and not intending
to obstruct the proceeding.293 Yet, with a purely subjective test of
intent, assuming that a court could know the actual intent of the
offending individual, such conduct would be immune from the con-
tempt power. This is undoubtedly the unstated premise that calls for
an objective standard of intent in contempt cases.
On the other hand, if the intent standard is purely objective, impos-
ing liability whenever the actor should have known that conduct was
obstructive, the ease with which wrongful intent might be inferred
from a finding of obstruction essentially negates intent as a meaningful
element of the offense.294 This is a particularly serious problem in
contempt cases. There really is no way of proving wrongful intent in a
contempt case other than by imputing it from the conduct itself; there
rarely is any other evidence upon which to base a finding of intent. In
contrast, with most other crimes, a defendant is often engaged in acts
leading up to the commission of the crime itself that might demon-
strate intent. In addition, the manner in which many crimes are com-
mitted might tend to prove that the actor performed the act
willfully.295
With contempt, however, the conduct at issue is an attorney's spon-
taneous reaction to events taking place in the courtroom and involves
no preparation or premeditation. Sometimes the trial judge can rely
on such things as prior warnings that an attorney's conduct was bor-
292. On the other hand, some courts have even held contemptuous the repeated assertion of
apparently valid objections after the court orders counsel to refrain from making them. See, e.g.,
United States v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1938). Although such contempt
convictions arguably can be based on disobedience of the court's directives, presumably,
regardless of intent, wholly proper advocacy should not be deemed contemptuous.
293. According to one commentator, contempt "might be regarded as willful only if the
defendant intended both to violate the injunction and to express defiance in doing so." Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 263 (1971).
294. Virtually all cases hold that the requisite criminal intent can be inferred from the
contemnor's actions. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir. 1972); People
v. Siegel, 94 Ill. 2d 167, 445 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1983).
295. For example, if a defendant defends against a charge of arson by claiming accident, a
prosecutor might counter the defense, and prove an intent to commit the act, by introducing:
evidence of the defendant's prior threats against the resident of the razed home; a history of
animosity between the defendant and the resident; receipts demonstrating the defendant's
purchase of accelerants or other materials used to set the fire; a witness who heard the defendant
make incriminating statements; an expert who could determine from the way the fire spread that




dering on the contemptuous, 296 a specific court order prohibiting the
conduct engaged in, or a contemporaneous comment by the contem-
nor shedding some light on the contemnor's intent. However even
where these indicators exist, they often do not themselves demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to obstruct justice. The contem-
nor may have honestly and justifiably believed that the conduct was
necessary to protect the client's interests, and had to be done in the
interests, of justice in spite of, not because of the fact that it violated a
court's order or might offend the judge.2 9 7
Indeed, even with respect to a subjective standard of intent, courts
can only impute intent from the conduct in question.2 98 Once a court
determines that conduct is obstructive, and that the acts in question
are volitional, it is not difficult to conclude that an attorney intended
the outcome of her specific actions. This is particularly true for attor-
neys, as opposed to lay persons, because attorneys are charged with
knowledge of acceptable standards of courtroom conduct. Thus, any
deviation from those standards by an attorney may be considered
intentionally obstructive. Moreover, to the extent that the contem-
nor's subjective intent is at issue, adjudicating the charge in a sum-
mary proceeding makes it impossible for the court to consider any
other evidence on intent, or for the accused to present an adequate
defense to rebut the presumption of wrongful intent.299 Conversely, if
296. See, eg., In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (en bane); State v. Goeller, 263
N.W.2d 135 (N.D. 1978). But see In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1972) (circuit
court reversed numerous contempt citations against attorneys for refusing to stop arguing and to
be seated after repeated orders of the trial court to do so), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974),
cer. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
297. Cf Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (applying subjective standard
of intent in equal protection challenge: discriminatory purpose implies that the decision-maker
acted at least "because of," not merely "in spite of" its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group).
298. Often the practice of permitting a contemnor to demonstrate in a summary proceeding
that she did not act with the requisite mens rea appears to shift the burden of proof on an
essential element of the crime. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Moreover, it is at
best questionable whether the judge, after charging the attorney with contempt, can fairly
determine whether the defendant has dispelled the judge's previous assumption of criminal
intent. Courts sometimes consider the contemnor's efforts to defend the contemnor's actions, or
even her silence, as opposed to an apology to the court, as probative evidence of the defendant's
wrongful intent at the time of the original conduct. See, ag., In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550,
530 A.2d 1260, 1280-81 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990).
299. Several commentators have suggested that it is a contradiction in terms to permit
summary adjudications of contempt, while declaring mental state to be an element of the offense.
The use of summary hearings is premised on the assumption that the judge saw and heard all of
the elements of contemptuous conduct, but because neither good faith nor an intent to commit
contumacious conduct may be perceived by the judge, it must be inferred from conduct. See
Note, Criminal Law-Contempt-Conduct of Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 329, 347-48.
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intent is not recognized as a vital element of contempt that may
require proof, courts will frequently resort to summary procedures
when a full evidentiary hearing is in order.
Inferring wrongful intent beyond a reasonable doubt is terribly dif-
ficult in any contempt case where the conduct in question does not
flagrantly violate the established rules of practice or commands of the
court.3"° As discussed earlier, the division between the most aggres-
sive advocacy tolerable and the minor excesses resulting from such
advocacy is very uncertain. Even a judge's order or warning does not
necessarily state the limits beyond which the contempt power properly
lies in wait. Thus, the practice of inferring wrongful intent from a
finding of obstruction, like the inappropriate and haphazard applica-
tion of the obstruction standard itself, has a powerful deterrent effect
on zealous representation. °1
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Seale3 2 and In re Dellin-
ger30 3 seemed to recognize implicitly some of these tensions. The
court concluded that "an attorney possesses the requisite intent only if
he knows or reasonably should be aware in view of all the circum-
stances, especially the heat of controversy, that he is exceeding the
outermost limits of his proper role and hindering rather than facilitat-
ing the search for truth. '' 3 ' This standard recognizes the needs of the
court, by incorporating an objective measure of intent. It also safe-
guards aggressive advocacy by recognizing that attorneys' obligations
to represent clients, as well as the pressurized atmosphere of trial prac-
tice, must be factored into any determination of whether lawyers
intend to be obstructive or are unintentionally carried too far by the
300. The conduct in question can be so egregious as to leave no doubt of the wrongful intent
of the actor (except, that is, as to mental capacity, see, e.g., Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29,
30-31 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing criminal contempt conviction and remanding for hearing
on criminal responsibility of contemnor)). Some courts have even dispensed with the intent
requirement altogether. See, e.g., Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
351 U.S. 988 (1956). In Offutt, the court held that if a contemnor's comments were insolent and
insulting in a way that constituted "misbehavior" in the course of a trial, "there would be no
need to make special inquiry into intent, except as to mitigation." Id. at 72. Offutt at least noted,
however, that where conduct is not "clearly blameworthy," proof of intent is still required. Id.
301. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 28 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1928) (punishing conduct
"where the intent to be insubordinate is not clear, might very well have the result of deterring an
attorney of less courage and experience from doing his full duty to his client").
302. 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
303. 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975).
304. Id. at 400. Other courts have also adopted this formula. See, e.g., Hawk v. Cardoza,
575 F.2d 732, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1977);
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498, 510 (3d Cir. 1977),




heat of the moment. This standard also appears to acknowledge the
distinction discussed earlier between misconduct that interferes with
the truth-finding function of a trial, and that which "facilitates the
search for truth," or at least does not hinder it.
The problem with this standard, however, is that it fails to account
adequately for the substantial likelihood that courts, having initially
determined that an attorney's conduct is sufficiently obstructive to
level a contempt charge, will not pause to consider independently
whether the lawyer could reasonably have been unaware that the con-
duct was wrongful."' This is particularly true because many of the
factors that would tend to indicate or dispel the presence of wrongful
intent are also probative of whether conduct should be adjudged
obstructive. For example, a court's warning to an attorney to cease
certain behavior helps establish that the transgression of the court's
command was intentionally obstructive. Similarly, where a lawyer
engages in a pattern of misconduct, wrongful intent is more readily
inferable from the behavior. At the same time, however, these vari-
ables help establish whether the conduct constitutes obstruction. But
in doing so, in facilitating the balance of the competing interests
involved and helping to measure any damage to the administration of
justice, these and many of the other factors suggested in the previous
section already account in large part for the intent of the actor. This is
so because the obstructiveness of certain misconduct-interference
with the courts' interests in respect and obedience and with the func-
tion of the judge's role in a trial-should be affected by whether the
conduct at issue is intentionally wrongful or results from a good faith
effort to advocate.30 6 Conduct should not be considered obstructive
unless it evidences substantial indicia of wrongful intent. Conversely,
305. Thus, for example, numerous opinions affirm contempt convictions of attorneys for
continuing legal argument or objections after a court's ruling, despite fervent and, for the most
part, probably honest remonstrances of good faith. See, eg., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1
(1952); United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966);
In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1965). Nevertheless, a few courts have concluded that
despite an attorney's obstructive conduct, there was insufficient evidence of wrongful intent to
support a contempt conviction. See, eg., United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.
1965) (although counsel made misstatements of material fact and improper inferences to jury in
closing argument, contempt conviction reversed because "[p]ositive evidence of a deliberate
intent to pursue a course of improper argument or prohibited conduct [was] absent").
306. See Raveson, supra note 2, at 561 n.292 and accompanying text; In re Ungar, 160 N.J.
Super. 322, 332-33, 389 A.2d 995 (App. Div. 1978) (because purpose of criminal contempt is to
"'punish an offender for his affront to government,' " lack of wrongful intent is probative in the
determination of obstruction (quoting In re Carton, 48 N.J. 9, 222 A.2d 92, 98 (App. Div.
1978)).
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what we consider to be good faith or criminal intent depends on how
we define the limits of proper advocacy.
Therefore, the necessity of establishing wrongful intent will inevita-
bly be structured into any accurate calculus for determining the divi-
sion between protected advocacy and punishable contempt. Indeed,
given the ease with which a court can impute illicit intent from a find-
ing of obstruction, and the practical inability to prove or disprove
actual intent in any other manner, the only effective way of giving
expression to the important policies underlying the requirement that
intent be an element of contempt-the promotion of vigorous advo-
cacy by preventing the punishment of mistaken but unintentional
excesses-is to incorporate those protections into the substantive stan-
dards for defining obstruction.30 7
This Article has attempted to incorporate an objective standard of
intent, such as that articulated in Dellinger, in the selection of vari-
ables for determining whether conduct is obstructive, with the critical
addition of a buffer zone that insulates valuable advocacy from the
contempt power. This combination of an objective intent standard
and the creation of adequate breathing room for advocacy protects the
administration of justice from the use of a purely subjective intent test
in circumstances where the specific purpose of obstructing the pro-
ceeding often is virtually impossible to prove. This combination also
protects the interests of attorneys and their clients by insuring that the
measure of whether conduct is obstructive is sufficiently objective-
representing an egregious departure from the norms of trial practice
which can not be addressed by any less drastic alternative-that it is
fair to impute wrongful intent from obstructive conduct itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
A colleague of mine recently wrote that both physicists and legal
scholars search for "elegant" theories to explain the phenomena or
concepts they strive to express. 30 "An 'elegant theory' "he writes, "is
not, as one might surmise, filled with complicated equations but is,
instead, the simplest possible explanation of the phenomenon in ques-
tion. ' 30 9 The simplest, perhaps the only, satisfactory explanation of
contempt is "obstruction of the administration of justice." However,
the simplicity of this definition is deceptive. As this Article explains,
307. This idea is reflected in an incipient fashion by a number of opinions noting that
"formulations of the requisite intent [in contempt cases] cannot be expected to be uniform in all
contexts." See United States v. Smith, 555 F.2d 249, 252 (9th Cir. 1977).





we can only determine whether the processes of justice have been
obstructed by balancing competing values of our judicial system. The
need for this balancing process is both most evident and most neces-
sary where the conduct at issue is that of an attorney representing a
client at trial.
Because the values underlying our adversary system are themselves
diffuse, and because the contempt power exists to protect the very
interests that may be threatened by its misuse, the calculus for deter-
mining whether an obstruction has occurred is frequently complex.
This complexity is reflected in the number of variables that must be
considered in determining whether conduct is sufficiently obstructive
to constitute contempt. Thus, the elegance of the theories discussed
here can only be measured by their inelegance. As William Blake said,
"the road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom."31
The application of these factors delineates the contempt power with
far greater precision than any definition can. However, because the
variables involved are numerous, it is often difficult for an attorney to
know with mathematical certainty before the fact whether specific
behavior will be deemed contemptuous. Therefore, aggressive advo-
cacy can only be protected from the deterrent effect of this inexact
power if courts fashion a buffer zone around valued advocative expres-
sion. The same variables that determine whether an obstruction has
occurred trace the contours of that insulating zone.
310. W. Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in MAJOR BRITISH POETS OF THE
ROMANTIC PERIOD (W. Heath ed. 1973).
